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Comment
Trust Betrayed: The Reluctance to Recognize
Judicially Enforceable Trust Obligations Under the
Indian Health Care Improvement Act (IHCIA)
Lauren E. Schneider*
The federal trust doctrine developed out of the legal relationship between
European sovereigns—and later, the United States government—and
American Indian tribes. By signing treaties with Indian tribes, the settler
governments entered into an ongoing relationship with sovereign tribal
governments. The United States government has a duty to fulfill the promises
inherent in these treaties, including the provision of such services as health
care to Indian tribes. The trust doctrine embodies these obligations.
When Congress legislates with respect to American Indians and Indian
tribes for the provision of services, such as the Indian Health Care
Improvement Act of 1976 (IHCIA), Congress acts in fulfillment of its historic
trust obligations. But the Indian Health Service (IHS) is drastically
underfunded. Patients go without critical care. Hospitals cannot keep their
doors open. Tribes have sought to enjoin the U.S. government to provide
necessary health care under the trust doctrine and the IHCIA. This Comment
* J.D. Candidate, Loyola University Chicago School of Law, 2022. I want to acknowledge my
personal complicity in the ongoing denial of justice to American Indian tribes and indigenous peoples and my family’s historical connection to Indian land dispossession. My ancestor William Wilson Larimer, the great-grandfather of my mother’s mother, purchased a tract of land from the
United States government on March 16, 1882, in what settlers called Washington Territory. He
homesteaded on this land, located in Snohomish County, Washington. It was later named Larimer’s
Corner, a name it carries to this day. His direct descendants, my mother’s family, lived in
Snohomish County continuously from 1882 until my grandmother’s death in 2018. Only about
thirteen miles from Larimer’s Corner and twenty-seven years earlier, on January 22, 1855, the Native peoples and tribes of the greater Puget Sound region were coerced into signing the Treaty of
Point Elliott, dispossessing them of their ancestral lands and forcing their removal to reservations
designated by the federal government. In exchange for their lands, the treaty promised that the
United States would pay the represented tribes $150,000 over ten years. It also promised “to employ
a physician . . ., who shall furnish medicine and advice to their sick . . . .” Many promises made in
the treaty to tribal leaders were not fulfilled. The lands that now comprise Snohomish County,
Washington, are the ancestral homelands of the contemporary Tulalip Tribes, including the Duwamish, Snohomish, Snoqualmie, Skagit, Suiattle, Samish, and Stillaguamish people. My family
settled on the stolen lands of the ancestors of the people of the Tulalip Tribes, and I benefit directly
and indirectly from this historic dispossession.
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analyzes divergent approaches in the Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts of
Appeals regarding the judicial enforceability of federal trust obligations
under the IHCIA. This Comment argues that, in recent years, the Supreme
Court has interpreted the trust doctrine and its enforceability under statutes
too narrowly to be compatible with the trust doctrine’s federal common law
principles. Finally, this Comment proposes that a broader interpretation of
judicially enforceable trust obligations inherent in statutes like the IHCIA
would be more faithful to original common law principles, align with human
rights and indigenous peoples’ rights principles under international law,
and initiate long overdue restorative justice for American Indians.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Rosebud Hospital, a thirty-five-bed medical facility, is the primary
health care provider for members of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe.1 It serves
approximately 35,000 Rosebud Sioux living on or around the Rosebud
Indian Reservation in South Dakota.2 It is also the only provider of
emergency medical services within a roughly forty-five-mile radius.3 The
1. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OEI-06-17-00270,
ROSEBUD HOSPITAL: INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE MANAGEMENT OF EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT
CLOSURE AND REOPENING 1 (2019) [hereinafter ROSEBUD HOSPITAL CASE STUDY]; see also Rosebud Service Unit, INDIAN HEALTH SERV., https://www.ihs.gov/Rosebud/ [https://perma.cc/U32YXMTM] (last visited Apr. 9, 2021) (describing Rosebud Hospital and its role in the community).
Rosebud Hospital, along with many other IHS hospitals on rural Indian reservations, has suffered
for years from inadequate funding, insufficient staffing, high turnover in leadership, and citations
from federal regulators for unsafe conditions at facilities. See generally Dan Frosch & Christopher
Weaver, ‘People Are Dying Here’: Federal Hospitals Fail Tribes, WALL ST. J. (July 7, 2017,
10:16 AM), https://www.wsj.articles/people-are-dying-here-federal-hospitals-fail-native-americans-1499436974 [https://perma.cc/SQK4-SBEC].
2. ROSEBUD HOSPITAL CASE STUDY, supra note 1, at 2; Rosebud Service Unit, supra note 1.
Rosebud Hospital provides a range of health care services, including obstetric, dental, pediatric,
and emergency services. ROSEBUD HOSPITAL CASE STUDY, supra note 1, at 2.
3. See ROSEBUD HOSPITAL CASE STUDY, supra note 1, at 1 (noting that when Rosebud’s emergency room closed, patients were forced to travel to the next-nearest emergency rooms, forty-five
and fifty-five miles away); see also Dana Ferguson, Feds Again Probe Problems at Government-

1102

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 52

Indian Health Service (IHS), a division of the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS), operates Rosebud Hospital.4
In November of 2015, federal inspectors for the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) evaluated Rosebud Hospital for
compliance with safety regulations.5 CMS inspectors cited several
violations6 and deemed the hospital in “immediate jeopardy,” the most
serious deficiency categorization based on the scope of potential harm to
patients.7 On November 23, 2015, CMS sent Rosebud Hospital a notice
setting December 12, 2015, as the deadline by which the hospital had to
correct the alleged violations, or CMS would terminate its provider
agreement with the hospital.8 But on December 5, 2015, IHS unilaterally
placed Rosebud Hospital’s Emergency Department (ED) on “divert
status”—effectively closing down the reservation’s only emergency
medical services provider—and cited “staffing changes and limited
resources” in its news release of the decision.9
IHS’s decision had immediate consequences. Patients who needed
urgent medical care were diverted to hospitals in Winner, South Dakota,
Run South Dakota Hospital, ARGUS LEADER (Aug. 4, 2018, 2:05 PM), https://www.argusleader.com/story/news/politics/2018/08/04/rosebud-sioux-tribe-feds-probe-south-dakota-ihshospital-medicaid-medicare/874640002/ [https://perma.cc/9ZWM-P3AS] (noting that sick and injured patients were transported nearly an hour away when the Rosebud ED was closed).
4. ROSEBUD HOSPITAL CASE STUDY, supra note 1, at 1; see also Agency Overview, INDIAN
HEALTH SERV., https://www.ihs.gov/aboutihs/overview/ [https://perma.cc/BS43-RLLY] (last visited Apr. 9, 2021) (describing the IHS as an agency within the Department of Health and Human
Services).
5. Complaint at 10, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 3d 986 (D.S.D. 2020)
(No. 16-CV-03038). CMS regularly monitors IHS hospitals’ compliance with minimum quality
and safety standards for participation in CMS reimbursement. ROSEBUD HOSPITAL CASE STUDY,
supra note 1, at 3; see also id. at 6 (“During an onsite survey in November 2015, CMS found both
quality-of-care and operational problems across Rosebud Hospital departments and cited the hospital for noncompliance with nearly one-third (7 of 23) of the Medicare CoPs [Conditions of Participation].”).
6. Complaint, supra note 5, at 10. Specifically, the federal surveyors “identified condition-level
deficiencies related to the Governing Board, Patient Rights, QAPI program, Medical Staff, Medical
Record Service, Physical Environment, and Emergency Services” categories of the Medicare Conditions of Participation. ROSEBUD HOSPITAL CASE STUDY, supra note 1, at 6.
7. ROSEBUD HOSPITAL CASE STUDY, supra note 1, at 6. Within the Emergency Services category of the Medicare Conditions of Participation, the surveyors noted the hospital’s “failure to
provide adequate and timely treatment for four patients,” including two patients with chest pain, a
pediatric patient with possible head injury, and “a patient who delivered a pre-term baby unattended
on the ED bathroom floor.” Id.
8. Complaint, supra note 5, at 10. IHS hospitals must either be certified by CMS or accredited
by a health care accrediting organization that meets CMS’s reimbursement requirements. ROSEBUD
HOSPITAL CASE STUDY, supra note 1, at 3.
9. Complaint, supra note 5, at 11; Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 3d 986,
988–89 (D.S.D. 2020) (“On December 5, 2015, Indian Health Service (IHS) placed the Rosebud
IHS Hospital Emergency Department in Rosebud, South Dakota, on ‘divert status.’”); see also Ferguson, supra note 3 (noting that the IHS closed the Rosebud ED while trying to improve the facilities and avoid federal funding cuts, resulting in patients being transported nearly an hour away).
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and Valentine, Nebraska, about forty-five and fifty-five miles away,
respectively.10 IHS did not tell Rosebud’s staff in advance about its
decision to divert patients.11 Nor did IHS notify the receiving hospitals
of the Rosebud ED closure, so they had no time to prepare for the
additional patients.12 Several patients died in transit trying to get to
hospitals nearly an hour’s drive away.13 Rosebud Hospital’s ED
remained closed for over seven months, through July 15, 2016.14
On April 28, 2016, Rosebud Sioux Tribe sued the United States
government, HHS, and its constituent agency IHS, seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief.15 The tribe alleged that the United States
government had, through federal legislation, “undertaken the specific
trust obligation of providing health care to Indians.”16 In closing the
Rosebud Hospital ED, the tribe argued that the government had violated

10. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 992 (noting both Winner and Valentine were about
fifty miles from Rosebud); ROSEBUD HOSPITAL CASE STUDY, supra note 1, at 1; see also Ferguson,
supra note 3 (noting that sick and injured patients were transported nearly an hour away when the
Rosebud ED was closed in December 2015).
11. ROSEBUD HOSPITAL CASE STUDY, supra note 1, at 8.
12. Id.
13. Ferguson, supra note 3; see also Lisa Kaczke, Rosebud’s ER Improved After Forced 2015
Closure. It Didn’t Last, Report Shows., ARGUS LEADER (July 23, 2019, 3:36 PM), http://www.argusleader.com/story/news/2019/07/23/indian-health-service-rosebud-hospital-didnt-sustain-improvements-after-forced-closure/1803042001/ [https://perma.cc/9TSU-W7KF] (noting that the additional patients taxed the receiving hospitals’ resources). Reports suggested that the extra distance
to the hospital and the lack of preparation by the already underresourced receiving hospitals contributed to negative health outcomes. Id.; see also ROSEBUD HOSPITAL CASE STUDY, supra note 1,
at 8–12 (describing the effects of the short notice closure on other underresourced area health facilities and the consequences for patients seeking emergency services).
14. ROSEBUD HOSPITAL CASE STUDY, supra note 1, at 1; see also Kaczke, supra note 13 (noting that Rosebud’s ED remained closed for seven months after the 2015 inspection).
15. Complaint, supra note 5, at 1. The Rosebud Sioux Tribe asked the court for a declaratory
judgment requiring IHS to acknowledge that it violated federal statutes and its trust duties arising
under treaty and statutes by closing the Rosebud Hospital ED. Id. at 21–22. The tribe also asked
the court for an injunction that “(a) preliminarily and permanently forces IHS to re-open and
properly staff the emergency room at the Rosebud Hospital and enjoins IHS from further action in
closing the Rosebud Hospital’s facilities . . . ; (b) requires IHS to comply with its trust duties to the
Tribe, protect the Tribe’s entitlement to health care services, take sufficient measures to ensure
health services are provided to members of the Tribe that permit the health status of the Tribe and
its individual members to be raised to the highest possible level . . . .” Id. at 22–23.
16. Complaint, supra note 5, at 5. The tribe cited federal obligations to provide health care to
American Indians arising under the Snyder Act of 1921, 25 U.S.C. § 13; the Indian Health Care
Improvement Act of 1976 (IHCIA), 25 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.; and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA), 25 U.S.C. § 103, that permanently reauthorized the IHCIA. Id.
at 5–6. “In enacting the Snyder Act, the IHCIA, and the Affordable Care Act, Congress imposed
statutory trust duties on the United States to confer upon tribes the right to receive health care
services and a duty to protect these rights. . . . Having undertaken responsibility for Indian health
care, the United States has a statutory and fiduciary trust obligation to provide such care in a competent manner.” Id. at 6–7.
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its trust duty to provide health care services.17 The tribe claimed that it
was, therefore, entitled to a declaratory judgment acknowledging this
breach, as well as an injunction mandating IHS “to comply with its trust
duties to the Tribe, protect the Tribe’s entitlement to health care services,
and take sufficient measures to ensure that health services are provided
to members of the Tribe.”18
The tribe asserted a judicially enforceable trust obligation, originating
in the common law trust relationship between the United States
government and American Indian tribes,19 and articulated in federal
legislation, including the Indian Health Care Improvement Act of 1976
(IHCIA).20 But the IHCIA’s scope and enforceability under the federal
trust doctrine is uncertain.21 Only two federal appellate courts have
directly addressed the issue, and they reached different conclusions.22
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held in White v. Califano
that the IHCIA did create specific trust obligations for the federal
government to provide health care services for American Indians and that

17. Complaint, supra note 5, at 17; see also Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. United States, 450 F. Supp.
3d 986, 989 (D.S.D. 2020) (stating the allegations in the breach of trust action).
18. Complaint, supra note 5, at 18; see also Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 989 (stating
the relief claimed).
19. “American Indian tribe” (or “Indian tribe” or “tribe” when shortened for convenience) is the
term used throughout this Comment to refer to the sovereign, self-governing legal entities that are
composed of individual members who trace their ancestry back to the original inhabitants of land
that is now governed by the United States. This Comment uses “American Indian” or “Indian” to
refer to the people who claim this ancestry. This is consistent with the terminology and usage in
the Restatement (Third) of the Law of American Indians and in Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, the two primary legal treatises in this field. Per the Restatement’s definition, “An ‘Indian
tribe’ is any Indian or Alaska Native tribe, band, nation, pueblo, village, or community that either:
(1) the Secretary of the Interior; or (2) Congress pursuant to its plenary authority has acknowledged
to exist as an Indian tribe.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF AMERICAN INDIANS § 2(a)
(AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 1 2015).
20. Complaint, supra note 5, at 16–17 (“The federal government has a specific, special trust
duty, pursuant to the Snyder Act, the IHCIA, the Treaty of Fort Laramie, and federal common law,
to provide health care services to the Tribe and its members and to ensure that health care services
provided to the Tribe and its members do not fall below the highest possible standards of professional care.”); see also Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 996 (identifying the substantive
sources of law for the Tribe’s complaint).
21. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 998 (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Lincoln v. Vigil, brought under the Snyder Act, the IHCIA, and the APA, where the
Court ruled on the reviewability under the Administrative Procedure Act of congressional allocations made under these health care-related statutes, but where the Court declined to issue a holding
based on the general trust relationship between the federal government and American Indians); see
also Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 195 (1993) (“Whatever the contours of [the trust] relationship,
though, it could not limit the [IHS’s] discretion to reorder its priorities from serving a subgroup of
beneficiaries to serving the broader class of all Indians nationwide.”).
22. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 998–99 (comparing the cases brought in the Eighth
and Ninth Circuits); see also cases cited infra note 138.
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courts could enforce these obligations through equitable relief.23 But the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in Quechan Tribe of the
Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v. United States that there was no
judicially enforceable trust obligation under the IHCIA to provide
specific health care services to Indian tribes.24
Despite the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation, the U.S. District Court for
the District of South Dakota ruled in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. United States
that Supreme Court precedent had not foreclosed the finding of an
affirmative trust obligation to provide health care services.25 Following
Eighth Circuit precedent, the district court ruled in favor of the tribe and
issued a declaratory judgment that the government owed the tribe “a duty
to provide competent physician-led health care to the Tribe and its
members.”26 The government has appealed the ruling to the Eighth
Circuit,27 where it is currently pending.28
The extent to which statutes providing health care services for
American Indians and Indian tribes embody specific trust obligations is
debated,29 but the statutes themselves broadly declare Congress’s
23. See White v. Califano, 581 F.2d 697, 698 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (holding that “Congress has unambiguously declared that the federal government has a legal responsibility to provide
health care to Indians” and thus the federal government had to pay for emergency inpatient mental
health care for indigent tribe member); see also Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 998 (citing
the Eighth Circuit affirming the district court’s reasoning in White v. Califano).
24. Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Rsrv. v. United States, 599 Fed. App’x 698, 699
(9th Cir. 2015); see also Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 999 (“The Ninth Circuit and a
district court therein, however, have considered claims brought by tribes alleging a governmental
duty to provide health care and found that no such trust duty existed.”).
25. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 999 (“This Court does not accept the Government’s
conclusion that it owes no duty for health care to the Tribe or its members. Although some courts
have found that the Snyder Act and the IHCIA speak of Indian health care in terms too general to
create an enforceable duty, the Eighth Circuit has explicitly recognized that these acts create a ‘legal
responsibility to provide health care to Indians.’ Furthermore, despite these ‘general terms,’ the
Supreme Court made note of IHS’s ‘statutory mandate to provide health care to Indian people.’”
(citations omitted)).
26. Judgment at 1–2, Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d 986 (No. 16-CV-03038); see also
Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 1005 (“It is further ordered that the Tribe’s motion for
summary judgment, Doc. 88, is denied in part, but granted to the limited extent that this Court
issues a declaratory judgment that the Defendants’ duty to the Tribe under the 1868 Treaty of Fort
Laramie expressed in treaty language as furnishing ‘to the Indians the physician’ requires Defendants to provide competent physician-led health care to the Tribe’s members.”).
27. Notice of Appeal at 1, Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d 986 (No. 16-CV-03038) (appealing the opinion and declaratory judgment from the U.S. District Court of the District of South
Dakota to the Eighth Circuit).
28. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. United States, No. 20-2062 (8th Cir. argued Mar. 18, 2021).
29. Compare McNabb v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 787, 794–95 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the IHCIA
embodied congressional intent and the trust doctrine required that the federal government meet
health care needs of American Indians when those needs were unmet by state and local programs),
and White v. Califano, 581 F.2d 697, 698 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (holding the IHCIA created
an obligation to provide health care services to an indigent Indian woman), with Gila River Indian
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legislative policy to uphold the government’s trust obligations.30 The
executive branch and its constituent agencies likewise affirm this
responsibility.31 But the Supreme Court in recent years has significantly
narrowed the scope of the federal government’s judicially enforceable
trust obligations to American Indians.32 This raises the question relevant
to the Rosebud Sioux Tribe in IHS’s forced closure of the tribe’s sole
provider of emergency health services: if courts cannot enforce IHS’s
statutory mandate to adequately maintain an IHS-operated hospital
because the IHCIA does not embody federal trust responsibilities, then
what purpose does the trust relationship serve? How can the federal trust
relationship be meaningful at all, if the beneficiary of the trust
relationship (American Indians and Indian tribes) cannot hold their
trustee (the United States) accountable for the provision of services which
they are entitled to by statute and common law?
This Comment will analyze the circuit split between the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits on the issue of whether the IHCIA embodies a judicially
enforceable trust obligation of the federal government to provide health
care services to American Indians. This Comment will, in its second part,
Cmty. v. Burwell, No. 14-CV-00943, 2015 WL 997857, at *4–5 (D. Ariz. Mar. 6, 2015) (finding
that the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act and other related health care legislation did not indicate government responsibility for providing services).
30. See Act of Nov. 2, 1921 (Snyder Act), Pub. L. No. 67-85, ch. 115, 42 Stat. 208, 208–09
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 13) (“[T]he Bureau of Indian Affairs, under the supervision of
the Secretary of the Interior, shall direct, supervise, and expend such moneys as Congress may from
time to time appropriate, for the benefit, care, and assistance of the Indians throughout the United
States for the following purposes: General support and civilization, including education. For relief
of distress and conservation of health. . . . For the employment of . . . physicians . . . .”); see also
Indian Health Care Improvement Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1602 (“[I]t is the policy of this Nation, in fulfillment of its special trust responsibilities and legal obligations to Indians—(1) to ensure the highest possible health status for Indians and urban Indians and to provide all resources necessary to
effect that policy . . . .”).
31. See, e.g., Statement on the Reauthorization of the Indian Health Care Improvement Act, 1
PUB. PAPERS 406 (Mar. 23, 2010) (“Our responsibility to provide health services to American Indians and Alaska Natives derives from the nation-to-nation relationship between the federal and
tribal governments.”); see also Basis for Health Services, INDIAN HEALTH SERV. (Jan. 2015),
https://www.ihs.gov/newsroom/factsheets/basisforhealthservices/
[https://perma.cc/GCR6NGEH] (“The trust relationship establishes a responsibility for a variety of services and benefits to
Indian people based on their status as Indians, including health care.”).
32. See, e.g., Daniel I.S.J. Rey-Bear & Matthew L.M. Fletcher, “We Need Protection from Our
Protectors”: The Nature, Issues, and Future of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 6 MICH.
J. ENV’T. & ADMIN. L. 397, 441 (2017) (“Regardless of what the Executive Branch may assert, it
could not avoid the federal trust responsibility without a Supreme Court inclined to rule against
Indians and skeptical of the federal trust responsibility.”); Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 195
(1993) (“Whatever the contours of [the trust] relationship, . . . it could not limit the Service’s discretion to reorder its priorities from serving a subgroup of beneficiaries to serving the broader class
of all Indians nationwide.”); United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 165 (2011)
(“The trust obligations of the United States to the Indian tribes are established and governed by
statute rather than the common law, and in fulfilling its statutory duties, the Government acts not
as a private trustee but pursuant to its sovereign interest in the execution of federal law.”).
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trace the development of the trust doctrine and the Court’s interpretation
of the relationship between the federal government and American Indian
tribes and their members. It will also discuss Congress’s affirmation of
the federal trust doctrine’s principles through legislation providing health
care services to tribes.
In its third part, this Comment will discuss the respective Eighth and
Ninth Circuit holdings and how the district court in Rosebud Sioux Tribe
v. United States applied the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning to reach its
judgment in favor of the tribe. In the fourth part, this Comment will show
that the Ninth Circuit based its reasoning on a flawed interpretation of
previous Supreme Court holdings on top of an imprecise application of
these holdings to the facts of the case it considered. Further, this part
predicts that the Supreme Court would most likely agree with the
government’s similarly flawed reasoning in its Rosebud Sioux Tribe
appeal. Finally, this Comment will propose that a radical judicial
reinterpretation of the trust doctrine—one that would simultaneously
return to federal common law principles while adopting current
international law principles—could rehabilitate the trust doctrine as a
right with a remedy. American Indians and Indian tribes could then enjoin
the federal government to provide the health care services they are
entitled to receive.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE TRUST DOCTRINE AND HEALTH CARE
Before discussing the Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ divergent approaches
to the federal trust doctrine and the subsequent application in Rosebud
Sioux Tribe v. United States, it is necessary to trace the development of
this unique legal doctrine, from its earliest articulation by Chief Justice
John Marshall through the most recent Supreme Court holdings. These
cases also implicate the government’s provision of health care services to
American Indians and Indian tribes. Thus, it is also important to
understand Congress’s health care legislation and policy for American
Indians and the executive branch’s role in implementing this legislation.
A. The Federal Trust Doctrine
The federal trust doctrine’s earliest formulations took shape out of the
treaty tradition derived from seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
international law33 and the Supreme Court’s subsequent interpretation of
the legal relationship between indigenous American peoples and

33. See 1 COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.02[1] (Nell Jessup Newton, ed.,
2019), LEXIS [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK] (describing European concepts of customary international law that influenced British, and later American, policy toward Indian tribes during the
colonial era).
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European colonizers.34 The Court’s first characterization of this
relationship both recognized tribal sovereignty in theory while
subjugating it in practice to the presumed Anglo-American supremacy of
the era.35 The treaty tradition, nonetheless, recognized inherent tribal
sovereignty and required by law that the European (and later, American)
governments provide goods, ongoing services, and protection from
external interference to Indian tribes in exchange for their land—basic
principles upon which the common law articulation of the federal trust
doctrine was founded.36
The trust doctrine evolved through periods where the Court asserted
its presumed Eurocentric cultural superiority as justification for the
federal government exercising complete control as the “guardian” over
Indian tribes as a “ward,” to justify its exploitation of tribal land and
resources.37 Eventually, the Court came to describe the federal trust
doctrine through principles of agency law, by virtue of both the de facto
control the federal government had assumed over indigenous lands and
resources over time and de jure control gained through federal

34. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 19, § 4 cmt. a
(“The trust relationship is based on the original understanding at the time of the Founding of the
government-to-government relationship of preexisting sovereigns. The Supreme Court initially
analogized the relationship of Indian tribes to the United States to a doctrine of the law of nations:
that when a stronger sovereign assumes authority over a weaker sovereign, the stronger one assumes a duty of protection for the weaker one, which does not surrender its right to self-government. The trust relationship was first exemplified during the treaty-making process, where the
United States either explicitly or implicitly agreed to protect individual Indians and Indian tribes
from outsiders in exchange to title to what would become the vast public domain.”).
35. See, e.g., Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573–74 (1823) (articulating the “law
of discovery,” by which European powers adhered to a doctrine of international law giving European powers exclusive claim to the title of land to the “discoverer” against all other European countries, whereas native peoples, though recognized as sovereigns, had only the “right of occupancy”
to their newly “discovered” lands); see also id. at 588–92 (rationalizing the European conquest of
the Americas and the United States’ rightful accession to this legacy based on the inherent right of
stronger, “civilized” nations to conquer and then control native inhabitants viewed as “fierce savages” by Europeans); Note, Rethinking the Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 422, 424–25 (1984) [hereinafter Rethinking the Trust Doctrine] (describing Chief Justice
Marshall’s derivation of the trust doctrine from his own moral judgment that obliged the United
States to act as guardian to Indian tribes, as a stronger nation to a weaker nation).
36. See Rey-Bear & Fletcher, supra note 32, at 402 (“[F]ederal-Indian treaties and agreements
are essentially contracts between sovereign nations, which typically secured peace with Indian
tribes in exchange for land cessions, which provided legal consideration for the ongoing performance of federal trust duties.”); COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 33, § 1.03[1] (“Basic principles
developed during this period [1789–1871] have nevertheless survived. Most notable are the general
tenets that Indian tribes are governments, . . . [and] that the United States has a special trust obligation to Indians . . . .”).
37. See Rethinking the Trust Doctrine, supra note 35, at 426–27 (describing the cultural theory
of trust responsibilities from the late nineteenth through early twentieth centuries where the Court
emphasized American Indians’ lack of civilization as justification for Congress to exert plenary
power over them).
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legislation.38 The Court now understands the federal government’s
fiduciary obligations to American Indian tribes under the federal trust
doctrine as limited only to situations where the government, pursuant to
statute or regulations, exercises exclusive or near exclusive control over
tribal property.39
1. The Trust Doctrine’s Development: The Treaty Era and the Marshall
Trilogy
In the post-Contact, pre-Revolution era, English law required colonial
land acquisitions from indigenous peoples to take place—at least
nominally—through negotiated purchases memorialized in treaties with
Indian tribes.40 During the American Revolutionary War, the Continental
Congress engaged as a sovereign government in treaty-making and
diplomacy with Indian tribes, pledging mutual assistance, boundary
recognition, and cessation of hostilities.41 The treaty tradition continued
after the war ended, and early treaties guaranteed the United States

38. See id. at 427–28 (describing the control theory of the trust doctrine, whereby the United
States’ trust obligations as a fiduciary flow from the government’s control over tribal land and
resources).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell I), 445 U.S. 535, 542 (1980) (holding that the
General Allotment Act did not obligate the federal government’s exclusive management of tribal
lands, so no fiduciary obligations attached under the Act); United States v. White Mountain Apache
Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 474–75 (2003) (holding that the federal government could be held liable for
money damages for failing to preserve the historic property it exclusively occupied and held in trust
on the White Mountain Apache reservation); United States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo Nation I),
537 U.S. 488, 506–07 (2003) (holding that the government could not be held liable in money damages for breach of fiduciary obligations regarding the tribe’s coal mine leasing royalties because
the applicable governing statute and regulations did not provide the requisite substantive law to
infer a trust relationship); United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 173–74 (2011)
(“The Government, of course, is not a private trustee. Though the relevant statutes denominate the
relationship between the Government and the Indians a ‘trust,’ that trust is defined and governed
by statutes rather than the common law. As we have recognized in prior cases, Congress may style
its relations with the Indians a ‘trust’ without assuming all the fiduciary duties of a private trustee,
creating a trust relationship that is ‘limited’ or ‘bare’ compared to a trust relationship between private parties at common law.” (citations omitted)).
40. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 33, § 1.02[1] (describing the competing seventeenthand eighteenth-century European legal theories regarding European settlers’ rights to Native-occupied lands in the Americas and dealings with Native peoples for acquisition of the land). “The
English colonists, like the Dutch, Spanish, and French, also maintained the practice of dealing with
tribal governments through treaties recognizing their sovereignty.” Id. Despite the legal requirement to acquire land through negotiations and treaty purchases with tribes, settlers did not consistently implement these laws, nor did they view or treat Native peoples as their equals. Id. Settlers
broke treaties, disrespected negotiated boundary lines, and when Native peoples defended their land
from intrusion, colonists responded with violence and conquest, resulting in further dispossession
of Native land. Id.; see also JILL LEPORE, THESE TRUTHS: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 52–
59 (2018) (discussing European justifications for the right to occupy Native land and make war on
Native peoples when they “rebelled” against settlers and their governments).
41. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 33, § 1.02[2].
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receiving Indian tribes “into their protection.”42 Treaties also expressed
the United States’ obligation to provide services to tribes as part of the
bargained exchanges.43 Therefore, treaties both recognized tribal
sovereignty and ongoing obligations, which came to be viewed as trust
responsibilities owed by one sovereign to another under its protection.44
The common law articulation of the relationship between the federal
government and American Indian tribes developed in the early days of
the Supreme Court with the “Marshall Trilogy” cases.45 Johnson v.
M’Intosh was the first Supreme Court case to consider the nature of
American Indian tribes’ title to their land in relation to the United States’
claim of sovereignty, which was grounded in the European understanding
of international law of the day.46 Chief Justice Marshall articulated the
“law of discovery” as essential to the law of nations, which entailed that
the European power that “discovered” a land reserved the rights (1) to
42. Id. (quoting Treaty with the Six Nations, 1784, 7 Stat. 15 (Treaty at Fort Stanwix)); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 19, § 4 Reporters’ Notes,
cmt. a (listing twelve examples of treaties completed from 1784 through 1861 between the federal
government and various Indian tribes, which incorporated language relating to the government’s
obligation to “protect” tribes). In its original context, this legal term of art from international law
referred to the federal government’s ongoing duty to preserve tribal property and self-government
from external interference, not to control tribes’ internal affairs. Id.
43. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 19, § 4 cmt.
a; see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 33, § 1.03[1] (“Treaties frequently called for the
United States to deliver goods and services to the tribes as part of an exchange for vast amounts of
Indian land. . . . Provisions were also commonly made for health and education services.”); ReyBear & Fletcher, supra note 32, at 402 (“In particular, federal-Indian treaties and agreements are
essentially contracts between sovereign nations, which typically secured peace with Indian tribes
in exchange for land cessions, which provided legal consideration for the ongoing performance of
federal trust duties. In terms of consideration, it is beyond question that the United States has long
reaped the benefit of vast cessions of Indian lands in exchange for its voluntarily and unilaterally
imposed trust relationship.” (footnotes omitted)).
44. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 33, § 1.03[1] (“The treaty tradition placed the word
of the federal government behind the recognition of tribal sovereignty and federal trust obligations;
these pledges, in turn, have fundamentally shaped Indian law and policy.”); see also Mary Christina
Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994
UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1495–99 (describing the origins and early development of the trust doctrine
wherein treaties recognized tribal sovereignty, pledged to protect tribes from external interference,
and promised the provision of goods and services).
45. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, A Short History of Indian Law in the Supreme Court, HUM.
RTS., May 2015, at 3, 3 (summarizing the “Marshall Trilogy” cases of Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S.
543 (1823), Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831), and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515
(1832), and their respective holdings); see generally, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK §§ 1:1–
1:2, Westlaw (database updated June 2020).
46. See Eric Kades, History and Interpretation of the Great Case of Johnson v. M’Intosh, 19
LAW & HIST. REV. 67, 70 (2001); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 33, § 5.07[1] & n.3
(citing Johnson v. M’Intosh as establishing the existence and scope of Indian title to property). The
case considered whether private buyers could purchase land from Indian tribes or whether the government maintained the exclusive purchasing rights. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.)
543, 544–72 (1823) (reciting the factual background of the land purchase claims in question and
summarizing the arguments of the plaintiffs and defendants).

2021]

Trust Betrayed

1111

exclude other European nations and (2) to determine by their own laws
their relationship with the indigenous occupants, including the right to
acquire land.47 This articulation both recognized Native peoples’
sovereignty—which presumed they must be dealt with on a nation-tonation basis—while designating their status as inferior to the nations of
Europe.48 This holding both established a relationship between superior
and inferior sovereigns and provided a legal basis for more efficiently
appropriating American Indian lands.49
The next two Marshall Trilogy cases, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and
Worcester v. Georgia, further clarified the Court’s view of Indian tribes
as sovereign nations, albeit nations of an inferior status, and first directly
47. But, as they were all in pursuit of nearly the same object, it was necessary, in order to avoid
conflicting settlements, and consequent war with each other, to establish a principle, which
all should acknowledge as the law by which the right of acquisition, which they all asserted,
should be regulated as between themselves. This principle was, that discovery gave title to
the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other
European governments, which title might be consummated by possession.
The exclusion of all other Europeans, necessarily gave to the nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives, and establishing settlements
upon it. It was a right with which no Europeans could interfere. It was a right which all
asserted for themselves, and to the assertion of which, by others, all assented.
Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives, were to be
regulated by themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other power could
interpose between them.
Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573 (emphasis added); see also Kades, supra note 46, at 71 (describing a twostep rule outlined in Johnson: first to determine the right to exclude other nations from acquiring
land via the “discovery rule,” and second for each nation to determine by its own laws how to
acquire land from native peoples).
48. In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no
instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired. They
were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to
retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion; but their rights to
complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power
to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.
While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives, as occupants,
they asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and claimed and exercised, as
a consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in possession of the natives. These grants have been understood by all, to convey a title to the
grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy.
The history of America, from its discovery to the present day, proves, we think, the
universal recognition of these principles.
Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574. According to Chief Justice Marshall, this status denied American Indian
tribes full fee title to their land and the right of alienation to anyone but the federal government. Id.
at 591–92 (“[T]he Indian inhabitants are to be considered merely as occupants, to be protected,
indeed, while in peace, in the possession of their lands, but to be deemed incapable of transferring
the absolute title to others.”).
49. See Kades, supra note 46, at 110–13 (arguing that the Court was motivated in part to justify
the federal government’s exclusive sovereign right to deal with another sovereign, thus allow it to
efficiently obtain more land).
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alluded to the federal trust doctrine.50 In Cherokee Nation, Chief Justice
Marshall termed Indian tribes “domestic dependent nations,” with a
relationship to the United States resembling “that of a ward to his
guardian.”51 Again, this concept derived from Eurocentric international
law of the time, when a stronger sovereign nation took a weaker nation
into its protection.52 But in the American context, Chief Justice Marshall
created “a new legal entity.”53 Tribes were sovereigns with a
government-to-government relationship with the United States,
somewhat like that of the states to the federal government.54 But by
analogizing to the guardian-ward relationship, the Court also alluded to
the federal government’s ongoing fiduciary responsibilities toward
Indian tribes inherent in this type of trust relationship.55
The following year, Chief Justice Marshall further elaborated on this
new type of relationship in Worcester v. Georgia.56 The Court reaffirmed
the Cherokee Nation’s sovereignty in its own territory, subject to no state
50. See Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to
Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1215–20 (1975) (discussing the relationship between tribal nations
and the federal government in the trust doctrine as expressed by the Marshall Court’s decisions in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Worcester v. Georgia); see also Sharon O’Brien, Tribes and Indians: With Whom Does the United States Maintain a Relationship?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1461, 1464 (1991) (“The first legal interpretations of tribal status and federal-tribal relations appeared in the seminal Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Worcester v. Georgia decisions by Chief
Justice John Marshall.”).
51. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (“Though the Indians are
acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and, heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government; yet it may
well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the
United States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly,
perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert
a title independent of their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of
possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States
resembles that of a ward to his guardian.” (emphasis added)).
52. See Rey-Bear & Fletcher, supra note 32, at 413 (explaining the dynamics of the United
States recognizing Indian tribes as “under its protection”); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra
note 33, § 5.07[1] (describing the international law origins of the trust doctrine). For discussion on
this legal term of art in international law, see sources cited supra note 42.
53. LEPORE, supra note 40, at 215; see also Wood, supra note 44, at 1498 (“It has often been
said that the relationship of Indian tribes to the federal government is unlike any other, or sui generis.”).
54. Rey-Bear & Fletcher, supra note 32, at 413.
55. Id. at 408. The “guardian-ward” characterization does not completely fit the nature of the
relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes, though, because tribes do not lack
legal capacity to act for themselves, as wards do. Id. Thus, the Marshallian conception of the trust
relationship can rightly be criticized as paternalistic and racist, as it assumed Native peoples were
not capable of acting in their own best interest, but instead relied on the “superior” judgment of
Europeans. See id. at 408–09. But this characterization nonetheless also recognized inherent tribal
sovereignty and legally cognizable fiduciary obligations, both of which are key foundational principles to understanding the common law articulation of the federal trust doctrine. Id.
56. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832). The Court declared that Georgia
had unlawfully exercised state jurisdiction on Cherokee land. Id.
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government’s jurisdiction over internal affairs.57 Despite this declaration
that Georgia had no authority to act within Cherokee land, the executive
branch, led by President Andrew Jackson, infamously refused to enforce
the Court’s judgment recognizing tribal sovereignty.58
Taken together, the Marshallian articulation of the trust relationship
between the United States and Indian tribes simultaneously emphasized
tribes’ sovereign status while also deeming them dependent upon the
United States.59 The United States was, in turn, bound by its
responsibilities as a sovereign “trustee” for American Indian nations and
by its treaty promises.60 These concepts tracked with Euro-American
international law at the time.61 This trust relationship continued to
develop throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when the
United States’ policies toward Indian tribes transitioned from expression
in treaties to statutory law.
2. Congressional Plenary Control: Late Nineteenth- and Early
Twentieth-Century Evolution of the Trust Doctrine
The tradition of treaty-making (and breaking) continued through
waves of mid-nineteenth-century westward expansion until 1871, when
Congress ended the practice of making treaties with Indian tribes with the
Appropriations Act of March 3, 1871.62 After the 1871 Act, statutes and
57. Id. at 560–61 (“The very fact of repeated treaties with [the Cherokee tribe] recognizes [their
title to self-government]; and the settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does
not surrender its independence—its right to self government, by associating with a stronger, and
taking its protection. A weak state, in order to provide for its safety, may place itself under the
protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself of the right of government, and ceasing to
be a state.”).
58. LEPORE, supra note 40, at 215–16. The Cherokee were forced, soon after, to cede their
remaining lands to Georgia and leave under threat of U.S. military force in the infamous Trail of
Tears. Id. at 216.
59. See Chambers, supra note 50, at 1219–20 (discussing the Marshallian guardianship status
conferred upon tribes as both recognizing tribes’ sovereignty while also conferring the United
States’ protection); see also Rethinking the Trust Doctrine, supra note 35, at 423–25 (describing
the Marshall Court holdings affirming the Cherokee Nation’s sovereignty but also asserting its dependency upon the United States).
60. See Wood, supra note 44, at 1496–1500 (describing the “sovereign trusteeship” and its trust
obligations).
61. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 33, § 1.02[1] (discussing the European legal precedents embedded in the trust doctrine); see also Kades, supra note 46, at 71 (describing the European
“law of discovery” put forth in Johnson v. M’Intosh); Rey-Bear & Fletcher, supra note 32, at 412
(noting the role of customary international law at the time of the writing of the Constitution in
shaping federal Indian law and policy).
62. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 33, § 1.03[9] (describing the termination of the practice of treaty-making but the validation by law of obligations made under previously ratified treaties, despite the frequent breaking or nonenforcement of treaty terms in practice); see also Act of
Mar. 3, 1871, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 71) (“Provided, That
hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged
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executive orders expressed federal policy toward tribes, and the military
and executive agencies enforced policy.63 Congress enacted the Snyder
Act in 1921, one of the trust doctrine’s earliest expressions in federal
legislation.64 The Snyder Act authorized the Bureau of Indian Affairs to
spend congressional appropriations “for the benefit, care and assistance
of the Indians throughout the United States.”65 During this period, the
Court deepened its commitment to the “guardianship” relationship
between Indian tribes and the government, the latter having by that point
appropriated nearly all tribal lands, created the reservation system, and
destroyed traditional ways of life.66
After deciding Worcester v. Georgia in 1832, the Court next
considered the nature of the relationship between the federal government
and Indian tribes more than fifty years later in United States v. Kagama.67
Citing the Marshall Court’s guardian-ward analogy, the Court
emphasized tribes’ dependency on the federal government’s provision of
goods and services68—a dependency into which they had been forced
or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract
by treaty: Provided, further, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to invalidate or impair the obligation of any treaty heretofore lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation
or tribe.”).
63. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 33, § 1.04 (discussing the federal statutes developed
in the period 1871–1928, including the General Allotment Act, the Citizenship Act of 1924, military campaigns against Western tribes, and policies carried out by the Bureau of Indian Affairs—
all of which generally carried out the “twin cornerstones” of federal Indian policy at the time of
acquisition of land and cultural assimilation of Indians).
64. Id.
65. Id. (quoting Act of Nov. 2, 1921 (Snyder Act), 42 Stat. 208 (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. § 13)). For further detail on the Snyder Act, see discussion infra Section II.B.2.
66. See Rethinking the Trust Doctrine, supra note 35, at 426–27 (describing the Supreme
Court’s opinions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries expounding the federal government’s duty to “civilize” American Indians, which served as justification for seizing tribal
lands); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 33, § 1.04 (describing the policy changes of the
“Allotment and Assimilation” era from 1871–1928).
67. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383–84 (1886); Chambers, supra note 50, at 1224;
see also United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 597–98 (1916) (quoting Kagama and holding that
Indians may be both citizens as well as subject to the guardianship of the United States). The plaintiff in Kagama challenged the constitutionality of Congress’s extension of criminal jurisdiction
over tribal citizens for crimes committed on Indian reservations. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 376. Considering the relationship between the United States and Indian tribes, the Court reasoned that, although Indians had once retained “a semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal
relations; not as States, not as nations, not as possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as
a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far not
brought under the laws of the Union or of the State within whose limits they resided,” Congress
now retained exclusive jurisdiction to extend the laws of the United States over tribal citizens. Id.
at 381–82, 384–85.
68. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383–84 (“These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are
communities dependent on the United States. Dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent
for their political rights. . . . From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course
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precisely because of the United States’ history of unfair dealings and
treaty breaking. In 1903, the Court in United States v. Rickert declared
American Indians “in a condition of pupilage,” wherein one of the federal
government’s responsibilities was to “maintain[]” them in preparation for
“assuming the habits of civilized life” and the eventual “privileges of
citizenship,” which had not yet been recognized.69 The same year, in
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, the Court declared Congress’s “plenary
authority” over Indian affairs, either pursuant to treaty or statute, and
declared that Congress could unilaterally abrogate the terms of a treaty or
the trust relationship if it decided to do so.70
The Court thus significantly undermined the foundational principles of
tribal sovereignty and self-government in the federal trust doctrine’s
original common law articulation.71 But against the executive branch, the
Court utilized the trust doctrine to place judicially enforceable restrictions
on federal agencies’ power over Indian land and property in several early
twentieth century cases.72 These cases reinforced the federal trust
doctrine with general fiduciary principles of the common law of trusts, at
least with respect to managing tribal property, where the government

of dealing of the Federal Government with them, and the treaties in which it has been promised,
there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power [exerted over them by the federal government.].”).
69. United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 437 (1903). In Rickert, the United States sued the
treasurer and tax assessor of Roberts County, South Dakota, who had tried to assess taxes on improvements to allotments of land that several members of the Sisseton Band of Sioux Indians possessed under the General Allotment Act. Id. at 433. The Court held that the State could not tax
United States property held in trust and granted only for occupation and use to the Indians as “wards
of the Nation.” Id. at 437.
70. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565–66 (1903); see also Chambers, supra note 50,
at 1225. In Lone Wolf, Congress had passed legislation changing the reservation lands of the Kiowa,
Comanche, and Apache tribes without the consent of three-fourths of the adult males of the tribes,
as required by the tribes’ 1867 treaty with the government that had created the reservation. See
Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 554–63 (detailing the tribes’ allegations of the United States’ fraud and
misrepresentations during the negotiation of an agreement with the federal government to sell tribal
land and open it for settlement to white people). The Court held that Congress retained full authority
to abrogate treaties with Indian tribes. Id. at 565–66. Thus, it did not matter that Congress had
passed legislation that violated the 1867 treaty’s terms, as Congress held unilateral authority to do
so. Id. at 567–68.
71. See Rethinking the Trust Doctrine, supra note 35, at 427 & nn.25–26 (citing Lone Wolf and
Kagama holdings that emphasized Congress’s plenary control over tribal affairs and property); see
also Chambers, supra note 50, at 1226 (“The effect of depriving tribes of land title [in the Kagama
and Lone Wolf cases] was, as a practical as well as conceptual matter, destructive of the tribal
powers of self-government confirmed in Worcester. This power of Congress recognized under the
Lone Wolf rendition of the trust responsibility is manifestly awesome, perhaps, unlimited.”).
72. See Chambers, supra note 50, at 1230–32 (arguing that in Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa,
Cramer v. United States, and United States v. Creek Nation, the Court held that federal executive
agencies such as the Department of the Interior could not abrogate their fiduciary obligations to
tribes with respect to the disposition or management of Indian lands).

1116

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 52

could be judicially restrained from acting adversely to tribes’ interests.73
The Court also later conceded that although Congress had plenary
power over Indian affairs per Lone Wolf, that power was not absolute.74
Rather, Congress’s power was limited by the responsibilities “inhering
in . . . a guardianship,”75 which included the duty of protection and the
duty to act in the tribe’s best interests.76 Still, when interpreting the
federal government’s trust obligations under statutes enacted by
Congress governing Indian affairs, the Court continued to rule narrowly
as to the government’s fiduciary duties as a trustee from this period
onward.
3. Narrow Statutory Enforcement: The Court’s Interpretation of the
Federal Trust Doctrine Since 1980
Over the past forty years, the Court has addressed in several landmark
cases the extent to which federal legislation embodies judicially
enforceable fiduciary obligations, most often where tribes have sought
monetary damages for alleged federal mismanagement of tribal lands and
resources. Common to these cases are tribes’ claims that the federal
government has breached a specific fiduciary obligation created by
statute and enforceable under the federal trust doctrine. Despite statutory
language reaffirming federal trust obligations,77 the Court has tended to
73. See Chambers, supra note 50, at 1246–47 (“[F]ederal officials can be judicially restrained
from actions contrary to their fiduciary duties to Indians—actions which contravene the ordinary
proprietary obligations of a fiduciary to a trust beneficiary—even if they are not contrary to any
treaty, statute, or agreement.”).
74. United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 52 (1946) (plurality opinion);
United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 109–10 (1935).
75. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. at 109–10.
76. See Rey-Bear & Fletcher, supra note 32, at 423–24. But see Chambers, supra note 50, at
1226–27 n.66 (listing several examples of Congress’s express termination by statute of the trust
relationship with specific tribes).
77. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 1902 (“[I]t is the policy of this Nation to protect the best interests of
Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families . . . .”), 2401
(“(1) the Federal Government has a historical relationship and unique legal and moral responsibility
to Indian tribes and their members, (2) included in this responsibility is the treaty, statutory, and
historical obligation to assist the Indian tribes in meeting the health and social needs of their members . . . .”), 2501(b) (“Congress declares its commitment to the maintenance of the Federal Government’s unique and continuing trust relationship with and responsibility to the Indian people for
the education of Indian children through the establishment of a meaningful Indian self-determination policy for education . . . .”), 3601 (“(1) there is a government-to-government relationship between the United States and each Indian tribe; (2) the United States has a trust responsibility to each
tribal government that includes the protection of the sovereignty of each tribal government;
(3) Congress, through statutes, treaties, and the exercise of administrative authorities, has recognized the self-determination, self-reliance, and inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes; . . .”), 3702
(“The purposes of this chapter are to—(1) carry out the trust responsibility of the United States and
promote the self-determination of Indian tribes by providing for the management of Indian agricultural lands and related renewable resources . . . .”), 4101(2) (“[T]here exists a unique relationship
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rule narrowly on claims invoking statutorily affirmed federal fiduciary
responsibilities enforceable by suits for legal or equitable relief.78
In Mitchell v. United States (Mitchell I), decided in 1980, the Court
held that statutes disposing of tribal lands and resources—in this case, the
General Allotment Act of 1887—did not necessarily establish judicially
enforceable fiduciary obligations.79 Congress must explicitly intend to
create this obligation by statute.80 Only then can a tribe sue for breach of
trust seeking monetary damages.81 Some statutes, according to the
Mitchell I Court, create only a “limited trust relationship,” to which
fiduciary duties do not attach.82 The case returned in 1983 (Mitchell II)
to test a different statute.83 The Mitchell II Court held that, where statutes
and implementing regulations plainly vest the federal government with
exclusive or near exclusive responsibility to manage tribal resources, they
“thereby establish a fiduciary relationship and define the contours of the
United States’ fiduciary responsibilities.”84 To sue for monetary damages
for breach of trust, the tribe’s claim must be grounded in a substantive
source of law that clearly supports a trust relationship.85 The Court in the
between the Government of the United States and the governments of Indian tribes and a unique
Federal responsibility to Indian people . . . .”).
78. See discussion, infra Section III.B (discussing this tendency as it arises in the case Quechan
Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v. United States, 599 Fed. App’x 698 (9th Cir. 2015)).
79. United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell I), 445 U.S. 535, 542 (1980) (“The Act does not unambiguously provide that the United States has undertaken full fiduciary responsibilities as to the
management of allotted lands [under the Act].”). See generally General Allotment Act of 1887,
Pub. L. No. 49-105, 24 Stat. 388–91 (describing the allotment of tribal lands, held in trust by the
United States, to individual members of tribes for their use).
80. See Mitchell I, 445 U.S. at 544 (“[W]hen Congress enacted the General Allotment Act, it
intended that the United States ‘hold the land . . . in trust’ not because it wished the Government to
control use of the land and be subject to money damages for breaches of fiduciary duty, but simply
because it wished to prevent alienation of the land and to ensure that allottees would be immune
from state taxation.”).
81. See id. at 546 (“The General Allotment Act, then, cannot be read as establishing that the
United States has a fiduciary responsibility for management of allotted forest lands. Any right of
the respondents to recover monetary damages for Government mismanagement of timber resources
must be found in some source other than that Act.”).
82. Id. at 542 (“We conclude that the [General Allotment] Act created only a limited trust relationship between the United States and the allottee that does not impose any duty upon the Government to manage timber resources.”).
83. United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), 463 U.S. 206 (1983). In this case, the Court held that
timber management statutes (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 406, 407, 466) and their implementing regulations established the federal government’s exclusive control over timber resources on the tribal
lands at issue, and thus established a substantive source of law to infer a common law trust relationship. Id. at 219–23.
84. Id. at 224.
85. Id.; see also United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 474–75 (2003)
(holding that the federal government could be held liable for money damages for failing to preserve
the historic property it exclusively occupied and held in trust on the White Mountain Apache reservation); United States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo Nation I), 537 U.S. 488, 506–07 (2003) (holding
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Mitchell cases thus eschewed the traditional understanding that the trust
relationship, with its origins in common law, could be enforced under
common law alone.
In Lincoln v. Vigil, the Court further clarified that despite statutory
language implying some quantum of trust responsibilities, an executive
agency’s spending discretion was not reviewable under the
Administrative Procedure Act, and the trust doctrine did not preclude an
agency from exercising its spending discretion.86 Congress provides
lump-sum appropriations pursuant to statutes—here, statutes providing
health care services to American Indians—and agencies have discretion
to adjust spending priorities.87 According to Lincoln, Congress’s lumpsum appropriations generally funding health care services under the
Snyder Act and the Indian Health Care Improvement Act did not establish
a judicially enforceable trust responsibility for the federal government to
provide one specific health care program.88 But the Court in Lincoln did
not attempt to determine whether there were any judicially enforceable
trust obligations for the provision of health care services under the
respective statutes, or what the scope of such obligations might be.89

that the government could not be held liable in money damages for breach of fiduciary obligations
regarding the tribe’s coal mine leasing royalties because the applicable governing statute and regulations did not provide the requisite substantive law to infer a trust relationship); United States v.
Navajo Nation (Navajo Nation II), 556 U.S. 287, 301–02 (2009) (foreclosing any fiduciary obligations arising from any other relevant statutes or regulations regarding the specific coal mine leasing
royalties discussed in Navajo Nation I).
86. Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 193–95 (1993). In Lincoln, the Indian Health Service reallocated its annual lump-sum congressional appropriations provided under the Snyder Act and the
Indian Health Care Improvement Act, discontinuing a residential mental health and therapeutic
center for disabled Indian children of the Navajo and Hopi reservations, so that the funds could be
used for a national mental health program for American Indians. Id. at 185–89. Tribal members
sued the Director of the IHS, arguing that discontinuing the program violated the federal trust responsibilities to Indians and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). Id. at 189.
87. Id. at 193 (“[A] lump-sum appropriation reflects a congressional recognition that an agency
must be allowed ‘flexibility to shift . . . funds within a particular . . . appropriation account . . .’
[But] [o]f course, an agency is not free simply to disregard statutory responsibilities . . . . But as
long as the agency allocates funds from a lump-sum appropriation to meet permissible statutory
objectives, § 701(a)(2) [of the Administrative Procedure Act] gives the courts no leave to intrude.”
(quoting LTV Aerospace Corp., 55 Comp. Gen. 307, 318 (1975))).
88. See id. at 193–94 (“The [Indian Health] Service’s decision to discontinue the Program is
accordingly unreviewable under § 701(a)(2). . . . [T]he appropriations Acts for the relevant period
do not so much as mention the Program, and both the Snyder Act and the Improvement Act likewise
speak about Indian health only in general terms.”).
89. See id. at 194–95 (“The Court of Appeals saw a separate limitation on the Service’s discretion in the special trust relationship existing between Indian people and the Federal Government. . . . Whatever the contours of that relationship, though, it could not limit the Service’s discretion to reorder its priorities from serving a subgroup of beneficiaries to serving the broader class
of all Indians nationwide.”). After disposing of the case as unreviewable under the APA, the Court
did not address the breach of trust claim, considering it to have been dependent upon reviewability
under the APA. Id. at 195.
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Most recently, in 2011 in United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, the
Court further hollowed out the federal government’s fiduciary
obligations owed to Indian tribes under the trust doctrine. Although the
plaintiff tribe asserted a narrow application of the fiduciary
relationship,90 the Court disagreed that the Jicarilla Apache Nation’s
claim of a common-law trust relationship between the federal
government and Indian tribes supported the fiduciary exception to the
government’s claim of attorney-client privilege.91 But the Court went
further than it had in prior holdings, declaring:
The Government, of course, is not a private trustee. Though the
relevant statutes denominate the relationship between the Government
and the Indians as a “trust,” that trust is defined and governed by statutes
rather than the common law. As we have recognized in prior cases,
Congress may style its relations with the Indians a “trust” without
assuming all the fiduciary duties of a private trustee, creating a trust
relationship that is “limited” or “bare” compared to a trust relationship
between private parties at common law.92

The Court thus denied meaningful recognition of a common-law trust
relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes, despite
the fact that the government here was acting, in fact, as trustee, managing
funds held in trust for the tribe.93 Justice Sotomayor observed in her lone
dissenting opinion that the Court’s holding in Jicarilla Apache Nation
portends sweeping negative consequences for the trust doctrine’s
future.94
The Court’s holdings in its recent cases interpreting the federal trust
doctrine leaves Indian tribes with significant unanswered questions: if
90. See United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 166–67 (2011). The Jicarilla
Apache Tribe had sued the federal government for alleged mismanagement of trust funds, and in
the course of discovery for the suit, the tribe moved to compel relevant documents that the government had withheld. Id. The government cited attorney-client privilege and the attorney work-product doctrine, and thus refused to produce the requested documents related to the trust funds. Id. at
166. The Court of Federal Claims granted the tribe’s motion to compel in part, because the communications related to the management of trust funds and thus fell within a common law “fiduciary
exception” to the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 167. The Jicarilla Apaches argued that “by virtue
of the trust relationship between the Government and the Tribe, documents that would otherwise
be privileged must be disclosed.” Id. at 170. The lower court agreed that the relationship between
the federal government and Indian tribes was “sufficiently analogous to a common-law trust relationship” that the fiduciary exception applied. Id. at 167–68.
91. Id. at 173–74.
92. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
93. See id. at 188 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
94. See id. at 189 (“I fear the upshot of the majority’s opinion may well be a further dilution of
the Government’s fiduciary obligations that will have broader negative repercussions for the relationship between the United States and Indian tribes.”); see also Rey-Bear & Fletcher, supra note
32, at 443–44 (describing the problematic reasoning in Jicarilla Apache Nation that failed to recognize the federal government’s primary obligation to tribes as a fiduciary in managing tribal trust
funds and praising Justice Sotomayor’s reasoning in dissent).
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Congress’s use of the word “trust” in statutes to describe its obligations
toward tribes, coupled with the executive branch’s subsequent
undertaking the role of a trustee of funds, do not actually confer commonlaw fiduciary responsibilities on the federal government, then what does
the federal trust doctrine actually mean?95 And if the federal government
owes no common-law fiduciary duties to Indian tribes, how should
obligations of government-to-government agreements under the federal
common law, traceable back to the early treaties and the Marshall trilogy
and subsequently expressed in federal legislation, be discerned, much less
enforced?
In summary, the Court initially conceived the common law
relationship between the United States and Indian tribes as one between
sovereign governments, with the “greater” nation owing protection from
external interference and ongoing obligations to the “lesser” nations in
exchange for land. As the federal government appropriated more and
more tribal lands and resources, the Court’s understanding of the
relationship shifted to one of a “guardian-ward,” which also implied
ongoing fiduciary obligations. But the Court also delegated to Congress
full plenary authority in the federal government’s relationship with
American Indians and Indian tribes. It held that federal agencies could be
restrained from acting adversely to tribes’ interests as beneficiaries, but
that trust obligations expressed in statutes enacted by Congress could
only be enforced in narrow circumstances.
Judicial interpretation and enforcement of the federal trust doctrine has
often involved restraint of federal authority over Indian tribes’
proprietary interests, and the Court has resolved the federal government’s
duties toward tribes according to fiduciary trust principles in such cases.96
But courts have rarely been asked to resolve whether the trust doctrine
includes the affirmative obligation to provide government services under
any statutory construction, and if so, whether the provision of such
services is judicially enforceable.97 The federal government’s provision
95. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564
U.S. 162 (2011) (No. 10-382) (Justice Sotomayor: “Is there . . . any greater value to a fiduciary
duty than to manage the account for the benefit of the beneficiary? That’s the very essence of what
a trust means . . . . So what you’re [the Government], it seems to me, you’re arguing is there is no
duty. You’re saying it’s all defined by statute only, but you’re rendering—there’s no need to use
the word ‘trust’ because it wouldn’t be a trust.”).
96. See Chambers, supra note 50, at 1246–47 (“[F]ederal officials can be judicially restrained
from actions contrary to their fiduciary duties to Indians—actions which contravene the ordinary
proprietary obligations of a fiduciary to a trust beneficiary—even if they are not contrary to any
treaty, statute, or agreement.”).
97. See id. at 1245–46 (“Although a persuasive argument can be made that the trust responsibility includes a federal duty to provide some governmental services to Indians, no court has enforced such an obligation. . . . There is a dearth of case law on this general question, and it seems
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of health care services to American Indians under the trust doctrine as
expressed through federal legislation is now directly at issue in a circuit
split between the Eighth and Ninth Circuits.
B. Federal Provision of Health Care Services to American Indians
The relationship of American Indian tribes with European nations and
later the United States implicated issues of health and health policy from
the first contact forward. The provision of health care services to tribes
began during the treaty era, expanded in the twentieth century, and
continues today. This section traces the development of the federal
government’s Indian health policy from its earliest treaty provisions
through the permanent reauthorization of the Indian Health Care
Improvement Act under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
in 2010. This section also identifies the government’s history and
expressed policy of providing health care services to American Indians
as demonstrative of its ongoing, affirmative trust obligation.
1. Early History and Policy
The fraught relationship between American Indians and European
colonizers and their American successors is inextricably intertwined with
issues of health. As has been well documented, European contact with
Native peoples of the Americas had devastating health consequences for
the latter.98 Native populations in the decades following the first
settlements were decimated by European diseases they had no immunity
to.99 Before Europeans arrived, Native peoples had their own advanced
unlikely that courts will enforce any federal trust obligation to furnish government services to Indians. As in the tribal self-government area, identifying which services should be offered and their
proper extent may be outside the area of judicial competence.”). Since the 1970s, few courts have
directly addressed this question, other than the cited Eighth and Ninth Circuit cases that are the
subject of this Comment, until the present-day Rosebud Sioux Tribe case. See also COHEN’S
HANDBOOK, supra note 33, § 22.01[3] (noting that the trust responsibility alone probably is not
legally enforceable against Congress).
98. See LEPORE, supra note 40, at 19 (“[T]he people of the New World: They died by the hundreds. They died by the thousands, by the tens of thousands, by the hundreds of thousands, by the
tens of millions. The isolation of the Americas from the rest of the world, for hundreds of millions
of years, meant that diseases to which Europeans and Africans had built up immunities over millennia were entirely new to the native peoples of the Americas. European ships, with their fleets of
people and animals and plants, brought along, unseen, battalions of diseases: smallpox, measles,
diphtheria, trachoma, whooping cough, chicken pox, bubonic plague, malaria, typhoid fever, yellow fever, dengue fever, scarlet fever, amoebic dysentery, and influenza. . . . The consequence was
catastrophe.”). See generally DANIEL K. RICHTER, Epidemics, War, and the Remapping of a Continent, in BEFORE THE REVOLUTION: AMERICA’S ANCIENT PASTS 143, 143–70 (2011) (detailing
the destruction wrought on Native populations from both European diseases and armed conflicts).
99. LEPORE, supra note 40, at 19; see also Betty Pfefferbaum et al., Learning to Heal: An Analysis of the History, Policy, and Framework of Indian Health Care, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 365,
367 (1995) (describing the devastating consequences of new European diseases introduced to the
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medical remedies developed over millennia, but much of this wisdom
was destroyed during the conquest and settlement.100 The mass death
brought on by disease made appropriation of Native land—by both
violent and diplomatic means—much easier for the Europeans, who
consequently saw their conquest and settlement as divinely ordained.101
Early treaties between Europeans (and later Americans) and American
Indian tribes often included the provision of physicians and medical
services as part of the exchange for lands,102 but there was no organized
public health policy (neither for Americans in general nor for American
Indians specifically) until the nineteenth century.103 In the early
nineteenth century, provision of medical services to American Indians
centered around military outposts because the War Department managed
Indian affairs at the time.104 Congress first provided funds for Indian
health care in 1832, when it appropriated $12,000 to hire physicians and
provide vaccinations against infectious diseases to which American

indigenous peoples of North America who had no immunity to them); Massimo Livi-Bacci, The
Depopulation of Hispanic America after the Conquest, 32 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 199, 205
(2006) (discussing the arrival of new diseases from Europe in the Americas).
100. Rose L. Pfefferbaum et al., Providing for the Health Care Needs of Native Americans:
Policy, Programs, Procedures, and Practices, 21 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 211, 212–13 (1997); see
also B. Pfefferbaum et al., supra note 99, at 367 (noting archaeological and historical evidence
indicating that Native Americans had healthy lifestyles and “natural and traditional” health wisdom).
101. LEPORE, supra note 40, at 20 (“Diseases spread ahead of the Spanish invaders, laying
waste to wide swaths of the continent. It became commonplace, inevitable, even, first among the
Spanish, and then, in turn, among the French, the Dutch, and the English, to see their own prosperity
and good health and the terrible sicknesses suffered by the natives as signs from God.”); see also
WALTER L. HIXSON, AMERICAN SETTLER COLONIALISM: A HISTORY 11 (2013) (“Settler colonials
typically viewed their own projects as divinely inspired and providentially destined.”).
102. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 33, § 1.03[1] (citing e.g., Treaty with the Miamies, art.
6, Oct. 23,1826, 7 Stat. 300, 301; Treaty with the Great and Little Osages, art. 6, June 2, 1825, 7
Stat. 240, 242; Treaty with the Chocktaws, art. 2, Jan. 20, 1825, 7 Stat. 234, 235) (“Provisions [in
treaties] were also commonly made for health and education services.”). The 1868 Treaty of Fort
Laramie, at issue in the Rosebud Sioux Tribe case, also provided that “in exchange for mutual peace
and vast forfeiture of land by the Sioux Nation, ‘[t]he United States hereby agrees to furnish annually to the Indians the physician . . . and that such appropriations shall be made from time to time,
on the estimate of the Secretary of the Interior, as will be sufficient to employ such persons.’”
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 3d 986, 996 (D.S.D. 2020) (alteration in original) (citing 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie, art. XIII).
103. B. Pfefferbaum et al., supra note 99, at 368–69 (discussing the history of federal public
health policy and the provision of healthcare services to American Indians); see also Aila Hoss, A
Framework for Tribal Public Health Law, 20 NEV. L.J. 113, 122 (2019) (describing the earliest
federal provisions of health care services to American Indians).
104. See B. Pfefferbaum et al., supra note 99, at 368–69 (stating that it was “not surprising” that
the primary focus was on Indians residing near military posts since the War Department was responsible for health care); Hoss, supra note 103, at 122 (“In an effort to prevent the spread of
infectious disease to United States soldiers, military physicians and missionaries treated Indians for
diseases such as smallpox throughout the early 1800s.”).
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Indians were particularly susceptible.105
Coordination of Indian medical services transferred to civilian control
in 1849 when the Department of the Interior took over the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA), but resources were scarce.106 Although the BIA
created a Division of Education and Medicine in 1873, the medical
section was discontinued four years later for lack of funding.107 Provision
of services throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth century
continued to be sporadic, underfunded, and largely ineffective at stopping
infectious disease outbreaks, which continued to plague Indian
populations crowded together on reservations and in boarding schools.108
Federal policy for Indian health care services struggled both to define and
meet the scope of its obligations to American Indians given the inherent
contradiction between their status as both noncitizen members of other
sovereign nations109 and also as “wards” of the U.S. government.110
2. The Snyder Act of 1921
The Snyder Act of 1921111 broadly authorized the BIA to spend
congressional appropriations for various services, including health care,
to American Indians.112 Congress thus declared an explicit, nationwide

105. B. Pfefferbaum et al., supra note 99, at 369; see also Hoss, supra note 103, at 122 (“The
first congressional action regarding Indian health occurred in 1832, which authorized the Army to
administer smallpox vaccinations for Indians.”).
106. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 33, § 22.04[1] (explaining that while the transfer
brought attention to health care, “resources were never sufficient to address the need”); see also
Robert McCarthy, The Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Federal Trust Obligation to American
Indians, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 4 (2004) (noting the establishment of the Bureau of Indian Affairs
within the Department of War in 1834 and its transfer to the Department of the Interior in 1849).
107. B. Pfefferbaum et al., supra note 99, at 369.
108. See id. at 369–73 (discussing the various policies and challenges regarding the provision
of health services); see also Hoss, supra note 103, at 122 (“With the spread of disease throughout
Indian reservations and crowded boarding schools [in the late nineteenth century], Congress was
pressured to increase health care appropriations for Indians.”).
109. American Indians were not considered United States citizens until 1924, when Congress
passed the Indian Citizenship Act. See Act of June 2, 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-175, ch. 233, 43 Stat.
253 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401).
110. B. Pfefferbaum et al., supra note 99, at 372.
111. Snyder Act, 25 U.S.C. § 13 (“The Bureau of Indian Affairs, under the supervision of the
Secretary of the Interior, shall direct, supervise, and expend such moneys as Congress may from
time to time appropriate, for the benefit, care, and assistance of the Indians throughout the United
States for the following purposes: —General support and civilization, including . . . For relief of
distress and conservation of health. . . . For the employment of . . . physicians . . . .”).
112. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 33, § 1.04. The context for this policy was a shift in
national policy to “civilization and assimilation,” since by the early twentieth century, the vast
majority of remaining tribes had either been removed to reservations or divested completely of any
right of occupancy of their own land. Id. The shift was motivated by a desire “[t]o assure that white
values lived and Indian civilization died,” so “federal policy used the full power of law.” Id.
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Indian health policy for the first time.113 The Snyder Act did not create
any specific health care programs;114 rather, it authorized general
congressional appropriations to fund a wide range of social development
programs for the BIA to carry out.115 But the BIA, housed within the
Department of the Interior, struggled to execute the Snyder Act’s health
care mandate.116
Indian health care programs transitioned in 1954 to the Public Health
Service (PHS) within the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW), predecessor to the current Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS).117 Now, the Indian Health Service (IHS) within HHS
coordinates federal health care services and programs for American
Indians.118 The reorganization in the 1950s greatly increased the number
of American Indians that IHS served.119 The agency bore increased costs
without receiving increased congressional appropriations; between 1955
and 1976, appropriations were “arbitrary.”120 IHS needed more
systematic funding.
3. The Indian Health Care Improvement Act of 1976 (IHCIA)
As context for the passage of the IHCIA in 1976, federal Indian policy
in the twentieth century shifted dramatically in a matter of decades. The
destructive assimilation policies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
113. R. Pfefferbaum et al., supra note 100, at 215; Hoss, supra note 103, at 122–23 (noting the
passage of the Snyder Act in 1921 to provide appropriations for health and other general benefits).
114. B. Pfefferbaum et al., supra note 99, at 376–77 (“The Act, however, established only discretionary programs rather than entitlement to specific services. It did not adequately define eligibility, nor did it identify levels or goals for funding. Programs remained under the general direction
of Congress.” (footnotes omitted)).
115. See McCarthy, supra note 106, at 118–19 (“The [Snyder Act] is liberally construed for the
benefit of Indians.”). Other programs funded under the Snyder Act’s auspices included those for
education, economic development, administration of property, public facilities, law enforcement,
and transportation. Id. at 118.
116. See McCarthy, supra note 106, at 120–21 (describing the BIA as “ill equipped” to carry
out the Snyder Act); see also Hoss, supra note 103, at 123 (“Although some improvements were
seen, health services remained insufficient to serve Tribal communities.”).
117. Hoss, supra note 103, at 123; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2001–2004 (outlining the maintenance
and operation of Indian hospitals and health services); COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 33,
§ 22.04[1] (describing the history of the Indian Health Service). Though the reorganization occurred in 1954, the PHS assumed legal responsibility for Indian health care in 1955. B. Pfefferbaum
et al., supra note 99, at 382.
118. McCarthy, supra note 106, at 120–21; see also Agency Overview, supra note 4 (describing
IHS’s organizational relationship to HHS and its mission).
119. B. Pfefferbaum et al., supra note 99, at 384 (“In the two decades following transfer to the
PHS, the number of individuals served by the IHS increased: hospital admissions in both IHS and
contract hospitals doubled, and there was a five-fold increase in the number of outpatient visits.
Unfortunately, there was no statutory mechanism to assure funding, congressional appropriations
were arbitrary, and the budget process failed to respond to the increased numbers of individuals
served . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
120. Id.
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centuries shifted in the mid-1920s through early 1940s toward “more
tolerance and respect for traditional aspects of Indian culture” and
resulted in somewhat improved protections for Indian land and other
rights.121 This era was followed by a much more destructive period of
“termination” policy from 1943 to 1961, in which Congress ended both
federal recognition of certain tribes and federal trusteeship over many
individual and tribal landholdings.122 Congress also shifted management
and funding of federal programs to state governments, as well as
transferred criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian lands from federal
to state governments.123 The federal government aimed to end the trust
relationship, so that American Indians would have no separately
recognized political status as tribal citizens. 124 This resulted in the
weakening of tribal sovereignty and worsening of poverty of American
Indians.125 Finally, in the years since the end of the termination era (1961
to present), federal policy shifted again to promote Indian tribes’ selfdetermination and self-governance.126 The passage of numerous statutes
expanding services to American Indians and Indian tribes reflected this

121. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 33, § 1.05 (describing the “Indian Reorganization”
period from 1928–1942); see also B. Pfefferbaum et al., supra note 99, at 379 (describing the New
Deal Era, increased congressional appropriations, and the reversal of forced assimilation policies
alongside the Indian Reorganization Act’s rejuvenation of tribal self-governance).
122. See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 33, § 1.06 (describing the “Termination”
period from 1943–1961).
123. See id.
124. Id. (“[F]ederal policy dealing with Indian lands and reserves during the termination era
focused primarily on ending the trust relationship between the United States and Indian tribes, with
the ultimate goal being to subject Indians to state and federal laws on exactly the same terms as
other citizens.”).
125. Id. (describing the impact termination had on tribal land and communities); see also B.
Pfefferbaum et al., supra note 99, at 380–81 (“Indian termination policy began with the aim of
reversing federal Indian policy by eliminating Native programs. Whatever the motivations for termination—acquisition of Native land and resources, elimination of favoritism toward Indians, assimilation of Indians into the mainstream, or response to continued condemnation of existing programs—the result was severe budget cuts and the identification of tribes for whom federal
government responsibility could be eliminated.” (footnote omitted)).
126. See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 33, § 1.07 (describing the “Self-Determination and Self-Governance” period). “As federal policy gradually moved away from the termination era, there was a return to much of the basic philosophy and many of the policy objectives
rooted in the Indian reorganization era (1928–1942). . . . It was rooted in a recognition of government-to-government relationships between the federal government and individual Indian tribes. . . .
The self-determination era and the concept of self-governance are premised on the principle that
Indian tribes are, in the final analysis, the primary or basic governmental unit of Indian policy.” Id.
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shift.127 In 1976, Congress passed the IHCIA.128
The IHCIA unequivocally expressed Congress’s policy to provide
health care services as demonstrative of the federal government’s trust
obligations to American Indians and Indian tribes.129 The IHCIA
described this responsibility as not simply discretionary policy, but as
legally required under the federal trust doctrine.130 The IHCIA provided
for a comprehensive range of programs, authorized appropriation of
funds to achieve the law’s policy objectives, and permitted Medicaid and
Medicare to reimburse health care providers for IHS-administered
services.131 But despite its lofty declarations of responsibility pursuant to
federal trust obligations, American Indians continue to suffer worse
health measures than any other minority population in the United
States.132 The IHCIA, like the Snyder Act, continued to authorize
127. See id. (including the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, the Menominee Restoration Act of
1973, the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, the Tribal Self-Government Act of 1994, the Indian Child Welfare Act, the Archaeological Resources Protection Act,
the National Museum of the American Indian Act, the American Indian Religious Freedom Act,
the Tribally Controlled Schools Act, the Indian Arts and Crafts Act, the Native Americans Graves
Protection and Restoration Act, and the Indian Education Act, and the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, among others).
128. Indian Health Care Improvement Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-437, 90 Stat. 1400 (codified
in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
129. See 25 U.S.C. § 1601(1) (“Federal health services to maintain and improve the health of
the Indians are consonant with and required by the Federal Government’s historical and unique
legal relationship with, and resulting responsibility to, the American Indian people.”); see also
McCarthy, supra note 106, at 121 (describing how the IHCIA is “notable” for expressly recognizing the federal government’s legal responsibility for providing health care services).
130. 25 U.S.C. § 1602 (“[I]t is the policy of this Nation, in fulfillment of its special trust responsibilities and legal obligations to Indians—(1) to ensure the highest possible health status for Indians and urban Indians and to provide all resources necessary to effect that policy . . . .”). The IHCIA
also declared federal policy to raise Indians’ health status, ensure Indian participation in the provision of health care services, increase the proportion of health care providers serving American Indians, consult with tribes regarding implementation, work in a government-to-government relationship with tribes, and “to provide funding for programs and facilities operated by Indian tribes and
tribal organizations in amounts that are not less than the amounts provided to programs and facilities operated directly by the Service.” Id.
131. B. Pfefferbaum et al., supra note 99, at 386 (providing an overview of the Indian Health
Care Improvement Act and its programs and objectives); see generally Indian Health Care Improvement Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-437, 90 Stat. 1400.
132. See, e.g., Disparities, INDIAN HEALTH SERV., https://www.ihs.gov/newsroom/factsheets/disparities/ [https://perma.cc/JYA8-HKSV] (last visited Apr. 10, 2021) (“The American Indian and Alaska Native people have long experienced lower health status when compared with
other Americans. Lower life expectancy and the disproportionate disease burden exist perhaps because of inadequate education, disproportionate poverty, discrimination in the delivery of health
services, and cultural differences.”); COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GENERAL ON INTEGRITY AND
EFFICIENCY, VULNERABILITIES AND RESULTING BREAKDOWNS: A REVIEW OF AUDITS,
EVALUATIONS, AND INVESTIGATIONS FOCUSED ON SERVICES AND FUNDING FOR AMERICAN
INDIANS AND ALASKA NATIVES 1 (2017), https://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/oig-reports/CIGIE_AIAN_Vulnerabilities_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/SLL6-GMQB] (describing
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discretionary congressional appropriations instead of creating an
entitlement to specific services, and it did not establish consistent funding
levels or goals going forward.133
Though the IHCIA expired in 2000, the 2010 Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA) permanently reauthorized its main
provisions.134 In signing the law, President Obama alluded to the trust
doctrine by acknowledging the federal government’s responsibility,
derived from the nature of its relationship with Indian tribes, to provide
health care services to American Indians.135 But the reauthorized IHCIA
still did not require Congress to appropriate a specific amount of funds
toward Indian health care services; nor did it generally require
appropriated funds to be spent in particular ways.136 Thus, current IHS
funding levels remain inadequate to meet health care needs for the
estimated 2.56 million American Indians who utilize IHS services.137
In summary, the federal trust doctrine developed from international
law, the treaty tradition, and the federal common law as expressed in the
Supreme Court’s early articulation of the legal relationship between the
United States and Indian tribes. While these legal traditions were
health disparities that American Indians face, including an infant mortality rate about forty percent
higher than the national rate, twice as high of a likelihood to develop diabetes when compared to
the national population, and disproportionately high death rates from both accidental injuries and
suicide).
133. R. Pfefferbaum et al., supra note 100, at 216 (noting the characteristics and limitations of
the IHCIA); see also Hoss, supra note 103, at 124 (“In its aggregate history, IHS has remained
chronically underfunded.”).
134. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10221, 124
Stat 119, 935 (2010); Holly E. Cerasano, The Indian Health Service: Barriers to Health Care and
Strategies for Improvement, 24 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 421, 430 (2017); see also Legislation, INDIAN HEALTH SERV., https://www.ihs.gov/aboutihs/legislation/ [https://perma.cc/X7A25RDS] (last visited Apr. 10, 2021) (noting the IHCIA’s expiration in 2000 and its permanent reauthorization under the ACA).
135. Statement on the Reauthorization of the Indian Health Care Improvement Act, supra note
31, at 406 (“Our responsibility to provide health services to American Indians and Alaska Natives
derives from the nation-to-nation relationship between the federal and tribal governments.”).
136. Cerasano, supra note 134, at 435 (describing the IHCIA’s continued inadequate funding
to meet health care needs of its constituents); see also NATIONAL TRIBAL BUDGET FORMULATION
WORKGROUP, RECLAIMING TRIBAL HEALTH: A NATIONAL BUDGET PLAN TO RISE ABOVE FAILED
POLICIES AND FULFILL TRUST OBLIGATIONS TO TRIBAL NATIONS 3 (April 2020) [hereinafter
RECLAIMING
TRIBAL
HEALTH],
https://www.nihb.org/docs/05042020/FINAL_FY22%
20IHS%20Budget%20Book.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MZ6-UFGV] (“The discretionary nature of the
federal budget that systematically fails to fulfill Trust and Treaty obligation is a legal, ethical, and
moral violation of the greatest order.”).
137. See RECLAIMING TRIBAL HEALTH, supra note 136, at 1 (indicating that a fully funded IHS
budget that ended health disparities between American Indians and other populations would require
an appropriation of $48 billion, but requesting a budget appropriation of $12.759 billion for FY
2022); IHS Profile, INDIAN HEALTH SERV., https://www.ihs.gov/newsroom/factsheets/ihsprofile/
[https://perma.cc/F8DT-B3SD] (last visited Apr. 10, 2021) (noting the FY 2020 budget appropriation of $6.0 billion and citing the estimated population served by IHS as of January 2020).
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premised on the era’s racist assumptions of European supremacy over
indigenous Americans, they also recognized American Indian tribal
sovereignty, acknowledged the government-to-government relationship,
and undertook ongoing fiduciary obligations inherent in a trust
relationship. In early treaties with Indian tribes, the United States agreed
to provide goods and services—including health care services,
particularly relevant in light of the massive disease outbreaks following
European colonization—in exchange for land.
But as federal policy shifted and settlers expanded westward, the
United States either broke or failed to enforce agreements respecting
tribal lands and resources. Crowded onto reservations throughout the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, American Indians were forced
to depend on federally provided resources. The federal government,
however, did not pay corresponding attention to the provision of health
care or other services inherent in treaty obligations and the trust
relationship. Rather, the characterization of American Indians and Indian
tribes as “wards” of the federal government influenced the Court’s
understanding of Congress’s authority to control nearly all aspects of
Indian life and to abrogate the terms of treaty or trust responsibilities if it
so chose. One hundred years ago, Congress passed the Snyder Act,
reflecting its acceptance of trust obligations for the provision of services
like health care, but the Act neither guaranteed nor regularly appropriated
funding.
Although Congress’s recognition of its trust responsibility to provide
health care to American Indians has deepened over the past fifty years, as
demonstrated in expansive federal legislation like the IHCIA and ACA,
the Court has simultaneously narrowed its general interpretation of the
trust doctrine. The Court now requires specific, explicitly articulated
fiduciary obligations grounded in express statutory language before it
will enforce such obligations against the federal government. In recent
years, the Court has all but ignored the common law origins of the federal
trust doctrine. Given this trend, the issue of whether the IHCIA creates
an affirmative, judicially enforceable trust obligation for the federal
government to provide necessary health care services to Indian tribes
remains in doubt, despite Congress’s intention in the statute’s text to
uphold its legal trust responsibility.
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III. THE IHCIA IN THE EIGHTH AND NINTH CIRCUITS
Few appellate-level cases have directly addressed the sources, scope,
and enforceability of the federal government’s affirmative trust
obligations to provide health care to American Indians under the
IHCIA.138 The Eighth and Ninth Circuits—the only federal courts of
138. A September 13, 2020 Westlaw search of “U.S. Courts of Appeals Cases” including the
word “trust” and the phrase “Indian Health Care Improvement Act” yielded nineteen results. The
author reviewed each result, including Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation, 599
Fed. App’x 698, 699 (9th Cir. 2015), discussed at length in this Comment (see discussion infra
Section III.B) and including the Tenth Circuit predecessor of Lincoln v. Vigil, Vigil v. Rhoades, 953
F.2d 1225, 1231 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that the district court appropriately exercised judicial
review of the IHS’s termination of an IHCIA-funded health care program for Indian children and
affirming its finding that the APA notice and comment proceedings were required before the agency
took such action, particularly in light of the federal trust relationship), rev’d sub nom. Lincoln v.
Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 193 (1993) (holding that Congress’s lump-sum appropriations for Indian health
care were not judicially reviewable under the APA as spending decisions were a matter of agency
discretion). See also discussion supra Section II.A.3.
Of the remaining seventeen cases, an Eighth Circuit case, subsequent to and consistent with White
v. Califano, noted that the Snyder Act imposed “affirmative obligations on BIA to relieve distress
and conserve Indian Health,” while the IHCIA similarly obligated the IHS pursuant to its trust
obligations “to refrain from contributing to poor health conditions on the Reservation.” Blue Legs
v. U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094, 1100 & n.5 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that the BIA
and IHS had a duty to clean up hazardous waste sites on reservations that they contributed to creating).
Two Ninth Circuit cases appeared to reach a different conclusion regarding the federal trust doctrine than was reached in Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation, as discussed infra
Section III.B. See McNabb ex rel. McNabb v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 787, 794–95 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that Congress intended, consistent with its federal trust responsibility to provide health care to
American Indians, that the federal government must meet Indians’ health care needs that were unmet under state and local health care programs); Arizona v. United States, No. 87-2523, 1988 WL
96613, at *4–5 (9th Cir. Sept. 12, 1988) (noting the conclusion in McNabb that congressional intent
as expressed through the Snyder Act and the IHCIA did not give the federal government exclusive
responsibility for Indian health care, and that this conclusion was not inconsistent with the federal
trust doctrine).
The Federal Circuit rejected a tribe’s claim that 25 U.S.C. §§ 1632, 1621, and 1603 of the IHCIA,
read in combination with other statutes at issue, demonstrated that the United States had accepted
a common-law fiduciary duty to manage the tribe’s water resources. Hopi Tribe v. United States,
782 F.3d 662, 669–71 (Fed. Cir. 2015). But this holding is not directly applicable to this Comment’s
focus, because despite being an action for breach of trust and implicating the IHCIA, the tribe was
(1) seeking monetary damages rather than equitable relief, and (2) the alleged breach ultimately
concerned the federal government’s obligation to ensure safe drinking water on a reservation, not
provision of health care services. Id. at 671.
In three cases, the respective courts either did not reach the issue of affirmative trust responsibilities under the IHCIA or did not discuss the issue at length. See Rincon Band of Mission Indians v.
Harris, 618 F.2d 569, 570, 575 (9th Cir. 1980) (concluding that the IHS breached its statutory responsibilities to California Indians under the Snyder Act to develop distribution criteria that were
rationally aimed at an equitable division of funds, without reaching the question of whether this
also breached federal trust responsibilities); Yankton Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Hum.
Servs., 533 F.3d 634, 644 (8th Cir. 2008) (“The Tribe has not identified any [health care-related]
assets taken over by the government such as tribally owned land, timber, or funds which would
give rise to a special trust duty.”); Blatchford v. Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium, 645 F.3d
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appeals with cases directly on point—have diverged in their approaches
to this issue.139 As the district court in Rosebud Sioux Tribe identified,
the Eighth Circuit found that enforceable trust obligations arose under the
IHCIA, and because the district is within the Eighth Circuit’s jurisdiction,
its rationale controls.140 But the district court also acknowledged that the
Ninth Circuit had found otherwise and held that the IHCIA did not create
specific, judicially enforceable trust obligations.141 This part will address
the two circuits’ divergent holdings and the district court’s application of
the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning to Rosebud Sioux Tribe.

1089, 1092–93 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that 25 U.S.C. § 1621e(a) of the IHCIA gave health care
providers the right to recover costs of treating Indians only against third parties, not against the
individual to whom it provided services, without holding on the trust responsibility).
Six of the cases briefly mentioned the IHCIA in lawsuits arising under other statutes, but in unrelated contexts. See Preston v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 1359, 1372–73 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting the IHCIA
in discussing general federal policy to ensure high quality health care services to American Indians); Tsosie v. United States, 452 F.3d 1161, 1166–67 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting the IHCIA in discussing whether a physician hired through a nonpersonal services contract to treat patients at IHS
facilities are considered independent contractors for purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act); Tunica-Biloxi Tribe v. Louisiana, 964 F.2d 1536, 1542 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the IHCIA and
the ISDEAA did not preempt the collection of state sales taxes for the off-reservation purchase of
a van used for the tribal health service with federal grant money); Malone v. Bureau of Indian Affs.,
38 F.3d 433, 438 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that the IHCIA’s 1988 amendments extended eligibility
to members of some tribes without federal recognition and analogizing to the BIA’s administration
of the Higher Education Grant Program); Penobscot Nation v. Fellencer, 164 F.3d 706, 713 (1st
Cir. 1999) (citing the IHCIA as an example of Congress’s policy to promote tribal self-determination); Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 101 F.3d
1286, 1298 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting the IHCIA along with other federal statutes as examples of
Congress’s continued intent to provide benefits and protections to Alaska Natives after the Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act) rev’d, 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
Finally, the two remaining cases were completely irrelevant, as they challenged the constitutionality of the ACA. See Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Hum. Servs., 648 F.3d
1235, 1249 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting the IHCIA within the structure of the ACA); Texas v. United
States, 945 F.3d 355, 418 (5th Cir. 2019) (King, J., dissenting) (mentioning the reauthorization and
amendment of the IHCIA as part of the ACA).
139. Compare White v. Califano, 581 F.2d 697, 698 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (holding the
IHCIA created an obligation to provide health care services to an indigent Indian woman), and Blue
Legs, 867 F.2d at 1100 (holding that the Snyder Act and IHCIA imposed affirmative trust obligations and citing White v. Califano in support), with Quechan Tribe, 599 Fed. App’x at 699 (holding
that there are no affirmative, judicially enforceable trust obligations that flow from the IHCIA). But
see also McNabb ex rel. McNabb v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 787, 794–95 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that
Congress intended, consistent with its federal trust responsibility to provide health care to American
Indians, that the federal government must meet Indians’ health care needs that were unmet under
state and local health care programs); Arizona v. United States, No. 87-2523, 1988 WL 96613, at
*4–5 (9th Cir. Sept. 12, 1988) (noting the conclusion in McNabb that congressional intent as expressed through the Snyder Act and the IHCIA did not give the federal government exclusive responsibility for Indian health care, and that this conclusion was not inconsistent with the federal
trust doctrine).
140. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 3d 986, 998 (D.S.D. 2020) (citing the
Eighth Circuit’s holding in White v. Califano).
141. See id.

2021]

Trust Betrayed

1131

A. White v. Califano
Two years after the IHCIA’s passage in 1976, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit first considered in White v. Califano the
federal government’s trust obligation to provide health care services to
American Indians.142 The story behind the case began in April of 1976,143
just a few months before Congress passed the IHCIA.144 Plaintiff Georgia
White acted as guardian ad litem for her sister Florence Red Dog, a
member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe and resident of the Pine Ridge Indian
Reservation in South Dakota.145 Ms. Red Dog suffered from severe
mental illness and needed immediate inpatient mental health treatment to
protect herself and others from physical harm.146 Some of the plaintiff’s
142. The Eighth Circuit decided the White case in 1978, only two years after the IHCIA was
passed. White, 581 F.2d at 697; see also White v. Califano, 437 F. Supp. 543, 554, 556 (D.S.D.
1977) (identifying the enactment of the IHCIA as the “latest statement[s]” of Congress regarding
its intent to uphold its trust responsibilities for providing health care to Indians). No earlier U.S.
Court of Appeals cases were found implicating the IHCIA and the federal trust responsibility. See
cases cited supra note 138.
143. White, 437 F. Supp. at 545 (“On April 13, 1976, J. W. Brantley, an Indian Health Service
psychiatric social worker determined that Florence Red Dog was mentally ill and in such condition
that immediate treatment was necessary for her protection from physical harm and for the protection of others.”).
144. The IHCIA was enacted as Public Law 94-437 on September 30, 1976. Indian Health Care
Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 94-437, 90 Stat. 1400 (1976) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§ 1601 et seq.).
145. White v. Matthews, 420 F. Supp. 882, 884 (D.S.D. 1976). In the first reported disposition
in this case, the defendants were listed as David Matthews, etc., et al. and Richard Kneip, etc., et
al. Id. at 882. The first named defendant, “David Matthews,” referred to F. David Mathews, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare during the Ford administration until 1977. See David
Mathews, GERALD R. FORD FOUND., https://geraldrfordfoundation.org/centennial/oralhistory/david-mathews/ [https://perma.cc/8QR5-G4SS] (last visited May 27, 2021). The second named defendant, Kneip, represented the relevant group of state and county officials who were “persisting
in their refusal to commit Florence Red Dog to the Human Services center in Yankton.” White, 420
F. Supp. at 884. The federal and state officials filed cross claims against each other for the responsibility for and cost of providing inpatient psychiatric care to Ms. Red Dog, and the state officials
also filed a third-party suit against the Oglala Sioux Tribe, as responsible for the cost of medical
care jointly or in the alternative to the federal government. Id. at 884–85. The court dismissed the
claim against the Oglala Sioux Tribe in a prior hearing, and the federal defendants moved to dismiss
the state defendants’ cross-claim. Id. at 885. The court denied the federal defendants’ motions to
dismiss. Id. at 890. In the subsequent published decision, 437 F. Supp. 543, the first named defendant was replaced with Joseph Califano, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare under President Carter from 1977–79. See Joseph A. Califano, Jr. (1977–1979), UVA MILLER CTR.,
https://millercenter.org/president/carter/essays/califano-1977-secretary-of-health-education-andwelfare [https://perma.cc/5HNX-C5VV] (last visited May 27, 2021). Thus, the substitution of the
named defendant in the case name between 1976 and 1977.
146. White, 437 F. Supp. at 545; see also White, 420 F. Supp. at 884 (“[The complaint alleged]
that Florence Red Dog was in a dangerously mentally ill condition and had threatened and physically attacked other persons and attempted suicide; that she was as of April 15 incarcerated in the
Pine Ridge tribal jail, was heavily sedated and all her clothing had been taken away to prevent
suicide attempts; that state officials had refused to act in accordance with state law to provide necessary emergency medical treatment . . . .”).
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claims against state and county officials, who denied responsibility to
care for Ms. Red Dog in the county’s public health facility, raised
complex jurisdictional questions between tribal and state jurisdiction.147
But her claims against the federal defendants implicated the federal trust
doctrine.148 The district court framed the federal question as whether the
government had a statutory or regulatory duty to provide inpatient mental
health care to American Indians.149
To determine whether the IHCIA created affirmative trust obligations
under the federal trust doctrine in this case, the U.S. District Court for the
District of South Dakota recounted the original sources of these
obligations.150 The court detailed the history of the expansion of health
care services provided to tribes and their members, first by military
personnel and funded according to treaty provisions, then by BIA after
the creation of the Department of the Interior, and finally under federal
statute.151 In describing this history in detail, the district court
emphasized the expansive responsibility and control the federal
government had taken over centuries to provide health care services to
American Indians.152 But in 1971, IHS decided to become “residual”

147. See White, 437 F. Supp. at 545–51 (discussing whether state officials had the jurisdictional
authority to intrude onto tribal jurisdiction to involuntarily commit a tribal citizen and concluding
that the state does not have such authority).
148. See id. at 553 (“Plaintiff's position is that the decision to become a ‘residual’ supplier of
services is incompatible with the federal government’s trust responsibility and with statutes and
regulations pertaining to Indian health care. Plaintiff admits that no statute states with specificity
that the I.H.S. must provide care for persons requiring involuntary commitment, but she does argue
that such a duty is implicit in the unique legal relationship that exists between the Indian tribes and
the federal government.”).
149. Id. at 551 (“The question presented . . . is as follows: Whether Federal Defendants have a
duty under statute and/or regulation to provide directly or by contract for inpatient mental health
care to reservation Indians . . . .”). The court also noted IHS treated some mental health conditions,
but that the local IHS hospital at Pine Ridge was not equipped to provide inpatient mental health
treatment, so would outsource this treatment to other non-IHS facilities. Id. at 552 (“The policy of
IHS with respect to inpatient mental health treatment is that alternative state resources will be relied
on in the allocation of IHS resources. This policy was followed in every state.”). Since 1971, IHS
had refused to pay for the full cost of inpatient mental health treatment to the state of South Dakota,
despite the state continuing to bill IHS for it. Id.
150. See id. at 551–53 (tracing the development of federal Indian health policy). The court paid
special attention to the provision of mental health care as especially relevant to this case. Id.
151. See id. at 553 (describing history of Indian health care services). The court noted the
Snyder Act’s authorization for the BIA to spend appropriations for health care services to American
Indians. Id. (“[The Snyder Act] specifically authorized the B.I.A. to spend money on the Indian
people ‘for relief of distress and conservation of health.’ 25 U.S.C. § 13. Under this act funds were
appropriated specifically for health services to Indians.”).
152. See id. The court noted that after the Snyder Act’s passage in 1921, health care services
expanded in 1934 with congressional authorization for the Department of the Interior to contract
with states, counties, private, and public institutions to provide health care. Id. In 1955, the Public
Health Service created a new Division of Indian Health—renamed the Indian Health Service (IHS)
in 1968—under the auspices of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Id.
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suppliers of certain Indian health services and to require tribal members
to use state resources first and then only resort to federal resources if state
resources were not available.153 The plaintiff argued the federal
government’s position was incompatible with its trust responsibility and
with federal law and its implementing regulations.154 The federal
government denied any trust responsibility to provide specific health care
services unless statutes explicitly required them.155
The court did not expressly define the contours of federal trust
responsibility’s scope, alluding to its complexity and indefiniteness.156
But the court did indicate that the recently passed IHCIA represented
Congress’s expression of its trust obligation to provide health care to
American Indians.157 The court directly quoted the IHCIA, grounding the
source of this trust obligation in the statute’s language.158 The court
reasoned this language was sufficiently explicit to create legally
cognizable trust obligations.159 The court then concluded that the federal
government was obligated to care for Ms. Red Dog.160 In the court’s
view, Congress’s declaration of policy in the IHCIA was specific enough
to require the IHS to provide inpatient mental health care services to Ms.
Red Dog, who otherwise would have had nowhere else to turn for care.161

153. White, 437 F. Supp. at 553.
154. Id. Although the plaintiff conceded that there was “no statute [that] states with specificity
that the IHS must provide care for persons requiring involuntary commitment,” the plaintiff argued
that “such a duty is implicit in the unique legal relationship that exists between the Indian tribes
and the federal government.” Id.
155. Id. at 554. According to the federal government, “whatever federal responsibilities might
be, they are not to be guessed at by reference to the vague idea of ‘trust responsibility.’ Duty, if any
can only be found by reference to specific statutes.” Id.
156. See id. (“Defining the dimensions of the trust relationship between Indians and the federal
government as that relationship has evolved could consume much time and labor, and we are doubtful that probing history can give us more than a framework within which to analyze the present
issue.”).
157. Id. (“We think that statute [the IHCIA] embodies the most relevant legislative material
available for ascertaining the intent of Congress on the subject of federal responsibility toward
Indians’ health needs, and is the latest statement of what the trust responsibility requires in the area
of health care.”).
158. Id.; see also Indian Health Care Improvement Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-437, §§ 2–3, 90
Stat. 1400, 1400–01 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1602).
159. White, 437 F. Supp. at 555.
160. Id. The court had already concluded in its opinion that the state had no jurisdiction to intrude onto tribal lands and commit Ms. Red Dog involuntarily. Id.
161. See id.
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The Eighth Circuit adopted verbatim the district court’s reasoning and
articulation thus far of the government’s obligation, so the district court’s
language bears restating here:
We think that Congress has unambiguously declared that the federal
government has a legal responsibility to provide health care to Indians.
This stems from the “unique relationship” between Indians and the
federal government, a relationship that is reflected in hundreds of cases
and is further made obvious by the fact that one bulging volume of the
U.S. Code pertains only to Indians.
It matters not at this juncture whether the federal government is
called a residual supplier or a primary supplier of services. We
determined earlier in this opinion that the State of South Dakota has no
jurisdiction to involuntarily commit Florence Red Dog. The question
then became, not whether the federal defendants are residual or primary
suppliers, but whether they can abandon Florence Red Dog entirely. We
hold here that they cannot abandon her if she requires involuntary
commitment. The federal defendants are free to call themselves
“residual suppliers” if that fits in better with their policy statements, but
where the state cannot act, they must.162

This was arguably a narrow holding. The Eighth Circuit did not further
define the full scope of what the federal trust responsibility required
under the IHCIA in all cases.163 In contrast, the district court defined a
mechanism by which the IHS should weigh its limited resources with its
obligations under the trust doctrine, and it rebutted the federal
government’s rejection of any trust obligation to provide specific health
care services, discussed below.
The district court acknowledged IHS’s limited resources,164 and
indicated that courts should not generally dictate agencies’ spending
discretion.165 For guidance, the district court looked to a somewhat
analogous situation in Morton v. Ruiz, where funding was inadequate to
meet the demands of statutory obligations.166 Following the reasoning in
162. White v. Califano, 581 F.2d 697, 698 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (quoting White, 437 F.
Supp. at 555).
163. See id. (affirming the district court’s reasoning and conclusions as related directly to the
quoted language).
164. White, 437 F. Supp. at 555 (“We are not unmindful of the fact that this is no simple matter
for I.H.S. officials. The I.H.S. staff on the Pine Ridge Reservation does not presently have adequate
facilities or manpower to treat Florence Red Dog and other similarly situated persons; moreover,
they cannot create programs out of the bald statements of Congress but must work with the funds
Congress appropriates.”).
165. Id. (“Courts have no expertise for deciding how limited resources should be allocated.”).
166. Id. at 555–56. The dispute in Morton v. Ruiz concerned the availability of BIA general
assistance (i.e., welfare) benefits to tribal members living nearby their tribe’s reservation but not
on the reservation itself. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 204–05 (1974). The Supreme Court reviewed the history of congressional proceedings and found that the BIA had not always exclusively
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Morton, the district court concluded that IHS must look to its agency
regulations to determine the bounds of its discretion in spending its
congressional appropriations.167 Regulations promulgated under the
IHCIA emphasized the relative need and access to other arrangements for
health care.168 Thus, the district court reasoned that Ms. Red Dog’s care
took priority because of the “extreme” nature of her need and her lack of
access to any other resources, given the state’s inability to provide it.169
The district court also flatly rejected the federal government’s position
that it had no trust responsibility, standing alone, to provide specific
health care services to any particular American Indian.170 The court
reasoned that the IHCIA represented an expansive statement of
Congress’s recognition of an affirmative trust obligation to provide health
care services to American Indians.171 The court distinguished Congress’s
limited its general assistance programs to tribal members living on the reservation, and that Congress had understood and sanctioned this benefit to extend to those living near reservations. Id. at
229–30. Recognizing BIA’s limited resources, however, BIA had to develop a rational eligibility
standard for benefits, apply it consistently, and ensure its communication with relevant stakeholders. Id. at 231.
167. White, 437 F. Supp. at 556; see also Morton, 415 U.S. at 236 (holding that the BIA had to
follow the Administrative Procedure Act to develop eligibility requirements for assistance benefits
and apply them to determine priority for scarce agency resources).
168. See White, 437 F. Supp. at 556; see also 42 C.F.R. § 36.1(a) (1977) (“The regulations in
this part establish the general principles to be followed in the discharge of this Department’s responsibilities for continuation and improvement of Indian health services. Officers and employees
of the Department will be guided by these policies in exercising discretionary authority with respect
to the matters covered.”); id. § 36.12(c) (“Priorities when funds, facilities, or personnel are insufficient to provide the indicated volume of services. Priorities for care and treatment, as among individuals who are within the scope of the program, will be determined on the basis of relative medical
need and access to other arrangements for obtaining the necessary care.” (emphasis added)).
169. White, 437 F. Supp. at 556.
170. See id. at 554 (“Ultimately, [the federal defendants] rest on the assertion that, whatever
federal responsibilities might be, they are not to be guessed at by reference to the vague idea of
‘trust responsibility.’ Duty, if any can only be found by reference to specific statutes. Finding no
statute that specifically creates a duty for I.H.S. to care for persons in the class of Florence Red
Dog, federal defendants deny that there is such a duty.”). The government’s argument in the Rosebud Sioux Tribe case forty years later would prove to be remarkably consistent with its argument
in White, even before the Mitchell cases and their progeny required trust obligations to be explicitly
grounded in statute in breach of trust claims for money damages. See discussion, infra Section IV.B
(analyzing the government’s argument on appeal in the Rosebud Sioux Tribe case in relation to case
law from 1980 to 2011).
171. White, 437 F. Supp. at 557 (“If Congress had, at some point in history stated that a trust
responsibility existed, and never said more, then in the absence of controlling precedent this Court
would scarcely be able to conclude that care for Florence Red Dog was included within the federal
government’s trust responsibility. But, the Congress has taken the well-accepted concept of trust
responsibility and has said a great deal about what it means; in particular, the Congress in 1976
stated that the federal government had a responsibility to provide health care for Indians. Therefore,
when we say that the trust responsibility requires a certain course of action, we do not refer to a
relationship that exists only in the abstract but rather to a congressionally recognized duty to provide services for a particular category of human needs. The trust responsibility, as recognized and
defined by statute, is the ground upon which the federal defendants’ duties rest in this case.”).
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intention in passing legislation providing services to American Indians
from other types of legislation. In no other context, the court
acknowledged, does Congress legislate specific protections, benefits, and
services that apply exclusively to a community of people recognized on
the one hand for their ethnic and racial origins, and on the other for their
ancestors’ history with the United States government.172 The court
therefore reasoned that the duties arising under the IHCIA can only be
justified with reference to the federal trust doctrine, itself a product of the
historical relationship between the federal government and Indian
tribes.173 But the Eighth Circuit’s opinion did not explicitly affirm this
rationale or finding by the district court.174
Thus, the rationale the Eighth Circuit adopted in White v. Califano
recognized the historical origins of the federal government’s obligation
to provide health care services to American Indians under the trust
doctrine.175 This “legal responsibility,” the Eighth Circuit affirmed,
originated not with the IHCIA nor with any of the other statutes in the
“bulging volume of the U.S. Code” concerning Indians, tribes, and tribal
members.176 Rather, the IHCIA, like the Snyder Act and other
congressional actions, reflected Congress’s expression of the
government’s historical trust obligation.177 Applying this reasoning to the
specific case of Florence Red Dog, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s order that IHS provide for her care.178
Whereas in White v. Califano the Eighth Circuit recognized the IHCIA
as the most recent expression of the federal trust doctrine and affirmed a
legally cognizable trust obligation to provide health care in at least some
contexts, the Ninth Circuit advanced an alternative interpretation. As next
discussed, in Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v.
United States, the Ninth Circuit held that neither the IHCIA nor the
172. Id. (“When the Congress legislates for Indians only, something more than a statutory entitlement is involved. Congress is acting upon the premise that a special relationship is involved, and
is acting to meet the obligations inherent in that relationship. If that were not the case, then most of
25 U.S.C. could not withstand an equal protection analysis for the reason that the legislation embodied in that volume is aimed at a class defined on the basis of race.”).
173. See id. (“We have, therefore, read and construed the Indian Health Care Improvement Act
as a manifestation of what Congress thinks the trust responsibility requires of federal officials, with
whatever funds are available, when they try to meet Indian health needs.”).
174. See White v. Califano, 581 F.2d 697, 698 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (declining to extend
its affirmation beyond the district court’s rationale for providing health care to Florence Red Dog
specifically).
175. See id. (quoting White, 437 F. Supp. at 555) (“This stems from the ‘unique relationship’
between Indians and the federal government . . . .”).
176. Id. (quoting White, 437 F. Supp. at 555) (“We think that Congress has unambiguously
declared that the federal government has a legal responsibility to provide health care to Indians.”);
see also 25 U.S.C. (the volume dedicated to Indian law).
177. White, 581 F.2d at 698.
178. Id. at 698.
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general trust relationship sufficed as a source of law to allege the
government’s failure to provide adequate health care services.
B. Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v. United States
In contrast to the Eighth Circuit in 1978, the Ninth Circuit held in 2015
that no affirmative, judicially enforceable trust obligations flowed from
the IHCIA or the general trust relationship.179 Like White v. Califano, the
Ninth Circuit issued a brief memorandum opinion affirming the lower
court’s judgment and rationale without much additional analysis.180 The
district court’s fact-finding and reasoning is therefore necessary to
understand the Ninth Circuit’s holding.
The Quechan Tribe received health care from the IHS Fort Yuma
Service Unit and alleged that these IHS medical facilities were so badly
maintained and ill-equipped that they were hazardous.181 Unlike in
White, this case did not allege inadequate care for specifically named
tribal members.182 Rather, the tribe asserted claims on behalf of all its
members and sought equitable relief to guarantee that IHS facilities met
the minimum standard of care.183 Three of the tribe’s causes of action
alleged breaches of trust obligations arising under the Snyder Act, the
IHCIA, and the federal trust doctrine at common law.184 The Quechan
Tribe sought a declaratory judgment to enforce the claimed trust

179. Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Rsrv. v. United States, 599 Fed. App’x 698, 699
(9th Cir. 2015).
180. The Eighth Circuit’s per curiam opinion affirming the district court’s judgment in White v.
Califano spanned only two pages in the reporter (697–98); likewise, the Ninth Circuit’s memorandum opinion affirming the district court’s judgment in Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian
Reservation v. United States was just over one full page (699–700).
181. Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Rsrv. v. United States, No. 10-2261, 2011 WL
1211574, at *1 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2011) (“Plaintiff alleges that the physical facilities at Ft. Yuma
are in disrepair and unsafe, that Ft. Yuma lacks basic medical equipment, and that Ft. Yuma affords
unsafe and unhealthy medical care as evidenced, for example, by an ‘exposure event’ in which
members of the Tribe received wound care and were possibly exposed to blood borne pathogens
due to improper sterilization.”).
182. Compare White v. Matthews, 420 F. Supp. 882, 883–84 (D.S.D. 1976) (noting the plaintiff
Georgia White acting as guardian ad litem for Florence Red Dog), with Quechan Tribe, 2011 WL
1211574, at *1 (indicating the Quechan Indian Tribe as bringing claims on behalf of its citizens).
183. Quechan Tribe, 2011 WL 1211574, at *1.
184. Id. at *1 (“Claim one alleges a breach of the duty to provide health care services and facilities in compliance with minimum standards of professional medical care. Claim two asserts a
breach of the duty to preserve and maintain trust property. Claim three asserts a breach of defendants’ duty as a health care provider.”). The tribe also asserted claims under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend V, and claims for a declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2201 and 2202 and a writ of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Id. Analysis of these claims is
outside the scope of this Comment.
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obligations.185 The government argued that these sources of law did not
create specific, judicially enforceable fiduciary duties and moved to
dismiss for failure to state a claim.186
First, the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona analyzed the
federal trust doctrine and found that under controlling Ninth Circuit case
law, the general trust relationship did not create legal obligations.187 The
district court then cited the Supreme Court’s 2003 holding in United
States v. Navajo Nation for the principle that tribal breach of trust claims
for damages against the federal government must be grounded in an
explicit, statutorily imposed fiduciary duty.188 This narrow reading of
when the trust doctrine supported breach of trust claims for money
damages extended in Ninth Circuit case law to breach of trust claims for
equitable relief as well.189
The district court analogized the Quechan Tribe’s claims to those
brought under the General Allotment Act (GAA) in Mitchell I and under
the various timber management statutes in Mitchell II.190 The district
court noted that the Mitchell cases turned on “whether a statute creates
only a ‘bare trust’ or establishes specific legal duties,” and declared,
without citation, that “the trust responsibility arises when the United
States holds tribal property in trust.”191 The court found the Snyder Act
and the IHCIA to be similar to the GAA in Mitchell I in that their
respective language created only a “bare trust” and was too broad to
impose any specific duties on the government.192 Therefore, the district
185. Quechan Tribe, 2011 WL 1211574, at *1; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (“In a case of
actual controversy within its jurisdiction, . . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an
appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking
such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall
have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.”); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2202 (“Further necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be
granted, after reasonable notice and hearing, against any adverse party whose rights have been
determined by such judgment.”).
186. Quechan Tribe, 2011 WL 1211574, at *1.
187. Id. at *2 (citing Marceau v. Blackfeet Hous. Auth., 540 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 2008)).
188. See id. (“When a tribe sues the government for damages, it ‘must identify a substantive
source of law that establishes specific fiduciary or other duties and allege that the Government has
failed faithfully to perform those duties.’” (quoting United States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo Nation
I), 537 U.S. 488, 506 (2003))).
189. See id. (citing Gros Ventre Tribe v. United States, 469 F.3d 801, 812 (9th Cir. 2006);
Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. FAA, 161 F.3d 569, 574 (9th Cir. 1998)).
190. Id. (citing Mitchell v. United States (Mitchell I), 445 U.S. 535, 542 (1980); Mitchell v.
United States (Mitchell II), 463 U.S. 206, 224 (1983)). But the district court did not distinguish the
Quechan Tribe’s claim for equitable relief from the claims in the Mitchell cases, which sought
money damages. Id.
191. Id.
192. Quechan Tribe, 2011 WL 1211574, *2–3 (“The Snyder Act consists of extremely broad
language . . . like the GAA . . . [and] [t]he Snyder Act fails to impose an affirmative duty on
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court found that the Quechan Tribe had failed to state a claim for breach
of the duty to provide medical services meeting a specific standard of
care.193 According to the court, no judicially enforceable fiduciary duty
existed under the IHCIA, the Snyder Act, or common law.194 The court
dismissed all the tribe’s claims against the government,195 so the tribe
appealed to the Ninth Circuit.196
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that neither the
general trust relationship nor the IHCIA created a judicially enforceable
duty for the federal government to provide any specific standard of health
care services to Indian tribes.197 The Ninth Circuit also cited Lincoln v.
Vigil in declaring the Snyder Act and IHCIA addressed health care
services to American Indians “only in general terms,”198 so there was not
“sufficient trust-creating language” on which to base breach of trust
claims.199 Moreover, the Supreme Court had recently ruled in United
States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation that the federal government was not a
private trustee when it fulfilled its statutorily imposed trust obligations.200
In the subsequent controversy between the Rosebud Sioux Tribe and
the federal government regarding the operation of IHS hospital facilities,
the district court addressed both the Eighth and Ninth Circuit holdings on
this issue. As next addressed, that district court followed the Eighth
Circuit’s approach.
defendants to provide a specific level of health care or to maintain facilities at a certain level. . . .
We next turn to the IHCIA to determine whether it ‘unambiguously provides that the United States
has undertaken full fiduciary responsibilities’ as to the management of Indian health care. . . . While
[its] provisions are more exacting than those in the Snyder Act, they still do not impose a duty on
defendants to provide a certain level of health care, preserve and maintain tribal property, or be a
health care provider.” (quoting Mitchell v. United States (Mitchell I), 445 U.S. 535, 542 (1980))).
193. Id. at *4.
194. Id. at *2 (citing Marceau v. Blackfeet Hous. Auth., 540 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The
general trust relationship between the United States and Indian tribes, alone, is insufficient to create
legal obligations in the United States.”); id. at *4 (“[P]laintiff’s parens patriae lawsuit asking us to
find a specific standard of care established in the Snyder Act and the IHCIA fails to state a valid
cause of action for breach of statutory or fiduciary duties.”).
195. Id. at *7.
196. Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Rsrv. v. United States, 599 Fed. App’x 698, 699
(9th Cir. 2015).
197. Id. (“[T]he federal-tribal trust relationship does not, in itself, create a judicially enforceable
duty. . . . Neither the Snyder Act nor the Indian Health Care Improvement Act contains sufficient
trust-creating language on which to base a judicially enforceable duty.”).
198. Id. (quoting Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 194 (1993)).
199. Id.
200. Id. (quoting United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 165 (2011) (“[T]rust
obligations of the United States to the Indian tribes are established and governed by statute rather
than the common law, and in fulfilling its statutory duties, the Government acts not as a private
trustee but pursuant to its sovereign interest in the execution of federal law.”). For analysis of the
Ninth Circuit’s application of the holdings in Jicarilla Apache Nation to its reasoning and holding
in Quechan Tribe, see Section IV.A, infra.
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C. Recent Application in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. United States
In Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. United States, the U.S. District Court for the
District of South Dakota considered the reasoning and holdings of both
the Eighth and Ninth Circuits201 when ruling on cross motions for
summary judgment.202 The Eighth Circuit’s holding in White v. Califano
bound the district court in Rosebud Sioux Tribe as precedent.203 But in
his opinion for the court, Chief Judge Roberto Lange also illustrated
why—contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning—the Supreme Court’s
holdings in the Mitchell cases, Lincoln v. Vigil, the Navajo Nation cases,
and Jicarilla Apache Nation did not foreclose a finding that the
government owed the Rosebud Sioux Tribe a duty to provide health care
services.204
IHS placed Rosebud Hospital on “divert status” on December 5, 2015,
after federal inspectors found its conditions unsafe and unsanitary.205 In
April 2016, while the hospital’s emergency services department (ED)
remained closed, the tribe filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment
and injunction for the alleged violation of the federal government’s
treaty, statutory, and common law trust duties to provide health care
services, among other claims.206 The court denied the government’s
201. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 3d 986, 998–99 (D.S.D. 2020)
(describing the respective reasoning and holdings in White v. Califano and Quechan Tribe of the
Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v. United States).
202. See id. at 989 (noting the procedural history of the case and the cross motions for summary
judgment before the court).
203. See id. at 998 (noting the Eighth Circuit’s recognition of an enforceable duty under the
IHCIA). The U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota is within the jurisdiction of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. South Dakota Courts, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE
EIGHTH CIR., https://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/south-dakota-courts [https://perma.cc/PS5M-QU3A]
(last visited May 28, 2021).
204. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 998–99 (explaining that the Supreme Court’s
holdings subsequent to the Eighth Circuit’s holding in White did not invalidate it); see also discussion supra Section II.A.3 (describing the Supreme Court’s holdings in the major federal trust doctrine cases decided since 1980).
205. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 989–90 (describing the background facts of
the case); see also discussion supra Part I (describing the chronology of the hospital’s closure and
its consequences).
206. 61. The federal government has a specific, special trust duty, pursuant to the Snyder Act,
the IHCIA, the Treaty of Fort Laramie, and federal common law, to provide health care
services to the Tribe and its members and to ensure that health care services provided to the
Tribe and its members do not fall below the highest possible standards of professional care.
62. Having undertaken responsibility for Indian health care at the Rosebud Hospital,
IHS has a statutory and fiduciary trust obligation to provide health care to permit the
health status of the Tribe and its individual members to be raised to the highest possible
level.
63. The United States breached and continues to breach its trust duty to the Tribe and
its members by providing health services to the Tribe at a level that falls substantially
below the highest standards of health care and that are inadequate to maintain the health
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motion to dismiss, and the action proceeded to discovery.207
On cross motions for summary judgment following discovery, the
court detailed the undisputed factual findings relevant to both the federal
government’s and the Rosebud Sioux Tribe’s positions.208 The court
found IHS had (1) faced funding challenges for major expenses over a
span of years;209 (2) often resorted to placing struggling hospitals on
divert status;210 (3) provided access to care relative to patients’ ability to
pay;211 and (4) failed to solve the staffing inadequacies and rampant
turnover evident before, during, and after the closure of Rosebud
Hospital’s ED.212 The court’s factual findings incorporated sources
of the Tribe’s members.

....
65. For these reasons, the Tribe is entitled to a declaratory judgment that IHS has violated its trust duty owed to the Tribe arising under the Treaty of Fort Laramie, the Snyder
Act, the Indian Health Care Improvement Act, and federal common law, to ensure that
health services provided to members of the Tribe permit the health status of Indians to
be raised to the highest possible level.
66. The Tribe is also entitled to a mandatory injunction requiring IHS to comply with
its trust duties to the Tribe, protect the Tribe’s entitlement to health care services, and
take sufficient measures to ensure that health services are provided to members of the
Tribe to permit the health status of Indians to be raised to the highest possible level.
Complaint, supra note 5, at 16–18 (citations omitted). This comprised Count III of the tribe’s four
count claim. See id. at 12–21 (alleging the violation of 25 U.S.C. § 1631(b)(1) in Count I, the violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 et seq. in Count II, and the violation of
equal protection and due process under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution in Count IV).
The court granted the government’s motion to dismiss Counts I, II, and IV for other reasons in an
earlier disposition of the case. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. United States, No. 16-CV-03038, 2017 WL
1214418, at *10 (D.S.D. Mar. 31, 2017).
207. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 2017 WL 1214418, at *10 (denying the government’s motion to
dismiss Count III of the Rosebud Sioux’s complaint).
208. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 989–95 (detailing the undisputed facts most relevant to the government’s position and the tribe’s position).
209. See id. at 992 (“Although the overall amount allocated to the Rosebud IHS Hospital increased by more than 11.5% between 2010 and 2017, allocations for some budget line items for the
facility decreased, notably for ‘hospitals and clinics (clinical services).’ According to . . . the Deputy Director for Management Operations of the IHS, the line item ‘hospitals and clinics’ is the
‘major funding support for a hospital or clinic,’ and pays for salaries and supplies among other
expenses.”).
210. Id. (“A 2010 report to the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs related that the Great Plains
Area [of the IHS] had a history of diverting health care service at its service units, including the
Rosebud IHS Hospital, which impacts the consistency and level of care the units provide to patients.” (footnote omitted)).
211. See id. at 993 (“[W]hen an IHS facility cannot provide a needed service, it will refer the
patient to another facility that can provide that service. However, . . . IHS typically only pays for
referrals to other providers if the patient has an immediate risk of loss of life, limb, or a sense; and
if the patient cannot afford to seek help at another facility, IHS provides less effective treatment
options . . . .”).
212. See id. at 994 (“The OIG [Office of Inspector General] found that staffing inadequacies
and changing leadership were longstanding issues that contributed to the noncompliance which
occurred before, during, and after the closure. The study noted that in September of 2018, Rosebud
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concluding that health care services provided at many IHS facilities,
including Rosebud Hospital, were inadequate.213 Many of the cited
reports showed similar problems persisted even after the ED reopened in
July of 2016.214 Congressional representatives and executive agencies
were aware of IHS’s issues, as numerous reports to congressional
committees and executive agencies’ internal reports detailed these
deficiencies.215
1. Considering When the Federal Government Owes a Trust Duty to
Tribes
The court’s discussion of the controlling law cited the well-established
existence of a “general trust relationship” and distinguished between
actions seeking money damages and those seeking equitable relief.216
Whereas the general trust relationship alone is not sufficient to sustain a
breach of trust suit when a tribe seeks money damages,217 the court noted
that the Rosebud Sioux Tribe sought equitable relief here.218 When a tribe
seeks equitable relief, the substantive source of law—such as a treaty,
agreement, executive order, or statute—providing the basis for the breach
of trust claim need not explicitly state the existence of a trust duty or
define its precise contours.219 Rather, the trust duty can be inferred from
that source’s provisions and reinforced by the general trust

IHS Hospital had 69 vacancies that were mostly filled by contracted providers and that between the
Emergency Department’s reopening in July 2016 and September 2018, the service unit had had six
CEOs, three Clinical Directors, and nine Directors of Nursing.”).
213. Id. at 992–95 (noting the conclusions from a 2010 report to the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, the testimony of a Rosebud IHS nurse and administrator, a January 2017 Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report to the Senate’s Indian Affairs Committee, the testimony of a
GAO Director to the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, a July 2019 report by the Office of
Inspector General, an August 2018 GAO report to the Senate Indian Affairs Committee, and a July
2018 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) survey).
214. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 994–95 (citing reports from July 2016 through
September 2018 describing rampant turnover, long-term vacancies in patient care positions, and
deficiencies that prompted CMS to place Rosebud on Immediate Jeopardy status again).
215. Id.
216. See id. at 995 (citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983) (Mitchell II),
United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 506 (2003) (Navajo Nation I), and United States v.
Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 176 (2011) as sources recognizing the “general trust relationship”).
217. Id. (“[T]hat general trust relationship alone cannot sustain a tribe’s cause of action for
breach of trust when the tribe seeks money damages. Rather, a tribe must point to a substantive
source of law imposing specific duties upon the Government and allege that the Government failed
to perform those duties.” (emphasis added) (first citing Navajo Nation I, 537 U.S. at 506; and then
citing United States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo Nation II), 556 U.S. 287, 290 (2009))).
218. Id. (“The Tribe is not seeking money damages in its complaint.”); see also Complaint,
supra note 5, at 21–23 (describing the tribe’s requested declaratory judgment and injunction).
219. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 995 (citing Blue Legs v. U.S. Bureau of Indian
Affs., 867 F.2d 1094, 1100 (8th Cir. 1989)).
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relationship.220 In other words, when seeking equitable relief, the trust
obligation and its scope can be inferred from substantive legal sources
and their historical context. The court thus clarified that it was not
necessary, in claims seeking equitable relief, for a statute to explicitly
mandate near-exclusive government control over tribal property as the
Supreme Court had held in the Mitchell cases, where the plaintiff tribe
had sought money damages for breach of trust.
Next, the court discussed when a trust duty arises under substantive
legal sources.221 The Rosebud Sioux Tribe had identified three
substantive sources of law implicating a trust duty to provide health care
services: a treaty source—the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie—and two
statutory sources—the Snyder Act and the IHCIA as reauthorized by the
ACA.222 Considering these sources chronologically, the court first
addressed the trust obligation arising under the 1868 Treaty of Fort
Laramie.223 The court concluded that the treaty’s language specifically
addressed the provision of a physician and appropriations made for his or
her employment, which implied a trust obligation to provide health care
services.224 Although IHS receives an annual congressional lump-sum
220. See Blue Legs, 867 F.2d at 1100 (“The existence of a trust duty between the United States
and an Indian or Indian tribe can be inferred from the provisions of a statute, treaty or other agreement, ‘reinforced by the undisputed existence of a general trust relationship between the United
States and the Indian people.’” (quoting Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 225)). The Rosebud court also cited
a case from the Court of Federal Claims as support for the proposition that the trust relationship
can be inferred from rather than explicitly stated by a substantive source of law, and that the government’s equitable obligation to a tribe turns instead on the interpretation of the relevant document’s terms. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 995 (citing Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United
States, 624 F.2d 981, 987–88 (Ct. Cl. 1980)). Neither of these supporting cases is Supreme Court
precedent. The district court relied on its own Eighth Circuit precedent and persuasive authority
from the Court of Federal Claims. But the Supreme Court has not yet ruled definitively on the
standard by which equitable claims for breach of trust will be judged when claiming judicially
enforceable affirmative trust duties in statutes. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
221. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 996 (citing Navajo Tribe of Indians, 624 F.2d at
988) (“The first step in this Court’s analysis then is to look to the terms of the sources of law put
forward and to determine whether a duty exists and the scope of that duty under applicable Supreme
Court precedents.”).
222. Complaint, supra note 5, at 16–17 (alleging that the federal government breached its treaty,
statutory, and common law trust duties arising under the Snyder Act, the IHCIA, the Treaty of Fort
Laramie, and federal common law to provide health care services to the tribe and its members); see
also Plaintiff Rosebud Sioux Tribe’s Combined Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment and in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 26–28, Rosebud
Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d 986 (No. 16-CV-03038) [hereinafter Rosebud Motion for Summary
Judgment Brief] (arguing that the federal government has a duty pursuant to legislation, treaty, and
federal common law); Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 995–96 (citing the tribe’s brief in
support of its motion for summary judgment).
223. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 996, 999–1000 (noting the provisions of the 1868
Treaty of Fort Laramie and applying its terms to the federal government’s claim that no duty existed
under the treaty to provide health care services).
224. See id. at 1000 (“Under a fair but liberal construction of the language used to favor the
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appropriation and has spending discretion, part of its allocation represents
the performance of a trust obligation under the treaty.225 Ultimately, the
court found that the trust obligation under the 1868 Treaty—not the
IHCIA, as discussed below—provided the strongest justification to grant
the tribe’s motion for summary judgment in part.226
2. Considering the Statutory Basis for the Breach of Trust Claim
The court next considered when statutes like the Snyder Act and the
IHCIA may serve as the basis for finding a trust duty. According to the
district court and contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Quechan
Tribe, the Supreme Court’s holdings in the Mitchell cases, Lincoln v.
Vigil, the Navajo Nation cases, and Jicarilla Apache Nation did not
foreclose such a finding.227 The court explained that after Mitchell I and
Mitchell II, a trust obligation could still arise under statute, even when the
government had not therein expressly assumed a fiduciary relationship
by managing tribal property.228 The court suggested that the Mitchell
cases did not require this narrow reading of the trust relationship when a
tribe sought an equitable remedy to assert and enforce affirmative trust
duties.229 The court briefly noted the holdings in the Navajo Nation cases
and read them as an extension of the Mitchell cases, without further
Tribe, the Sioux Nation and the United States as well at the time must have meant the clause—that
the United States furnish ‘the physician’ and ‘that such appropriations shall be made from time to
time . . . as will be sufficient to employ such persons’—to require the United States to provide
physician-led health care to tribal members. Such physician-led health care may fairly imply some
level of professional competency.”); see also Treaty Between the United States of America and
Different Tribes of Sioux Indians, art. XIII, Apr. 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635 [hereinafter 1868 Treaty of
Fort Laramie] (“The United States hereby agrees to furnish annually to the Indians the physician . . .
as herein contemplated, and that such appropriations shall be made from time to time, on the estimates of the Secretary of the Interior, as will be sufficient to employ such persons.”).
225. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 1001.
226. See id. at 1001, 1003, 1005 (indicating that the federal government owed an implied duty
under the treaty’s terms to provide some measure of competent physician-led health care to the
tribe, and granting the tribe’s motion for summary judgment to a declaratory judgment to that extent).
227. See id. at 997–99 (discussing the precedential Supreme Court, Eighth Circuit, and Ninth
Circuit holdings on finding trust duties arising under statutes).
228. Id. at 997 (“Although the Supreme Court in Mitchell II noted that ‘a fiduciary duty necessarily arises when the Government assumes such elaborate control over forests and property belonging to Indians,’ it does not make such control a prerequisite to establish a trust relationship.”
(emphasis added) (quoting Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 225)).
229. See id. at 998–99 (explaining that although the Mitchell cases predated the Eighth Circuit’s
decision in White v. Califano, the Supreme Court’s holdings had not contradicted the Eighth Circuit’s holding or reasoning). The Rosebud court suggests, therefore, that statutes need not mandate
government control of all tribal health care facilities as assets held in trust to imply a duty to provide
health care services. Contra Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Rsrv. v. United States, No.
10-2261, 2011 WL 1211574, at *4 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2011) (finding that, because the Fort Yuma
IHS unit was not a tribal asset held in trust by the government, the government had no fiduciary
duty to preserve or maintain it).
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application to this case.230 The court also cited Jicarilla Apache Nation
as support for the United States’ moral responsibility to Indian tribes but
did not address its reasoning as to whether the federal government acted
as a trustee in this case.231
The district court finally considered the most closely related Supreme
Court precedential holding in Lincoln v. Vigil.232 As the district court
noted, the Lincoln Court focused on whether IHS’s reallocation of its
lump-sum congressional appropriation was reviewable under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and found it was not.233 But the
district court also pointed out that the Lincoln Court had not addressed
the general trust responsibility to provide health care services to Indian
children.234 Although the Lincoln Court said the Snyder Act and IHCIA
230. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 997–98 (describing the Supreme Court’s holdings
in Navajo Nation I and Navajo Nation II in light of the Mitchell cases). The district court’s minimal
analysis and application of the holdings of the Navajo Nation cases can seem difficult to reconcile
at first, given the apparently related issues facing the court in the case at bar. This could, however,
reflect the court’s understanding that the plaintiffs in the Navajo Nation cases were, like in the
Mitchell cases, seeking money damages in a breach of fiduciary duty claim against the federal
government for trust duties allegedly arising under statutes related to mineral leases. See United
States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo Nation I), 537 U.S. 488, 493 (2003) (noting the controversy at
issue); United States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo Nation II), 556 U.S. 287, 289 (2009) (repeating the
background of the case). The district court therefore may not have considered the Supreme Court’s
holdings in the Navajo Nation cases to have provided any additional relevant application to the
issues presented in Rosebud Sioux Tribe, where the tribe asserted the federal government’s trust
duty to provide services—not to manage tribal property—and sought an equitable remedy, not
monetary compensation. Compare Navajo Nation I, 537 U.S. at 493 (“The Tribe seeks to recover
money damages from the United States for an alleged breach of trust in connection with the Secretary’s approval of coal lease amendments . . . .”), with Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 995
(noting the tribe is not seeking money damages).
231. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 999 (quoting United States v. Jicarilla Apache
Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 176 (2011)) (“Although a substantive source of law is required to establish
and define an actionable fiduciary duty owed by the Government, the Supreme Court has also recognized the moral responsibility the United States owes to Indian Tribes. ‘The Government, following a humane and self[-]imposed policy . . ., has charged itself with moral obligations of the
highest responsibility and trust . . . obligations to the fulfillment of which the national honor has
been committed.’” (alterations in original)).
232. Id. at 998 (analyzing Lincoln v. Vigil). Unlike the Mitchell cases and the Navajo Nation
cases, the tribal members in Lincoln sought an equitable remedy for an alleged breach of trust duty
arising under statute. See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 185–89 (1993) (describing the controversy
and plaintiffs’ argument that discontinuing a specific health care program violated the federal trust
responsibilities to Indians and the Administrative Procedure Act). In Lincoln, tribal members accused the federal government of violating the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and sought to
compel reallocated IHS funds for a discontinued health care program for disabled Indian children
as a trust obligation arising under the Snyder Act and the IHCIA. Id. at 189; see also discussion
supra Section II.A.3.
233. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 998 (noting the holding in Lincoln); see also
Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 193–94 (“The Service’s decision to discontinue the Program is accordingly
unreviewable under § 701(a)(2).”). See generally discussion supra Section II.A.3 (noting that an
executive agency’s spending discretion is not reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act).
234. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 998.
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“speak about Indian health only in general terms,” the Court also
recognized IHS’s statutory mandate to provide health care to American
Indians.235 The Court in Lincoln did not fully explore the potential trust
obligations arising under the IHCIA, having stopped its analysis after
holding that this specific claim was not reviewable under the APA. Thus,
the district court observed that Lincoln did not foreclose a finding of a
trust duty arising under the IHCIA to provide some measure of health
care services, much less define the potential scope of such a duty.
In addition to Supreme Court precedent, the district court relied on the
Eighth Circuit’s reasoning and holding in White v. Califano to support
the principle that the United States has a trust duty arising under the
IHCIA to provide health care services.236 The district court cited White’s
language emphasizing the trust relationship and its connection with
Congress’s policy declared in the IHCIA to provide health care
services.237 There was no conflict, according to the Rosebud district
court, between the Eighth Circuit’s holding in White and the Supreme
Court’s subsequent holdings in the Mitchell cases, the Navajo Nation
cases, and Lincoln.238
Yet the Rosebud court also recognized the Ninth Circuit’s alternative
reading of this precedent and its contradictory holding that no affirmative
trust obligations flowed from the Snyder Act or IHCIA.239 The court
pointed to the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on the Lincoln Court’s statement
that these statutes address Indian health in general terms, leading the
Ninth Circuit to conclude that no judicially enforceable duty could be
derived from them.240 But the Rosebud district court had already noted
235. Id. (quoting Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 194).
236. Id. (describing White v. Califano, 581 F.2d 697, 697 (8th Cir. 1978)).
237. Id. (citing White, 581 F.2d at 698) (“The Eighth Circuit’s opinion adopted the statement of
facts and the reasoning of the district court, and specifically quoted District Judge Andrew Bogue’s
opinion that through the IHCIA: ‘Congress has unambiguously declared that the federal government has a legal responsibility to provide health care to Indians. This stems from the ‘unique relationship’ between Indians and the federal government, a relationship that is reflected in hundreds
of cases and is further made obvious by the fact that one bulging volume of the U.S. Code pertains
only to Indians.’” (quoting White v. Califano, 437 F. Supp. 543, 555 (D.S.D. 1977)). See also
discussion supra Section III.A (noting that Congress has unambiguously declared that the federal
government has a legal responsibility to provide health care to Indians).
238. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 998–99.
239. See id. at 999 (“The Ninth Circuit and a district court therein, however, have considered
claims brought by tribes alleging a governmental duty to provide health care and found that no such
trust duty existed.”).
240. Id.; see also Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Rsrv. v. United States, 599 Fed. App’x
698, 699 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 194) (“Neither the Snyder Act nor the Indian
Health Care Improvement Act contains sufficient trust-creating language on which to base a judicially enforceable duty. Both statutes ‘speak about Indian health only in general terms.’”). The
district court in Rosebud Sioux Tribe did not grapple with the Ninth Circuit’s reading of Jicarilla
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that the Lincoln Court had not fully explored the scope of the trust
relationship and whether any affirmative trust obligations arose under the
IHCIA.241 Moreover, the court is within the Eighth Circuit’s jurisdiction
and thus bound to follow Eighth Circuit precedent in White.242
3. Applying White and Supreme Court Precedent to Rosebud Sioux
Tribe
The district court then turned to apply the derived legal rules to the
parties’ respective arguments in their cross-motions for summary
judgment.243 The court flatly rejected the government’s argument that it
owed no duty to provide health care to the tribe.244 It relied on White v.
Califano’s holding as well as Lincoln’s general recognition of IHS’s
statutory mandate to support the existence of a cognizable duty under the
IHCIA.245 The court also disagreed with the government’s argument that
Lincoln foreclosed the existence of a duty to provide health care,
explaining instead that Lincoln did not directly address this issue.246
But the Rosebud district court stopped short of interpreting the IHCIA
as supporting the specific, judicially enforceable trust duty asserted in this
case. Neither did the court define the potential scope of this duty under
the IHCIA vis-à-vis Rosebud IHS Hospital. Rather, the court insisted that
Apache Nation and its application to Quechan Tribe, which was also crucial to the holding in
Quechan Tribe. See Quechan Tribe, 599 Fed. App’x at 699; see also discussion supra Section III.B.
It is unclear whether the district court in Rosebud Sioux Tribe declined to discuss this aspect of the
Ninth Circuit’s holding because the district court did not agree with the Ninth Circuit’s analysis
and application of Jicarilla Apache Nation, or whether the district court did not see Jicarilla Apache
Nation as applicable to the legal rules for Rosebud, or for some other reason.
241. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 1000–01.
242. See South Dakota Courts, supra note 203.
243. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 999–1003 (first addressing the government’s
arguments for summary judgment and then the tribe’s arguments for summary judgment). The government argued that the Rosebud Sioux had not identified any substantive source of law from which
an enforceable trust duty arose. Defendants’ Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at
9–18, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 3d 986 (D.S.D. 2020) (No. 16-CV03038). The tribe argued that “[t]he Government’s specific trust obligation to provide adequate
health care to Indians repeatedly has been codified through legislation, including in the Snyder Act
of 1921, the Indian Health Care Improvement Act of 1976 (‘IHCIA’), and most recently, the Affordable Care Act (‘ACA’).” Rosebud Motion for Summary Judgment Brief, supra note 222, at 26.
244. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 999.
245. Id.
246. See id. at 1000–01 (“In Lincoln, the Supreme Court correctly characterized the plaintiff’s
claim as a challenge to the allocations IHS made to programs from the lump sum appropriations it
received from Congress. The Court accordingly focused its attention on its authority to review
IHS’s discretionary spending under the APA. The Court in Lincoln did not address whether the
United States had a duty to provide health care to tribal members or the scope of that duty. . . .
Lincoln stands for the proposition that lump-sum appropriations, once given, allow IHS considerable discretion in how it executes its duties; Lincoln does not hold that the existence of lump-sum
appropriations for IHS absolves IHS of any duty to provide health care to the Tribe and its members.” (citations omitted)); see also discussion supra Section II.A.3 (discussing Lincoln v. Vigil).
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the tribe had overstated the government’s obligations arising under the
IHCIA.247 The court instead found that the IHCIA’s language invoked by
the Rosebud Sioux Tribe represented Congress’s aspirations in enacting
the law, not an affirmative obligation.248 The court left the door cracked
open just a bit, though, by recognizing “that other provisions in the
IHCIA place affirmative duties on the Government for Indian health
care,” but these duties were more limited than what the tribe had
argued.249 The court denied the tribe’s motion for summary judgment
based on the alleged breach of trust arising under the IHCIA.250
The court did not reject the tribe’s underlying assertion that some trust
duty to provide health care services to Indian tribes existed pursuant to
the Snyder Act and the IHCIA read together.251 It found that the Rosebud
Sioux Tribe had gone a bit too far in its assertions of the scope of this
duty.252 Furthermore, the court disagreed with the government’s
contention that it had no duty whatsoever, and it refuted the government’s
reasoning and its reading of precedent regarding the trust doctrine’s
enforceability in general.253 The court instead based its ruling for the tribe
on the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie and the duty implied therein.254 This
247. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 1002. The Tribe argued that it was “Congress’s clear intention to obligate the federal government to provide for the highest level of health
care services possible to tribes . . . .” Rosebud Motion for Summary Judgment Brief, supra note
222, at 32; see also id. at 26 (“The IHCIA identifies the . . . duty owed by the federal government
to Indian tribes, requiring the federal government to provide ‘the highest possible health status for
Indians’ and ‘the quantity and quality of health services which will permit the health status of Indians to be raised to the highest possible level.’” (quoting 25 U.S.C. §§ 1621(a)(1), 1601(3)).
248. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 1002 (“As an expression of a national goal—to
provide ‘the quantity and quality of health services which will permit the health status of Indians
to be raised to the highest possible level’—is not the enforceable legal duty owed by the Government to the Tribe.”).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1002–03.
251. See id. at 999 (“This Court does not accept the Government’s conclusion that it owes no
duty for health care to the Tribe or its members. Although some courts have found that the Snyder
Act and the IHCIA speak of Indian health care in terms too general to create an enforceable duty,
the Eighth Circuit has explicitly recognized that these acts create a ‘legal responsibility to provide
health care to Indians.’ Furthermore, despite these ‘general terms,’ the Supreme Court made note
of IHS’s ‘statutory mandate to provide health care to Indian people.’” (citations omitted) (first
quoting White v. Califano, 581 F.2d 697, 698 (8th Cir. 1978); and then quoting Lincoln v. Vigil,
508 U.S. 182, 194 (1993))).
252. See id. at 1002 (“This Court recognizes that other provisions in the IHCIA place affirmative duties on the Government for Indian health care. However, those duties are more limited in
scope than the broad, aspirational duty proposed by the Tribe.” (citation omitted)).
253. See id. at 999–1001 (rejecting the federal government’s arguments supporting its motion
for summary judgment).
254. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 1003 (“Now, on cross motions for summary judgment, the parties have framed the question of what duty the Government owes the Tribe and its
members for health care. As to the tribes that entered into the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie for the
reasons discussed above, the Government’s duty—expressed at the time as ‘furnishing to the
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may point to a deliberate and strategic choice on the part of the judge in
this case to ground the ruling for the tribe in treaty rights rather than the
rights inferred from statutes.255 As discussed in the next part of this
Comment, the judge may have anticipated an uphill battle on appeal if
the ruling had been grounded in interpreting trust obligations arising
under the IHCIA and their enforceability.
The federal government appealed the district court’s ruling and order
to the Eighth Circuit, where it is pending.256 Although the Eighth
Circuit’s holding in White v. Califano supported judicially enforceable
trust obligations under the IHCIA, it is likely that the Supreme Court—
increasingly hostile to recognizing the fiduciary responsibilities affirmed
in statutes that the federal government owes to American Indian
tribes257—would side with the Ninth Circuit’s reading of precedent in
Quechan Tribe, discussed next.
IV. THE TRUST DOCTRINE’S NARROWING ENFORCEABILITY
The circuit split between the Eighth and Ninth Circuit reflects the
substantial narrowing over the past forty years of the Court’s
understanding of the federal trust doctrine and its sources, scope, and
enforceability.258 This part will address the divergent approaches taken
in the respective appellate courts regarding the enforceability of
affirmative trust duties arising under statutes. This part will show that the
Ninth Circuit’s reasoning strays from the foundational common law
principles of the trust doctrine. That court’s reasoning, however, aligns
with the government’s position in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. United States
on appeal. Despite the logical inconsistencies of this approach, it appears
Indians the physician . . . and that such appropriations shall be made from time to time, on the
estimate of the Secretary of the Interior, as will be sufficient to employ such persons’—can be
interpreted under the canons of construction applicable to Indian treaties as requiring the Government to provide competent physician-led health care to the Tribe.”).
255. See discussion infra Section IV.B.3 (discussing the district court’s possible anticipation of
a Supreme Court that is favorable to the government’s arguments for limiting the federal trust doctrine’s enforceability).
256. Notice of Appeal, supra note 27, at 1–2 (appealing the Opinion and Declaratory Judgment
from the U.S. District Court of the District of South Dakota to the Eighth Circuit).
257. See discussion supra Section II.A.3 (discussing the Court’s increasingly narrow reading of
the federal trust doctrine in the Mitchell cases, Lincoln v. Vigil, the Navajo Nation cases, and
Jicarilla Apache Nation); see also Rey-Bear & Fletcher, supra note 32, at 443–44 (criticizing the
Court’s narrow interpretation of the trust doctrine in the Navajo Nation cases and Jicarilla Apache
Nation); Wood, supra note 44, at 1516 (“Until recently, courts generally assumed a prevailing trust
relationship between the executive branch and the tribes, and held that branch to fiduciary duties
even absent explicit statutory expression of a trust duty. This was entirely consistent with the common law origins of the trust doctrine. In the early 1980s, however, the Supreme Court decided the
Mitchell cases, which somewhat narrowed the application of the trust doctrine in the context of
claims seeking monetary compensation for breach of fiduciary duty.” (footnote omitted)).
258. See sources and accompanying notes, supra note 257.
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likely that the Court will agree with the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in
Quechan Tribe and side with the government’s position in Rosebud Sioux
Tribe, should that case ever reach the Supreme Court.
A. Divergent Approaches to the Trust Doctrine in the Eighth and Ninth
Circuit Courts of Appeals
The Eighth Circuit adhered in White v. Califano to the trust doctrine’s
foundational principles: that congressional legislative policy represents
an ongoing fulfillment of trust obligations to tribes rooted in the common
law trust relationship.259 Congress’s expressed policy objectives must
guide the executive branch’s execution of these obligations.260 Moreover,
the Eighth Circuit affirmed that courts properly serve as arbiters of
whether the federal government has adequately fulfilled its policy toward
Indian tribes.261 In a case where health care services were critical and
otherwise unavailable for a qualifying tribal member, the Eighth Circuit
recognized that the federal government could not abdicate its legal
responsibility to provide them.262 But the Eighth Circuit declined to
define the full scope of this responsibility beyond its application in Ms.
Red Dog’s case.263 It also declined to affirm, as the lower court had
proposed, a mechanism for the agency to balance appropriation of its
limited resources with meeting its trust obligations.264 In contrast, the
Ninth Circuit read and applied more recent Supreme Court case law so as
259. White v. Califano, 581 F.2d 697, 698 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (quoting White v. Califano, 437 F. Supp. 543, 555 (D.S.D. 1977)) (“We think that Congress has unambiguously declared
that the federal government has a legal responsibility to provide health care to Indians. This stems
from the ‘unique relationship’ between Indians and the federal government . . . .”); accord ReyBear & Fletcher, supra note 32, at 403–04 (explaining that federal policies and benefits provided
to tribes are not gratuities, but rather exist to fulfill historical promises in treaties whereby tribes
surrendered land in exchange for compensation, including ongoing government-provided services).
260. See White, 581 F.2d at 698 (“[B]ecause Ms. Red Dog lacks an alternative source of health
care, federal policy as reflected by legislative and administrative action places responsibility for
providing the necessary care upon the United States.”); see also Wood, supra note 44, at 1513
(“Over time, a fairly substantial body of caselaw has developed enforcing fiduciary duties against
the executive branch in Indian affairs.”).
261. See White, 581 F.2d at 697 (affirming the district court’s order to the federal government
to pay for health care for Ms. Red Dog).
262. See id. at 698 (“The United States cannot evade that responsibility . . . .”).
263. Compare White v. Califano, 437 F. Supp. 543, 557 (D.S.D. 1977) (“When the Congress
legislates for Indians only, something more than a statutory entitlement is involved. Congress is
acting upon the premise that a special relationship is involved, and is acting to meet the obligations
inherent in that relationship. . . . We have, therefore, read and construed the [IHCIA] as a manifestation of what Congress thinks the trust responsibility requires of federal officials, with whatever
funds are available, when they try to meet Indian health needs.”), with White, 581 F.2d at 698
(confining the application of the district court’s holding to the case of Florence Red Dog).
264. Compare White, 437 F. Supp. at 555–56 (proposing a reading of the priorities for congressional health care appropriations according to the regulations promulgated under the statute), with
White, 581 F.2d at 698 (declining to propose a resolution to future Indian health care controversies
where the IHS exercises discretion in spending its appropriations).

2021]

Trust Betrayed

1151

to divorce the government’s trust obligations from its common law
origins.265 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit arguably applied case law that
did not fit the legal question at issue, leading to incorrect results, as
discussed below.
In Quechan Tribe, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
rationale relying on the Supreme Court’s holdings in the Mitchell cases,
the Navajo Nation cases, and Lincoln v. Vigil.266 But the district court had
mischaracterized and improperly analogized the reasoning in those cases
to the Quechan Tribe case. First, in the Mitchell cases, the tribe sought
money damages for the federal government’s mismanagement of tribal
property.267 The Navajo Nation cases also dealt with breach of trust
claims for money damages and reaffirmed the high standard for judicial
review set in the Mitchell cases for tribes seeking compensation from the
federal government.268 But the showing required for equitable relief is
not the same as that for money damages.269 Equitable relief for agency
action (or inaction) that harmed tribal interests is normally sought under
the APA, in which the federal government consents to suits in equity for
legal harms caused by federal agencies or employees.270 Once judicial
265. See Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Rsrv. v. United States, 599 Fed. App’x 698,
699 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he federal-tribal trust relationship does not, in itself, create a judicially
enforceable duty. Rather, ‘trust obligations of the United States to the Indian tribes are established
and governed by statute rather than the common law, and in fulfilling its statutory duties, the Government acts not as a private trustee but pursuant to its sovereign interest in the execution of federal
law.’” (quoting United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 165 (2011))).
266. See id. at 699 (affirming Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v. United
States, No. 10-2261, 2011 WL 1211574 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2011)).
267. See United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell I), 445 U.S. 535, 537 (1980) (“The respondents
contended that they were entitled to recover money damages because [the Government’s] alleged
misconduct breached a fiduciary duty owed to them by the United States as a trustee of the allotted
lands under the General Allotment Act.”); United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), 463 U.S. 206,
207 (1983) (“The principal question in this case is whether the United States is accountable in
money damages for alleged breaches of trust in connection with its management of forest resources
on allotted lands of the Quinault Indian Reservation.”).
268. See United States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo Nation I), 537 U.S. 488, 503 (2003) (“To state
a litigable claim, a tribal plaintiff must invoke a rights-creating source of substantive law that ‘can
fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damages sustained.’” (quoting Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 218)).
269. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 33, § 5.05[3][c] (“Much confusion arises because
of the tendency of courts to fail to distinguish between money damages claims . . . and claims
brought in federal court seeking equitable relief, which do not require the sharper focus on the
statutory basis for a claim required in the Court of Federal Claims (CFC) [for money damages]. In
particular, some courts have read the jurisdictional language in the CFC breach of trust cases
broadly as requiring that the trust doctrine be limited to obligations specifically stated in statutes.
This analysis has been rejected . . . and is no substitute for careful analysis of the statute in the
context of the trust doctrine in a case seeking equitable relief.” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)).
270. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of
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review for equitable claims is established under the APA, the court can
then analyze the claim’s substance to determine whether the federal
agency violated a duty to the plaintiff generally grounded in statute,
treaty, or the common law, such that the tribe is entitled to relief.271
Though useful to establish the court’s jurisdiction over claims seeking
equitable relief, further APA analysis is not required to show a trust
obligation enforceable at equity, as shown in the Eighth Circuit’s holding
in White v. Califano, where the general and historic trust relationship was
sufficient.272 But the Quechan Tribe district court’s failure to distinguish
between the respective standards required for claims seeking equitable
relief and those seeking monetary damages was the first misstep in its
analysis.273
Second, even assuming claims for equitable relief required the same
standard as those for damages, the Quechan Tribe district court also failed
to identify the substantive distinction between the Mitchell cases, where
the plaintiff sought compensation for mismanagement of tribal resources,
rather than enforcement of a statutory duty to provide a service.274 Stated
the relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. An action in a court of the United States
seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not
be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States or that
the United States is an indispensable party.”); id. § 706 (“To the extent necessary to decision and
when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency
action. The reviewing court shall— (1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed; and (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be—
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; . . . (D)
without observance of procedure required by law . . . .”); see also Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182,
184 (1993) (holding that the tribe’s claims for equitable relief were not subject to judicial review
under the Administrative Procedure Act, because funding the program in question discontinued by
IHS was committed to agency discretion per 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199,
235–36 (1973) (holding that the BIA should promulgate eligibility requirements for general assistance benefits as required not only by its own procedures but also by the Administrative Procedure
Act).
271. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 33, § 5.05[1][a] (describing how tribes establish
claims for equitable relief by establishing jurisdiction under the APA).
272. See discussion supra Section III.A (discussing White v. Califano).
273. See Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Rsrv. v. United States, No. 10-2261, 2011 WL
1211574, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2011) (citing Gros Ventre Tribe v. United States, 469 F.3d 801,
812 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied 552 U.S. 824 (2007)). The Supreme Court has not yet ruled definitively on this issue, but Indian law treatises reaffirm that they require different analyses. See, e.g.,
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 33, § 5.05[c].
274. To support its assertion that the same standard applies to equitable relief, the district court
cited Ninth Circuit case law. Quechan Tribe, 2011 WL 1211574, at *2 (citing Gros Ventre Tribe,
469 F.3d at 812). Full review of Ninth Circuit case law on this issue is beyond the scope of this
Comment; however, other authorities have criticized this improper mental shortcut. See, e.g.,
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 33, § 5.05 n.99 (“Often broad statements about the applicability
of the Mitchell line of cases in federal question jurisdiction case are made in opinions not involving
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another way, asking for money as compensation for what the government
has already done poorly (i.e., mismanaging timber held in trust, costing
the tribe its valuable resources by breaching this duty) is not the same as
asking the government to do something it has already promised to do (i.e.,
provide health care services for American Indians, to whom it owes
affirmative duties). The district court failed to distinguish these
situations, both of which implicate the federal trust doctrine but in
different legal contexts.275 Thus, the district court failed to explore the
scope of the trust doctrine’s affirmative obligation to provide services,
which is not necessarily the same as if the Quechan Tribe had sought
monetary compensation for a breach of trust claim.
Third, although the court grounded its analysis primarily in the
Mitchell cases assuming they were analogous, it found that neither the
Snyder Act nor the IHCIA created judicially enforceable affirmative trust
obligations to provide health care services.276 Under the Mitchell cases,
the extent to which federal statutes and their implementing regulations
create enforceable trust obligations turns on the government’s exclusive
control and management of tribal resources to infer a common law trust
relationship.277 Again, this analogy is inapposite on its face because
proving that the government manages tribal property is neither necessary
nor relevant to showing that the government also has a separate duty to
provide health care services, grounded in the common law trust doctrine
and expressed in statute. Nevertheless, the court considered the language
of both the Snyder Act and the IHCIA to be too broad to impose any
specific obligations on the federal government.278
Assuming for the sake of argument that the Mitchell analogy worked,
management of trust funds or resources.”); United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537
U.S. 465, 472–73 (2003) (describing the standard for raising breach of fiduciary duty claims for
monetary damages under the Tucker Act, as set forth in the Mitchell cases).
275. Management of trust resources implicates the trust doctrine’s imposition of fiduciary duties where the federal government acts as a trustee of tribal resources for the tribe’s benefit, which
requires an analysis of the common law of trusts and fiduciary duties in a more traditional—and
narrower—sense. In contrast, provision of services pursuant to the general trust relationship requires analysis of the full legal context of this relationship and its expression in treaties and federal
common law as a government-to-government, mutually binding, and ongoing legal obligation affirmed in statutes.
276. Quechan Tribe, 2011 WL 1211574, at *2–3.
277. United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), 463 U.S. 206, 224 (1983) (“In contrast to the bare
trust created by the General Allotment Act, the statutes and regulations now before us clearly give
the Federal Government full responsibility to manage Indian resources and land for the benefit of
the Indians. They thereby establish a fiduciary relationship and define the contours of the United
States’ fiduciary responsibilities. The language of these statutory and regulatory provisions directly
supports the existence of a fiduciary relationship.”); see also discussion supra Section II.A.3 (discussing the Mitchell cases).
278. See Quechan Tribe, 2011 WL 1211574, at *2–3 (considering the language of the Snyder
Act and the IHCIA).
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the Quechan Tribe district court’s assessment of the Snyder Act was
probably fair. The Snyder Act does include only “extremely broad
language,” and the full text of the Act is less than a full page; it only
briefly mentioned the provision of health care services as authorized
under its congressional appropriations.279 But by the Mitchell analogy’s
standards, the court’s analysis of the IHCIA’s language is perfunctory, as
it noted only three specific citations to the statute.280 This statute
describing the provision of health care services originally comprised
fifteen pages,281 was reauthorized and amended as recently as 2010,282
and currently coincides with approximately thirty-eight pages of
additional implementing regulations.283 The district court showed
minimal analysis comparing the timber statutes and regulations discussed
in Mitchell I and Mitchell II with the IHCIA and its implementing
regulations before concluding the IHCIA was too broad to impose any
affirmative obligations to provide health care services or meet any
standard of care within the federal government’s IHS facilities.284
Finally, the district court’s unsupported assertion that the trust
responsibility arises exclusively when the United States holds tribal
property in trust further mischaracterized the federal trust doctrine.285
The district court conflated the federal trust doctrine—which was
originally conceived as much broader than federal oversight of tribes’
property interests alone—and the common law concept of trust
property.286 The trust doctrine was founded upon government-togovernment agreements, in which the United States made certain
promises, whether explicitly or implicitly, to sovereign tribes in exchange
279. Id. at *2; see also discussion supra Section II.B.2 (discussing of the Snyder Act).
280. Quechan Tribe, 2011 WL 1211574, at *3 (“The IHCIA requires defendants to eliminate
deficiencies in health status and resources, and to meet the health needs of Indians in an equitable
manner. 25 U.S.C. § 1621(a); (c)(1). It also requires competent personal [sic], § 1661(c)(2), and
facilities that meet accreditation standards, § 1631(a)(2). While these provisions are more exacting
than those in the Snyder Act, they still do not impose a duty on defendants to provide a certain level
of health care, preserve and maintain tribal property, or be a health care provider.”).
281. Indian Health Care Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 94-437, 90 Stat. 1400, 1400–14 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1680v).
282. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10221(a), 124 Stat.
119, 935–36 (2010) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1680v) (reauthorizing the IHCIA).
283. 42 C.F.R. §§ 136.1–136.418 (2020).
284. See Quechan Tribe, 2011 WL 1211574, at *3–4 (discussing the IHCIA’s language and
requirements, which according to the court, did not rise to the level of imputing fiduciary duties on
the federal government toward the tribe).
285. See id. at *2 (“Moreover, the trust responsibility arises when the United States holds tribal
property in trust.”). The court did not provide a citation for this assertion.
286. See id. at *3 (“Here, the United States does not even hold the Ft. Yuma facility in trust. It
belongs to the United States. It is not held in ‘trust’ for the tribe.”). But see Wood, supra note 44,
at 1496–98 (describing the trust relationship as a “sovereign trusteeship” comprising obligations
rooted in treaties and agreements between sovereign governments and reinforced in statute).
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for their lands.287 But the district court’s statement ignored precedent that
recognizes trust responsibilities as extending beyond the government’s
management of tribal property.288 Even if the federal trust doctrine could
be equated with the common law of trusts, the lack of specific trust
“assets,” as the court puts it, would not foreclose the existence of a
broader trusteeship relationship with ongoing fiduciary duties beyond
management of property interests.289 Thus, the Quechan Tribe district
court interpreted the trust doctrine’s scope narrowly without proper
support.
By grounding its decision in this incorrect understanding of the federal
trust doctrine and misapplication of the facts and holdings of Supreme
Court case law, it is not surprising that the Quechan Tribe district court
concluded that neither the Snyder Act nor the IHCIA created judicially
enforceable affirmative trust duties. Accepting the district court’s
findings, the Ninth Circuit did not interrogate the language of the IHCIA
or its implementing regulations to determine whether they might embody
any trust obligations, as did the timber statutes and regulations in Mitchell
II.290 The Ninth Circuit summarily stated without analysis that the IHCIA

287. See discussion supra Section II.A.1 (describing the Marshallian conception of the trust
relationship). It is also imperative to acknowledge that these were lands over which the federal
government had already unilaterally declared a monopolistic right to extinguish Native title, and
which were violently conquered when the federal government broke promises or deemed them
inconvenient to uphold. Id. The district court failed to acknowledge any historic responsibility for
this colonial legacy inherent in the trust doctrine and reduced it to a banal casualty of the presentday political process divorced from historical context. See Quechan Tribe, 2011 WL 1211574, at
*7 (“At its core, plaintiff’s complaint does not raise legal issues, but policy issues as to the proper
allocation of resources for Indian health care. The Tribe is just one of many interest groups throughout the country competing for scarce resources. The Tribe’s concerns are best addressed through
the political process.”).
288. See, e.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 236 (1974) (holding that the BIA’s denial of general assistance benefits to Indians living off but nearby the reservation was not consistent with the
government’s trust obligations); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296–97 (1942)
(“In carrying out its treaty obligations with the Indian tribes the Government is something more
than a mere contracting party. Under a humane and self imposed [sic] policy which has found
expression in many acts of Congress and numerous decisions of this Court, it has charged itself
with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust. Its conduct, as disclosed in the acts
of those who represent it in dealings with the Indians, should therefore be judged by the most exacting fiduciary standards.”); United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), 463 U.S. 206, 225–26 (1983)
(collecting cases supporting the “undisputed existence of a general trust relationship between the
United States and the Indian people”).
289. See Rey-Bear & Fletcher, supra note 32, at 403–11 (arguing that a broad trusteeship relationship exists between Indian tribes and the federal government); see also Wood, supra note 44,
at 1496–98 (describing the trust relationship as a “sovereign trusteeship” comprising obligations
rooted in agreements between sovereign governments and reinforced in statute).
290. See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 219–27 (analyzing the language of several relevant timber
statutes and regulations carefully and finding that they fairly expressed the government’s undertaking of specific fiduciary obligations with respect to managing tribal timber resources).
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and Snyder Act placed no affirmative duties on the government.291
The Ninth Circuit also added new, misapplied, authority to its holding
through United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, which the Supreme
Court decided mere months after the district court’s ruling in Quechan
Tribe.292 The appellate court quoted Jicarilla Apache Nation to support
the misguided assertion that the trust doctrine originated exclusively in
statute and thus requires narrow statutory interpretation.293 Taken out of
context, the quotation the Ninth Circuit pulled from Jicarilla Apache
Nation appears to show the Supreme Court has definitively settled the
trust doctrine’s sources and scope. But in context, the narrow question
decided in Jicarilla Apache Nation—whether the fiduciary exception to
the claim of attorney-client privilege applies to the general trust
relationship between the United States and the Indian tribes during a
breach of trust lawsuit294—is very different from the issue the Ninth
Circuit faced. The latter court did not address or analyze why Jicarilla
Apache Nation’s holding on such a narrow evidentiary privilege issue
would completely foreclose any affirmative obligations under the trust

291. See Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v. United States, 599 Fed. App’x
698, 699 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Neither the Snyder Act nor the Indian Health Care Improvement Act
contains sufficient trust-creating language on which to base a judicially enforceable duty. Both
statutes ‘speak about Indian health only in general terms,’ and neither requires the United States to
provide a specific standard of medical care.” (quoting Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 194 (1993))).
292. See Quechan Tribe, 599 Fed. App’x at 699; Quechan Tribe, 2011 WL 1211574, at *1
(noting the district court’s ruling on March 31, 2011); see also United States v. Jicarilla Apache
Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 162 (2011) (noting the Court’s decision on June 13, 2011).
293. See Quechan Tribe, 599 Fed. App’x at 699 (“[T]rust obligations of the United States to the
Indian tribes are established and governed by statute rather than the common law, and in fulfilling
its statutory duties, the Government acts not as a private trustee but pursuant to its sovereign interest
in the execution of federal law.” (quoting Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. at 165)).
294. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. at 165 (“The attorney-client privilege ranks among the
oldest and most established evidentiary privileges known to our law. The common law, however,
has recognized an exception to the privilege when a trustee obtains legal advice related to the exercise of fiduciary duties. In such cases, courts have held that, the trustee cannot withhold attorneyclient communications from the beneficiary of the trust. In this case, we consider whether the fiduciary exception applies to the general trust relationship between the United States and the Indian
tribes.”). Similar to the Marshall cases and the Navajo Nation cases, Jicarilla Apache Nation also
originated as a breach of trust action for money damages against the federal government for alleged
mismanagement of trust assets. Id. at 166. During discovery for the breach of trust action, the government withheld some potentially relevant documents from the tribe, claiming attorney-client
privilege. Id. Because the tribe identified itself as the beneficiary of the trust funds, the tribe moved
to compel disclosure of the documents under the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege.
Id. at 167. The Court of Federal Claims and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit both ruled
in favor of the tribe. Id. at 167–69. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Id. at 169. The
issue of the trust doctrine’s scope in Jicarilla Apache Nation, therefore, was substantially narrower
than that in Quechan Tribe or the subsequent Rosebud Sioux Tribe.
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doctrine, much less any government obligation to provide health care
services under the IHCIA.295
Finally, the Ninth Circuit denied any judicial authority to order IHS to
operate its facility safely or reallocate its internal funding.296 Neither did
the court consider the Quechan Tribe’s request for a declaratory
judgment.297 The court ultimately deferred entirely to the authority of
Congress and the executive agencies to define and implement Indian
health care policy, abdicating any judicial oversight of such actions by
the other branches.298
In sum, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Quechan Tribe rested primarily
on the district court’s misapplication of the Mitchell cases and the Ninth
Circuit’s additional inapposite application of Jicarilla Apache Nation.
The district court inappropriately applied the Mitchell cases in the first
place. In those cases, the plaintiffs sued for monetary damages, which
entail a narrower reading of trust obligations arising under statute. But
even had Mitchell provided the appropriate standard, the district court
failed to apply it correctly. The court did not adequately analyze and
compare the statutes at issue in those cases with the IHCIA in Quechan
Tribe. The district court’s analysis was very thin in this regard. When the
Ninth Circuit affirmed, the Court of Appeals inserted authority from
Jicarilla Apache Nation to further narrow the scope of the government’s
trust obligations, despite that case’s consideration of a very different
question of the government’s fiduciary duties in another context.
Unfortunately, the government has picked up on this line of reasoning
295. Even if Jicarilla Apache Nation does govern the holding in this case, then it is unclear
under the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning how the federal government’s “sovereign interest in the execution of federal law” is not implicated by its statutory obligations under the IHCIA. See Jicarilla
Apache Nation, 564 U.S. at 165 (“[I]n fulfilling its statutory duties, the Government acts not as a
private trustee but pursuant to its sovereign interest in the execution of federal law.”).
296. Quechan Tribe, 599 Fed. App’x at 699 (“The Tribe also argues that this court should issue
an order compelling IHS to maintain and operate the Fort Yuma Service Unit safely, and to allocate
additional available funds to the Unit. This court cannot compel IHS to maintain the Unit because
there is no specific, unequivocal statutory command to do so. This court also cannot compel IHS
to allocate greater funding to the Unit, because IHS’s allocation of the lump-sum appropriation for
Indian health care is committed to its discretion.” (citation omitted)).
297. Id. The relevant statutes give federal courts the authority to “declare the rights and other
legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration,” and for the aggrieved party to then
seek further relief based on the declaratory judgment. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202.
298. Quechan Tribe, 599 Fed. App’x at 699–700 (“In closing, we emphasize that we appreciate
the Tribe’s commitment to ensuring adequate healthcare for its members, and we acknowledge the
challenges faced by the Tribe in ensuring such care. However, the solution lies in Congress and the
executive branch, not the courts.”). In response to the court’s direction to the federal political
branches, it must be acknowledged that American Indians constitute a very small percentage of the
United States population, scattered across various states, and with comparatively few resources.
See Rey-Bear & Fletcher, supra note 32, at 448 (noting that because Indian tribes are small and
only located in some states, Congress is not as familiar with Indian issues). It is therefore exceptionally difficult for American Indians to advance their interests in Congress. Id.
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and carried it forward in its appeal in Rosebud Sioux Tribe, discussed
next.
B. Narrowing the Federal Trust Doctrine in the Rosebud Sioux Tribe
Appeal
In Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. United States, the parties’ framing of the
key issues on appeal to the Eighth Circuit demonstrate the continued
divergence between Eighth Circuit and plaintiff tribes’ understanding of
the federal trust doctrine—including its proper sources, scope, and
enforceability—and that of the federal government. The government
(defendants-appellants in the suit) contends that there can be no
enforceable trust obligations—whether grounded in treaty or statutory
language—where the government does not manage tribal property, and
where there is no explicit assumption of fiduciary obligations in a
substantive source of law.299 The Rosebud Sioux Tribe (plaintiff-appellee
in the suit) argues that trust responsibilities extend beyond the
government’s narrow framing. In particular, the tribe argues that the
government’s insistence on the management of tribal property (a trust
corpus) as a necessary precondition to any trust obligations flowing from
treaty or statutory sources would render the promises the United States
originally made in treaties, and which Congress has repeatedly reinforced
by statutes, meaningless and illusory.300
The government denied the existence of any enforceable trust duty
under the Treaty of Fort Laramie of 1868, the IHCIA, or any other related
statute to provide “competent physician-led health care” to the tribe and
its members,301 as the district court had ordered.302 In its framing of the
issue on appeal of whether the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie “gives rise to
a duty . . . grounded in Indian trust doctrine” to provide such services to
the Rosebud Sioux Tribe,303 the government reasserted its narrow
understanding of federal trust doctrine’s sources, scope, and
enforceability.

299. Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 11, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. United States, No. 20-2062
(8th Cir. July 9, 2020), 2020 WL 4060372 at *11.
300. Brief of Appellee Rosebud Sioux Tribe at 29, Rosebud Sioux Tribe, No. 20-2062, 2020
WL 5607354 at *29.
301. Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 299, at 10, *10 (“IHS does not have an Indian
trust duty under the Treaty of Fort Laramie of 1868, the IHCIA, and/or the Snyder Act to provide
“competent physician-led health care” to the Rosebud Sioux Tribe’s members.”).
302. Judgment, supra note 26, at 1–2 (“[It is] [o]rdered, adjudged, and decreed that Summary
Judgment on Count III enters for Plaintiff and against Defendants under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 to the
limited extent that this Court enters a declaratory judgment that the Defendants owe the Tribe a
duty to provide competent physician-led health care to the Tribe and its members.”).
303. Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 299, at 2, *2.
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1. Narrowing the Sources of the Trust Doctrine
The government now rejects any common law basis for the trust
doctrine,304 and it repeats the misapplied standard of the Mitchell cases,
the Navajo Nation cases, and Jicarilla Apache Nation to insist that the
trust doctrine requires both a trust corpus and a substantive legal source
explicitly assuming and defining fiduciary responsibilities.305 Similar to
the Ninth Circuit’s holding,306 the government does not distinguish the
monetary damages claims in this line of Supreme Court cases from the
tribe’s claim for equitable relief in Rosebud.307
It made sense in the Mitchell line of cases for the Court to identify both
a trust corpus and require an explicit statutory basis for the government’s
fiduciary duty to manage tribal resources. The tribes in these cases sought
monetary damages precisely for the government’s alleged
mismanagement (i.e., breach of fiduciary duty inherent in a traditional
common law trust relationship) of tribal property.308 But as the Rosebud
Sioux Tribe points out in its own brief on appeal, obligations arising
under the common law trust relationship and further grounded in treaties
and statutes are not limited to the compensatory interest in fiduciary
duties that attach to a trust corpus.309
This is a fundamentally different type of claim. The tribe did not seek
compensatory damages for mismanagement of tribal property but rather
“a declaration of the rights and obligations” of the federal government to
provide health care services, which originally arose under treaty and were

304. Id. at 11, *11 (“[A]ny specific obligations the Government may have under [the trust] relationship are ‘governed by statute rather than the common law.’” (quoting United States v. Jicarilla
Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 165 (2011)).
305. Id. at 11, *11 (quoting United States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo Nation I), 537 U.S. 488,
506 (2003); accord United States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo Nation II), 556 U.S. 287, 296, 302
(2009)).
306. See Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Rsrv. v. United States, No. 10-2261, 2011 WL
1211574, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2011) (“When a tribe sues the government for damages, it ‘must
identify a substantive source of law that establishes specific fiduciary or other duties and allege that
the Government has failed faithfully to perform those duties.’” (quoting Navajo Nation I, 537 U.S.
at 506 (2003)), aff’d, 599 Fed. App’x 698, 699 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming the judgment and adopting
the reasoning of the district court).
307. See Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 299, at 11–12, *11–12 (citing the Mitchell
cases, the Navajo Nation cases, and Jicarilla Apache Nation as support for the argument that “[a]
trust duty only exists if the plaintiff can both identify ‘a substantive source of law that establishes
specific fiduciary or other duties’ and establish that the United States has taken over tribal assets
such as tribally owned land or timber.” (citation omitted)).
308. See discussion and accompanying footnotes, supra Section II.A.3 (discussing the monetary
damages claims in the Mitchell cases, the Navajo Nation cases, and Jicarilla Apache Nation).
309. See Brief of Appellee Rosebud Sioux Tribe, supra note 300, at 35, *35 (“The district court
correctly rejected the Government’s attempt to avoid its treaty and statutory obligations by grafting
in a trust corpus requirement that does not fit the case.”).
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affirmed by statute.310 It would make no sense to tie such obligations to
the existence of a trust corpus. Nor does it follow that the existence of
such obligations be denied altogether simply because there is no trust
corpus to justify them. Rather, the government’s affirmative trust
obligations to provide services and benefits are grounded in—and should
be judged according to—the generally accepted canons of construction
for treaties and statutes governing the unique relationship between the
United States and Indian tribes.311
If the Eighth Circuit accepts the government’s argument that the trust
doctrine applies only in the narrowest of circumstances, when there is
(1) a trust corpus, and (2) statutes that explicitly undertake exclusive
government responsibility for its management, this would divorce the
federal trust doctrine entirely from its common law origins that implied
an ongoing performance of responsibilities in exchange for the historic
dispossession of land from Indian tribes.312
2. Narrowing the Scope of the Trust Doctrine
Furthermore, the government has disclaimed any trust obligation
arising under statute or the 1868 Treaty to provide specific health care
services, claiming that any funds appropriated by Congress pursuant to
the IHCIA represented only gratuitous, lump-sum appropriations that
IHS had complete discretion to spend as it saw fit.313 The government
rejected the Eighth Circuit’s holding in White, arguing that Lincoln had
effectively overturned it.314 As the tribe observed, however, the
government misinterpreted Lincoln because the Lincoln Court never
310. Id. at 35, *35 (noting the distinction between damages claims and equitable claims).
311. See id. at 20–21, *20–21 (explaining the relationship between Indian tribes and the United
States through treaties as contracts between sovereign nations, and that traditional canons of construction interpreting treaties require fulfillment of the spirit of those agreements to tribes’ benefit
rather than strict adherence to the specific language); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note
33, § 2.02[1] (“The basic Indian law canons of construction require that treaties, agreements, statutes, and executive orders be liberally construed in favor of the Indians and that all ambiguities are
to be resolved in their favor.” (footnotes omitted)).
312. Brief of Appellee Rosebud Sioux Tribe, supra note 300, at 30, *30 (“The United States at
times will manage a trust corpus and can be liable for mismanagement, but it is a non sequitur to
conclude that all straightforward treaty obligations require a trust corpus for there to be a treaty
violation. It would come as a rude shock to tribes all over the country, and would violate every
principle of treaty construction and fair dealing if the conclusion were reached that all of the bargained-for treaty obligations that lack a corpus are unenforceable.”).
313. See Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 299, at 15–17, *15–17 (arguing that the
statutory language of the Snyder Act and IHCIA did not create any specific trust obligation and
that the treaty at issue did not contain language that could reasonably be interpreted as the district
court did).
314. Id. at 19, *19 (“[T]he Supreme Court has held that IHS’s appropriations, the Snyder Act,
and the IHCIA speak of Indian health only in general terms and do not impose trust obligations.
This holding directly invalidates the White court’s reliance on the IHCIA . . . .” (citing Lincoln v.
Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 194–95 (1993))).
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reached the issue of whether the IHCIA implicated the trust doctrine.315
The government’s position implies that, if it owes no duty whatsoever
and congressional appropriations to IHS are merely gratuitous, then IHS
could completely “eliminate health care services to the Rosebud Tribe
without violating any duty.”316 This absurd and unjust result illustrates
that the government’s position is extreme. Thus, the district court
reasonably concluded that the scope of the government’s duty includes
some provision of health care services. It would also be absurd to agree
with the government that, even if such a duty existed, it would be limited
to merely employing and housing one physician on the tribe’s land, per a
strict reading of the treaty’s language.317 The tribe and the government,
when the treaty was made, had to intend for this to represent the ongoing
provision of meaningful health care services.318 Congress’s affirmations
under the IHCIA further reinforce this interpretation.319 That the scope
of the federal trust doctrine extends to provide “competent physician-led
health care”320 is a far more reasonable conclusion.
3. Reducing the Enforceability of the Federal Trust Doctrine
Finally, the government argues the declaratory judgment issued by the
district court was too vague to be enforced.321 The declaratory
315. Brief of Appellee Rosebud Sioux Tribe, supra note 300, at 34, *34. The tribe correctly
observed—as did the district court—that the Lincoln Court “held only that courts could not review
the IHS’s decision about the funds pursuant to the [Administrative Procedure Act].” Id.; cf. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 3d 986, 998 (D.S.D. 2020) (“The Court however
did not opine on the general trust responsibility IHS owed . . . to tribes.”); Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 193
(“The Service’s decision to discontinue the Program is accordingly unreviewable under § 701(a)(2)
[of the Administrative Procedure Act].”).
316. Brief of Appellee Rosebud Sioux Tribe, supra note 300, at 29, *29.
317. 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie, supra note 224 (“The United States hereby agrees to furnish
annually to the Indians the physician . . . as herein contemplated, and that such appropriations shall
be made from time to time, on the estimates of the Secretary of the Interior, as will be sufficient to
employ such persons.”). The Rosebud district court also noted the absurdity of the government’s
argument: “If this Court were to adopt a truly literal interpretation as the Government suggests, the
Government could satisfy its duty by employing and furnishing a physician and housing him on the
reservation without the physician providing any sort of services. This interpretation could not have
been the intended result of the negotiating parties.” Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at
1000 n.11.
318. The district court also recognized the historic reality that “treaties between the Government
and tribes routinely were written by the Government in English rather than in the language spoken
by tribal chiefs or members and frequently involved tribal representatives placed under extreme
duress.” Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 1000 n.10. Thus, the court recognized the federal
government’s advantage in negotiating these terms in the first place.
319. See 25 U.S.C. § 1601(1) (“Federal health services to maintain and improve the health of
the Indians are consonant with and required by the Federal Government’s historical and unique
legal relationship with, and resulting responsibility to, the American Indian people.”).
320. Judgment, supra note 26, at 2.
321. Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 299, at 21, *21 (“Even if the Treaty did
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judgment’s lack of specificity, according to the government, originated
precisely in the lack of a specific statutory or regulatory obligation.322
But as the tribe explains, the parties had a right to seek the court’s
declaration of enforceable legal responsibilities to each other in this
controversy.323 The trust obligations under the 1868 Treaty were just one
aspect of that controversy, which the court defined according to its
role.324 The resulting declaration can be enforced through the federal
government applying its own stated standards of medical care (which
already apply to Rosebud Hospital) and ensuring that IHS does, in fact,
meet such standards.325 This judgment does not require the court to
involve itself in the internal policy matters and demand specific budget
allocations within IHS.326 Rather, the judgment declares that IHS take
into consideration its obligation to provide competent, physician-led
health care to the Rosebud Tribe during this budgetary process.
It is notable, however, that the district court’s declaratory judgment
was premised on trust obligations implicated in the 1868 Treaty’s
language, not the IHCIA.327 The government here persuasively points out
that the district court did not ground its order and judgment in the
enforceability of the IHCIA under the trust doctrine.328 The court
explained that the tribe had overstated its duty under the IHCIA in this
particular claim, but that there were enforceable affirmative duties to
provide health care services under the IHCIA and the trust doctrine in

impose some general obligation to provide adequate health care, the district court independently
erred by entering an abstract declaratory judgment that does not clearly define the rights and obligations of the parties in the context of any concrete controversy.”).
322. Id. (“Because the district court did not purport to identify any specific and concrete obligation grounded in a statute or regulation, it could not frame its declaratory judgment in concrete
terms.”).
323. Brief of Appellee Rosebud Sioux Tribe, supra note 300, at 16–17, *16–17.
324. Id. at 17, *17 (“[The district court] just needed to declare the legal rights of the parties
under the Treaty based on the set of concrete facts presented in this case. The district court’s opinion
properly interpreted the Treaty and declared the respective rights of the parties thereunder.”).
325. Id. at 18, *18. (“[T]he federal government sets minimum standards for medical care across
the country and enforces compliance with those standards, without any indication that such regulations are vague or meaningless.”).
326. Indeed, this concerns the matter decided in Lincoln, that IHS’s internal appropriations decisions regarding specific programs fell outside of judicial review, but Lincoln did not define the
parties’ rights and obligations toward one another under the trust doctrine.
327. See discussion supra Section III.C.3.
328. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 3d 986, 1002–03 (D.S.D. 2020)
(explaining why the government’s affirmative duties under the IHCIA do not extend as far as the
tribe’s brief in support of its motion for summary judgment had asserted); see also id. at 1005
(“[T]his Court issues a declaratory judgment that the Defendants’ duty to the Tribe under the 1868
Treaty of Fort Laramie expressed in treaty language as furnishing ‘to the Indians the physician’
requires Defendants to provide competent physician-led health care to the Tribe’s members.”).
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general, per White v. Califano.329 But it is also possible that Chief Judge
Lange foresaw the challenges facing judicial enforcement of affirmative
statutory duties under the IHCIA and other similar statutes.
The trend, as shown in the Ninth Circuit’s Quechan Tribe holding and
the evolution of the Supreme Court’s increasingly narrow understanding
of the trust doctrine, has meant fewer judicially enforceable rights for
Indian tribes.330 In the Marshall, Navajo Nation, and Jicarilla Apache
Nation cases, the Supreme Court opted to look to statutes over the
common law as the primary sources for the trust doctrine, despite the
doctrine’s common law origins.331 Because the interpretation of treaties
is linked more closely to the common law tradition and origins of the trust
doctrine, it is possible the Rosebud court saw the treaty language as more
likely to be enforceable.332 Treaties are more tangible embodiments of
the ongoing promises that the federal government made to sovereign
Indian tribes in exchange for their vast cessions of land.333 The Supreme
Court has previously emphasized that treaties should be interpreted
liberally and in tribes’ favor when possible.334 Thus, the district court in
Rosebud Sioux Tribe may have foreseen that appellate courts would be
more likely to liberally interpret duties established by treaty rather than
those duties affirmed by legislation. Some district courts have viewed the
329. See id. at 1002 (explaining that an affirmative duty exists under the IHCIA but that it is
not coextensive with the broad policy claimed by the tribe).
330. See Alexander Tallchief Skibine, The Supreme Court’s Last 30 Years of Federal Indian
Law: Looking for Equilibrium or Supremacy?, 8 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 277, 291–92 (2018) (describing the Supreme Court’s trend over the past thirty years that construes trust obligations narrowly); see also Wood, supra note 44, at 1507 (“The outright dismissal of the trust responsibility
effectively drowns out any continuing special federal obligation toward tribes. It forecloses a potentially effective judicial avenue for requiring agencies to protect native lands and resources.”).
331. See discussion supra Section II.A.1, 3 (discussing the trust doctrine’s origins in common
law and the most recent Supreme Court interpretations).
332. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 450 F. Supp. 3d. at 1000 (“Congress has not extinguished the
1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie but has legislated to widen the Government’s role in providing health
care to tribal members generally.”). The Rosebud court also took care to outline the history of the
1868 Treaty and the common law canon of treaty interpretation that traditionally favors tribal interests, given the context in which they were negotiated that heavily favored the drafting party. Id.
at 989–90, 1000.
333. See sources cited supra note 36 (describing the history of treaties between the federal government and Indian tribes).
334. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985) (“The canons of
construction applicable in Indian law are rooted in the unique trust relationship between the United
States and the Indians. Thus it is well established that treaties should be construed liberally in favor
of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit.” (citations omitted)). See
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 19, § 6 (“A treaty
must be liberally interpreted in favor of the relevant Indian tribes to give effect to the purpose of
the treaty. Courts apply the following canons of construction: (a) Doubtful or ambiguous expressions in a treaty must be resolved in favor of the relevant Indian tribes. (b) An Indian treaty must
be construed as the Indians understood it at the time of the treaty negotiation. (c) An Indian treaty
must be construed by reference to surrounding circumstances and history.”).
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latter as conferring to American Indians little more than a mere, voluntary
gratuity.335
C. Predictions for the Supreme Court’s Resolution of the Circuit Split
The Eighth Circuit may be persuaded by the Rosebud Sioux Tribe’s
arguments and by the Eighth Circuit’s own line of precedent in White v.
Califano supporting the enforceability of trust obligations, pursuant to
treaty and statutory language in this case and other similar cases. But the
Supreme Court is likely to prefer to extend its increasingly narrow view,
as illustrated in recent case law, to apply to the trust obligation to provide
health care services to Indian tribes under the IHCIA and earlier treaties.
This approach aligns more closely with the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in
Quechan Tribe and with the government’s position in Rosebud Sioux
Tribe. If this case reaches the Supreme Court, the Court would likely hold
that there is no specific, judicially enforceable trust obligation to provide
health care that arises from either the IHCIA or treaties like the 1868
Treaty of Fort Laramie.
First, the Court will likely agree with the government that trust
obligations derive from both an existing trust corpus and from explicit
provisions in statutes that assume near-exclusive government control of
the management of that trust corpus. This would extend the Court’s strict
requirements for tribes’ claims for monetary damages proclaimed in the
Mitchell, Navajo Nation, and Jicarilla Apache Nation cases to future
tribal claims for equitable relief. Such a holding would follow the Court’s
trend of seeking specificity in the plain text of statutes and treaties,
divorced from consideration of the doctrine’s broader historical context;
the intent of the drafters; and common law principles.336 It also would
follow a longer-term trend of the Court narrowing the government’s
federal trust obligations.337 By limiting the sources to derive enforceable
335. See, e.g., Gila River Indian Cmty. v. Burwell, No. 14-CV-00943, 2015 WL 997857, at *6
(D. Ariz. Mar. 6, 2015) (describing congressional appropriations made pursuant to statute as “gratuitous”); Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Rsrv. v. United States, No. 10-2261, 2011 WL
1211574, at *2–3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2011) (“The provision of [health care] services under that
[Snyder] Act is a matter of grace, not a legal obligation. . . . We do not disagree that the statutes
discuss the voluntary assumption by the United States of the provision of some health care to Indians.” (emphasis added)).
336. See Skibine, supra note 330, at 292 (“The Court . . . does not want to extend general principles of trust law to interpret the extent of the Indian trust doctrine unless specifically mandated
to do so by Congress.”).
337. See Rey-Bear & Fletcher, supra note 32, at 442 (describing the Court at odds over the past
fifty years with the political branches, which have reaffirmed the federal trust responsibility as
national policy); see also Skibine, supra note 330, at 291–92 (reviewing the eight Supreme Court
cases in the past thirty years that implicated the trust doctrine, seven of which the tribes lost, indicating the trend in the Court’s narrow interpretation of the trust doctrine and its reluctance to extend
the trust doctrine’s principles without an explicit congressional mandate).
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trust obligation from, the Court would reduce the government’s burden
and substantially increase the tribes’ burden, making it much harder for
tribes to pursue claims for which the government has little incentive to be
held accountable.
The Court would probably also go further and overrule the district
court’s reading of White and vacate any forthcoming Eighth Circuit
decision that affirmed the district court’s ruling in Rosebud Sioux Tribe.
The Court would most likely emphasize that neither the 1868 Treaty nor
the IHCIA or other related health care statutes (i.e., the Snyder Act or the
ACA) creates a judicially enforceable trust obligation. The Court will
likely agree with the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Lincoln v. Vigil,
which the government relies on for its appeal in Rosebud, saying the
language both in statutes and the treaty address health care “only in
general terms.” The Court will likely continue to interpret the scope of
the federal government’s trust obligations very narrowly, especially
considering the relatively new composition of the Court.338 The Court
338. Since Jicarilla Apache Nation was decided in 2011, three justices have departed. Justice
Antonin Scalia died in February 2016 and was replaced by Justice Neil Gorsuch in April 2017. Neil
Gorsuch, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices/neil_gorsuch [https://perma.cc/U5J8-Q384] (last
visited May 29, 2021). Justice Anthony Kennedy retired in 2018 and was replaced by Justice Brett
Kavanaugh in October 2018. Brett M. Kavanaugh, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices/brett_m_kavanaugh [https://perma.cc/WX4D-9KFX] (last visited May 29, 2021). Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg died in September 2020. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, OYEZ,
https://www.oyez.org/justices/ruth_bader_ginsburg [https://perma.cc/F5PR-LZC8] (last visited
May 29, 2021). President Trump appointed Judge Amy Coney Barrett, sitting judge on the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, to replace Justice Ginsburg, and after receiving Senate confirmation, she
was sworn in on October 27, 2020. Judicial Oath Ceremony: The Honorable Amy Coney Barrett,
SUP.
CT.
U.S.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/oath/oath_barrett.aspx
[https://perma.cc/6P5Q-GBYK] (last visited May 29, 2021). Prior to Justice Ginsburg’s death, the
Court ruled 5–4 in McGirt v. Oklahoma to recognize that a treaty signed in 1832 between the Creek
Nation and the federal government remained in effect. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452
(2020). Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority, detailed the extensive history of the treaties and
successive Acts of Congress that fractured the Creeks’ lands and broke prior commitments. McGirt,
140 S. Ct. at 2460–68. But throughout that history, Justice Gorsuch explained, Congress never
dissolved the Creek Tribe nor disestablished its reservation. Id. at 2468. Justice Gorsuch has thus
been praised for his recognition of Indian rights, but the decision is firmly grounded on a strict
reading of statute. See, e.g., Ronald Mann, Opinion Analysis: Justices Toe Hard Line in Affirming
Reservation Status for Eastern Oklahoma, SCOTUSBLOG (July 9, 2020, 7:15 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/07/opinion-analysis-justices-toe-hard-line-in-affirming-reservation-status-for-eastern-oklahoma/ [https://perma.cc/3EYK-ZFYN]. Justice Kavanaugh joined
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion in McGirt. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2482 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting). The newest member of the Court, Justice Barrett has written of Indian law, “the peculiar circumstances surrounding the emergence of [canons of liberal construction for statutes related
to Indian law]—particularly its grounding in treaty interpretation, where a court enforces an agreement reached by multiple parties rather than functioning solely as Congress’s faithful agent—make
its history of limited utility notwithstanding its presence on the list of old canons that modern courts
continue to apply.” Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV.
109, 152 (2010). Therefore, given what is known of the records of the three newest additions to the
Court in interpreting Indian law, the Court is likely to continue to favor narrow, textualist constructions of statutes related to the federal government’s relationship with Indian tribes.
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may also reject the Rosebud district court’s declaratory remedy as “too
vague,” just as the government claimed in its brief.339 The Court may
further decide this kind of claim is not justiciable at all, as it falls within
the exclusive policy-making purview of Congress and the executive
branch, just as Ninth Circuit declared in Quechan Tribe.340 As a
consequence, Indian tribes would potentially lose access to judicial
recourse to protect their rights under the federal trust doctrine for not only
health care services, but potentially other types of government-provided
services described in statute as well.341
In conclusion, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning and holding in Quechan
Tribe diverged significantly from that of the Eighth Circuit in White v.
Califano, decided thirty-seven years prior. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s holdings in the Mitchell
cases and their progeny, despite the fact these cases invoked a higher
standard for stating breach of trust claims more appropriate to claims for
money damages rather than claims for equitable relief. Furthermore, the
Ninth Circuit inappositely applied Jicarilla Apache Nation in order to
assert unilaterally that in its relationship with Indian tribes, the
government was not a private trustee, and thus it owed no specific,
judicially enforceable fiduciary duties, including the claimed duty to
provide health care services under the IHCIA and other relevant statutes.
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, however, is less an aberration than a
continuation of a general trend by which the government has advanced—
and the Supreme Court has endorsed—an increasingly narrow
understanding of the federal trust doctrine and its sources, scope, and
enforceability. Should the Rosebud Sioux Tribe appeal arrive at the
Supreme Court following its pending disposition in the Eighth Circuit,
the Court is likely to extend its narrow understanding expressed in case
law regarding breach of trust claims for damages to cases seeking
equitable relief. This reflects the forty-year trend that has hollowed out
the trust doctrine’s enforceability and Indian tribes’ ability to vindicate
their rights. This trend can only be reversed through a radical
reinterpretation of the trust doctrine, discussed next.

339. Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 299, at 23–24, *23–24. (“Both the declaratory
relief requested by the Tribe and that awarded by the district court in this case are far too nebulous
to constitute a conclusive decree on particular facts. . . . A vague directive [to provide competent
physician-led health care] of this kind is not the proper subject of a declaratory-judgment action.”).
340. Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Rsrv. v. United States, 599 Fed. App’x 698, 700
(9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he solution lies in Congress and the executive branch, not the courts.”).
341. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1451 (financing); id. § 1802 (higher education); id. § 1902 (child
welfare); id. § 2401 (employment); id. § 2501(b) (schools); id. § 2702(1) (gaming); id. § 3104(a)
(forests); id. § 3502(a)(1) (energy resources); id. § 3601(2)–(7) (justice); id. § 3702(1), (4) (agriculture); id. § 4101(7) (housing); id. § 4301 (business development).
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V. REHABILITATING THE TRUST DOCTRINE
This Comment proposes that the Court reinvigorate the trust doctrine’s
foundations in both federal common law and international law principles.
The Court should construe congressional legislation so as to both protect
tribal sovereignty and uphold the government’s ongoing promises, made
in exchange for land cessions and still in full effect. Additionally, the
Court should incorporate contemporary principles of international law
pertaining to human rights and indigenous peoples’ rights into the
interpretation of the federal trust doctrine. Such an approach is not
inconsistent with the trust doctrine’s origins. It aligns, in fact, with the
trust doctrine’s foundational principles and objectives.
This Comment further proposes that the Supreme Court affirm the
approach of the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota in
White v. Califano. The White district court offered a workable mechanism
for determining whether IHS had complied with its trust obligations
under the IHCIA.342 This could serve as a potential avenue of relief for
Indian tribes against the federal government in future breach of trust
claims for equitable relief implicating the IHCIA.
A. Ground the Trust Doctrine in Its Common Law Origins
First and foremost, the Court should reject its Jicarilla Apache Nation
holding and its line of precedent. These cases are premised on the false
assertion that the United States’ relationship with Indian tribes derives
solely from—and should be interpreted exclusively pursuant to—
congressional legislation.343 The Court has put on historical blinders in
justifying its reliance on statutory interpretation alone to define the
origins, scope, and enforceability of the federal government’s obligations
toward Indian tribes under the trust doctrine.344 This approach shields the
342. White v. Califano, 437 F. Supp. 543, 555–56 (D.S.D. 1977) (discussing the mechanism for
determining, after it had established that an enforceable trust duty exists under the IHCIA and the
common law trust doctrine, how the court can analyze the statute and its implementing regulations
to determine the scope of that duty, whether it has been breached, and what may be an appropriate
equitable remedy); see also discussion of White, supra Section III.A.
343. See United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 175 (2011) (“Throughout the
history of the Indian trust relationship, we have recognized that the organization and management
of the trust is a sovereign function subject to the plenary authority of Congress.”). In support of this
assertion, the Jicarilla Court cited a line of precedent originating in Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock
and Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, the problematic aspects of which are discussed supra Section II.A.2.
On top of citing these problematic cases, the Court elevated mere footnote text from a 1982 case
that stated, “The United States retains plenary authority to divest the tribes of any attributes of
sovereignty.” Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S at 175 (citing Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
455 U.S. 130, 169 n.18 (1982)). These and the other several cited cases subjugated tribal sovereignty to Congress’s discretion.
344. The Court’s assertions of Congress’s plenary authority over Indian tribes, derived from the
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United States from accountability for its centuries of broken promises to
American Indians.345 Further, this troubling rationale also directly
opposes the principle of inherent tribal sovereignty—not subject to
Congress’s power—which is one of the trust doctrine’s foundational
principles expressed by the Marshall Court as grounded in the “law of
nations.”346 As sovereign parties to government-to-government
agreements, Indian tribes should be able to hold the United States
accountable to its historic obligations rather than be considered just
another interest group in the political process.347
Instead, the Court should return to the common law approach and
consider the full historical context of the government’s relationship with
Indian tribes.348 Under this approach, the “general trust relationship”
Lone Wolf line of cases, contradicted the Marshall Court’s conclusions about Indian tribes’ inherent
sovereignty, conclusions which relied on English common law and European international legal
principles. See discussion supra Section II.A.1.
345. See Rey-Bear & Fletcher, supra note 32, at 444 (“[I]t is troubling that the Supreme Court
[in Jicarilla Apache Nation] overlooked or disregarded the contracts between Indian tribes and the
federal government under which tribes gave up land and external sovereignty in exchange for the
federal government’s commitment to the federal trust responsibility regarding Indians.” (citing
Elizabeth Ann Kronk, United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation: Its Importance and Potential Future Ramifications, FED. LAW., Apr. 2012, at 4, 4–6)); see also id. at 442 (“[T]he Supreme Court . . .
seems more normatively concerned about undermining the federal trust responsibility and protecting federal agencies than it does about promoting a viable framework for protecting Indians from
federal malfeasance in the twenty-first century.” (citing Philip P. Frickey, Doctrine, Context, Institutional Relationships, and Commentary: The Malaise of Federal Indian Law Through the Lens of
Lone Wolf, 38 TULSA L. REV. 5, 8 (2002))).
346. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560–61 (1832) (“The very fact of repeated
treaties with [the Cherokee tribe] recognizes [their title to self-government]; and the settled doctrine
of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not surrender its independence—its right to self
government, by associating with a stronger, and taking its protection. A weak state, in order to
provide for its safety, may place itself under the protection of one more powerful, without stripping
itself of the right of government, and ceasing to be a state.”); cf. Rey-Bear & Fletcher, supra note
32, at 413 (“As recognized in Emer de Vattel’s The Law of Nations in 1758, and in Worcester in
1832, a state which places itself under the protection of another without divesting itself of the right
of government does not, because of that, cease to be an independent sovereign subject to the law
of nations.”).
347. See, e.g., Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Rsrv. v. United States, No. 10-2261,
2011 WL 1211574, at *7 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2011) (“The Tribe is just one of many interest groups
throughout the country competing for scarce resources. The Tribe’s concerns are best addressed
through the political process.” (emphasis added)).
348. Cf. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. at 192–93 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Since 1831,
this Court has recognized the existence of a general trust relationship between the United States
and Indian tribes. Our decisions over the past century have repeatedly reaffirmed this ‘distinctive
obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government’ in its dealings with Indians. Congress, too, has
recognized the general trust relationship between the United States and Indian tribes. Indeed,
‘[n]early every piece of modern legislation dealing with Indian tribes contains a statement reaffirming the trust relationship between tribes and the federal government.’ Against this backdrop, Congress has enacted federal statutes that ‘define the contours of the United States’ fiduciary responsibilities’ with regard to its management of Indian tribe property and other trust assets.” (citations
omitted)).
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grounded in common law would sustain an action for breach of trust
without needing to point to statutory language where the government
explicitly undertook the duties of a fiduciary trustee for Indian tribes.349
This approach maintains as its linchpin the inherent sovereignty of Indian
tribes because it recognizes tribes as political entities with legal rights
that predate Congress’s authority by centuries.350 By centering inherent
and indissoluble tribal sovereignty, as embodied in treaties and in the
Marshallian articulation at common law, all branches of the federal
government will be exhorted to uphold the historic body of promises the
United States made to tribal governments and indigenous peoples over
the course of centuries.
Statutory interpretation should still play an important role in the
consideration of the government’s trust obligations, particularly when
Congress legislates in accordance with those obligations.351 The
proposed approach foregrounds the common law trust relationship as the
underlying foundation for legislation, rather than divorcing statutes from
their historical legacy and corresponding legal (not to mention moral)
obligations. Embedding the trust doctrine in both common law and
statutory sources should, therefore, enlarge rather than narrow the scope
of the government’s trust obligations. This would allow courts to follow
the approach endorsed by the Eighth Circuit in White v. Califano and find
that the IHCIA imposed affirmative, judicially enforceable trust
obligations to provide health care services to American Indians and
Indian tribes.352 Furthermore, the proposed approach would support the
349. These duties are implied by the general trust relationship. See Blue Legs v. U.S. Bureau of
Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094, 1100 (8th Cir. 1989) (“The existence of a trust duty between the
United States and an Indian or Indian tribe can be inferred from the provisions of a statute, treaty
or other agreement, ‘reinforced by the undisputed existence of a general trust relationship between
the United States and the Indian people.’” (quoting United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), 463 U.S.
206, 225 (1983))).
350. As previously discussed, European governments, colonial governments, and later, the
United States, negotiated treaties with Indian tribes from the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 33, §§ 1.02–1.03. Congress ended this practice with the
Appropriations Act of March 3, 1871, codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 71, which states: “No
Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized
as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty; but
no obligation of any treaty lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe prior to
March 3, 1871, shall be hereby invalidated or impaired.”
351. Cf. White v. Califano, 437 F. Supp. 543, 557 (D.S.D. 1977) (“When the Congress legislates
for Indians only, something more than a statutory entitlement is involved. Congress is acting upon
the premise that a special relationship is involved, and is acting to meet the obligations inherent in
that relationship.”).
352. White v. Califano, 581 F.2d 697, 698 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam). The proposed approach,
of course, would also support finding affirmative trust obligations grounded in other substantive
sources of law, such as treaties, as the district court found in Rosebud Sioux Tribe. Rosebud Sioux
Tribe v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 3d 986, 1001 (D.S.D. 2020). This approach may also support

1170

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 52

mechanism offered by the district court in White v. Califano for courts to
judge whether the executive branch is living up to its statutory and
common law trust obligations, and to issue declaratory judgments and
injunctions enforcing such obligations.353 This approach will be further
discussed in Section C, below.
B. Update the Trust Doctrine with Contemporary Principles of
International Law
Second, the original conception and purpose of the trust doctrine must
also be updated to incorporate contemporary principles of international
law regarding modern government relationships with indigenous peoples.
The Court’s original common law articulation of the trust doctrine was
hampered by the prevailing attitudes of its era, and thus its limits must be
acknowledged and recognized. Chief Justice Marshall subscribed to the
Euro- and Anglo-supremacist views of the time.354 The Court also carried
this racist ideology down through the ages.355 This can only be corrected
through an active judiciary attentive to its role in the reproduction of
systemic racism and committed to its reversal by enforcing Congress’s

finding trust obligations grounded in other legal sources, such as executive orders, but exploring
this possibility is outside the scope of this Comment.
353. See discussion of White, 437 F. Supp.at 555–56, supra Section III.A, and accompanying
notes 164–173 (proposing that the court consider whether the executive branch (i.e., IHS) has acted
consistently with Congress’s expressed policy of upholding its affirmative trust obligations, and
that when it falls short, the court look to Congress’s intentions as expressed in statute and regulations regarding its priorities).
354. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 591 (1823) (“However extravagant the
pretension of converting the discovery of an inhabited country into conquest may appear; if the
principle has been asserted in the first instance, and afterwards sustained; if a country has been
acquired and held under it; if the property of the great mass of the community originates in it, it
becomes the law of the land, and cannot be questioned.”); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (“Meanwhile [Indians] are in a state of pupilage.”).
355. See, e.g., Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877) (calling American Indians “an
ignorant and dependent race”); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (“The power of
the General Government over these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished
in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they
dwell.”); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908) (“The reservation was a part of a very
much larger tract which the Indians had the right to occupy and use and which was adequate for
the habits and wants of a nomadic and uncivilized people. It was the policy of the Government, it
was the desire of the Indians, to change those habits and to become a pastoral and civilized people.”); Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 289–90 (1955) (“Every American
schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges by
force and that, even when the Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty in return for blankets, food
and trinkets, it was not a sale but the conquerors’ will that deprived them of their land.”); Oliphant
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978) (explaining that Indian tribes cannot exercise
jurisdiction over criminal acts committed within their lands when doing so would be “inconsistent
with their status” as contemplated by Congress).
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self-declared policy to uphold the government’s trust obligations.356
Rather than employing a neocolonial lens, the Court must reinvigorate
the trust doctrine through the lens of reparations and human rights, as
expressed by contemporary international law. Current principles of
international law, declared under the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, require nation states to acknowledge the
historic and ongoing harms indigenous peoples have suffered as a result
of colonization.357 The Declaration emphasizes indigenous peoples’
human rights,358 and exhorts nation states to take affirmative action to
remedy these harms and uphold their obligations to indigenous
peoples.359 Health care is considered a human right under international
law.360 Indigenous peoples have “an equal right to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standards of physical and mental health” under

356. See statutes cited supra note 77 (noting congressional legislation that explicitly invokes
the United States’ trust obligations to American Indians and Indian tribes).
357. G.A. Res. 61/295, annex, U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ¶ 6 (Sept.
13, 2007) (“Concerned that indigenous peoples have suffered from historic injustices as a result of,
inter alia, their colonization and dispossession of their lands, territories and resources, thus preventing them from exercising, in particular, their right to development in accordance with their own
needs and interests, . . . .”).
358. Id. at ¶ 18 (“Convinced that the recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples in this
Declaration will enhance harmonious and cooperative relations between the State and indigenous
peoples, based on principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, non-discrimination
and good faith, . . . .”); id. at ¶ 22 (“Recognizing and reaffirming that indigenous individuals are
entitled without discrimination to all human rights recognized in international law, and that indigenous peoples possess collective rights which are indispensable for their existence, well-being and
integral development as peoples, . . . .”).
359. Id. at ¶ 19 (“Encouraging States to comply with and effectively implement all their obligations as they apply to indigenous peoples under international instruments [such as treaties], in
particular those related to human rights, in consultation and cooperation with the peoples concerned, . . . .”).
360. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), art. 25(1) (Dec.
10, 1948) (“Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of
himself and of his family, including . . . medical care . . . .”). The UDHR is not a legally binding
treaty document in and of itself, but it serves as the foundation for international human rights law
and the basis for subsequent binding treaties. The Foundation of International Human Rights Law,
UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/udhr/foundation-of-international-humanrights-law [https://perma.cc/R42D-H9WB] (last visited May 29, 2021). One such treaty based on
the UDHR was the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which President Carter signed in 1977, but which was not ratified by Congress. Chapter IV: Human Rights, 3.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UNITED NATIONS, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&clang=_en
[https://perma.cc/5TWY-5AZL] (last visited October 12, 2020). Thus, the treaty is not binding. See
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur . . . .”).
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international law.361 These are not empty words; national governments
must take affirmative action to meet this objective.362
Although the United States typically does not follow the international
human rights approach in judicial interpretation of the government’s
obligations toward indigenous peoples,363 the federal government has
recognized these international law principles as consistent with the
federal trust doctrine’s foundational principles.364 International law
principles emphasize indigenous peoples’ sovereignty and rights to
political self-determination and cultural preservation.365 They also
recognize and reinforce indigenous peoples’ rights to economic and
social benefits in part as remedial measures for the damage caused by
governments of colonizers over centuries.366 These rights to benefits are
thus framed through the lens of reparations. The United States remains
financially and morally indebted to the indigenous peoples whose
ancestors were slaughtered and whose descendants were thus deprived of
an incalculable inheritance.367 Finally, Chief Justice Marshall built
361. G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 357, at art. 24(2); see also id. at art. 21(1) (“Indigenous
peoples have the right, without discrimination, to the improvement of their economic and social
conditions, including, inter alia, in the areas of education, employment, vocational training and
retraining, housing, sanitation, health and social security.”).
362. Id. at art. 24(2) (“States shall take the necessary steps with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of this right [to the highest attainable standards of physical and mental
health].” (emphasis added)); see also id. at art. 29(3) (“States shall also take effective measures to
ensure, as needed, that programmes for monitoring, maintaining and restoring the health of indigenous peoples . . . are duly implemented.” (emphasis added)); id. at art. 21(2) “States shall take
effective measures . . . to ensure continuing improvement of their economic and social conditions
[such as health]. Particular attention shall be paid to the rights and special needs of indigenous
elders, women, youth, children and persons with disabilities.” (emphasis added)).
363. See Nicholas Kaldawi, Note, Indigenous Health Policy in the United States and Latin
America: The Marshall Trilogy and the International Human Rights Approach, 33 ARIZ. J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 481, 482–83 (2016) (comparing and contrasting the “Marshall model” of the United
States with the “International Human Rights Approach” to health care followed in civil law countries).
364. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ANNOUNCEMENT OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS
DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (2010), https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/184099.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FES-BEJ9]; see also Rey-Bear & Fletcher, supra note 32, at 419–20 (noting the U.S. Department of State’s recent recognition of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples).
365. See generally G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 357, at ¶ 19.
366. Cf. S. James Anaya, The United States Supreme Court and Indigenous Peoples: Still a
Long Way to Go Toward a Therapeutic Role, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 229, 230 (2000) (“For a
jurisprudence concerning indigenous peoples to be in any sense therapeutic from the standpoint of
all concerned, it should include a recognition of the wrongful nature of historic events and the
suffering those events have caused, rather than a reinforcement of the conquest myth. . . . When a
court addresses a particular controversy involving an indigenous group, the history of wrongs that
are relevant to the controversy should come to the fore.”).
367. See generally Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims for Reparations, Compensation, and
Restitution in the United States Legal System, in WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH 261 (Roy L. Brooks
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international law into the Court’s original common law articulation of the
United States’ legal relationship with American Indians.368 In looking to
updated international law principles incorporating contemporary human
rights and indigenous peoples’ rights, the Court would not act
inconsistently with its common law history.369
C. Apply the Common Law and White District Court’s Approach to
Find Judicially Enforceable Trust Obligations under the IHCIA
Finally, this Comment proposes that in future interpretations of the
IHCIA’s legal obligations and their sources, scope, and enforceability
under the trust doctrine, courts should center common law and
international law principles described above. This approach both
recognizes the United States’ historic obligations to sovereign tribes and
to American Indians, and it further incorporates the United States’
contemporary obligations under international law. The district court in
White v. Califano provided model jurisprudence consistent with this
approach. If adopted by the Eighth Circuit and subsequently affirmed by
the Supreme Court, then tribes in a similar position to the Rosebud Sioux
Tribe could succeed in future breach of trust claims for equitable relief
under the IHCIA.370
The White district court recognized—and the Eighth Circuit
affirmed—the common law origins of the federal government’s trust duty

ed., 1999) (describing the history of the United States’ dispossession of Indian lands and resources,
and American Indians’ claims for restoration and remediation).
368. See discussion supra Section II.A.1 (detailing Justice Marshall’s incorporation of international law into the common law relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes).
369. Cf. Rey-Bear & Fletcher, supra note 32, at 420 (explaining how the federal trust responsibility originated in international law, and that international law principles could be re-incorporated
into the trust responsibility in useful ways).
370. It would not be possible in the pending Rosebud Sioux Tribe appeal to test this legal theory
and provide model jurisprudence for a future Supreme Court to affirm or reject. The Rosebud district court discussed the sources of trust obligations as expressed in the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie,
the Snyder Act, and the IHCIA, and it accepted that “[t]he United States does owe the Tribe some
duty to provide health care to its members, even if the fiduciary duty judicially enforceable is just
competent physician-led health care based on the construction of the 1868 Treaty of Fort
Laramie . . . .” Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 3d 986, 1001 (D.S.D. 2020).
The Rosebud court did not foreclose judicially enforceable trust duties arising from the IHCIA, and
in fact, stated that there are affirmative duties therein. Id. at 1002 (“This Court recognizes that other
provisions in the IHCIA place affirmative duties on the Government for Indian health care.”). But
the tribe focused its argument for summary judgment on the Congressional Findings and policy
sections of the IHCIA, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1602, which the Rosebud court could not endorse. Id. at
1002. The court thus denied the “more stringent duty contained in § 1602” and granted only the
tribe’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of the treaty language, not the statutory language.
Id. at 1002–03; see also discussion supra Section III.C. The scope and enforceability of the
IHCIA’s trust obligations expressed in its statutory language, therefore, were not issues available
on appeal to the Eighth Circuit in this pending lawsuit.
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to provide health care services to American Indians371 and its subsequent
expression in the IHCIA.372 The respective courts found this affirmative
trust duty sufficed to sustain this specific breach of trust claim.373 But the
White district court also provided a mechanism for analyzing the scope
and enforceability of the trust doctrine under the IHCIA in other similar
cases for plaintiffs seeking equitable relief.374 Essentially, the mechanism
looks to the agency’s regulations for weighing competing priorities
aligned with meeting the IHS’s trust obligation to provide health care
services.375 The regulations prioritize meeting the highest, most urgent
medical needs first.376 Thus, life-sustaining medical services—such as
emergency medical services—should be prioritized when resources are
limited. This mechanism is also consistent with the principles of
international law that recognize health care as a human right and the
obligation of governments to ensure indigenous peoples have access to
necessary services.377
Tribes in a position analogous to that of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe,
whose only provider of emergency medical services is effectively shut
down by IHS for failure to meet appropriate standards of care, could
pursue a deliberate strategy that would encourage a court to employ the
White mechanism in seeking equitable relief for breach of trust claims
under the IHCIA. First, the tribe would need to identify the substantive
371. White v. Califano, 437 F. Supp. 543, 551–55 (D.S.D. 1977) (detailing the history of federal
provision of health care services to American Indians).
372. White v. Califano, 581 F.2d 697, 698 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (“We think that Congress has unambiguously declared that the federal government has a legal responsibility to provide
health care to Indians. This stems from the ‘unique relationship’ between Indians and the federal
government, a relationship that is reflected in hundreds of cases and is further made obvious by the
fact that one bulging volume of U.S. Code pertains only to Indians.” (quoting White, 437 F. Supp.
at 555)).
373. See White, 581 F.2d at 698 (quoting White, 437 F. Supp. at 555) (agreeing that the IHCIA,
grounded in the federal government’s trust obligation to provide health care services to American
Indians, required the IHS to take responsibility for Florence Red Dog’s care).
374. See discussion of White, 437 F. Supp. 543, supra Section III.A, and accompanying notes
164–173 (proposing that the court consider whether the executive branch (i.e., IHS) has acted consistently with Congress’s expressed policy of upholding its affirmative trust obligations, and that
when it falls short, the court look to Congress’s intentions as expressed in statute and the executive
agency’s regulations regarding its priorities).
375. White, 437 F. Supp. at 556 (referencing regulations that set priorities for treatment when
agency officials have limited funds to work with).
376. Id.; see also 42 C.F.R. § 136.12(c) (2020) (“Priorities when funds, facilities, or personnel
are insufficient to provide the indicated volume of services. Priorities for care and treatment, as
among individuals who are within the scope of the program, will be determined on the basis of
relative medical need and access to other arrangements for obtaining the necessary care.”).
377. See discussion of the relevant international legal principles supra Section V.B, and accompanying notes 357–369. The White court did not discuss international law, but its recognition of the
historic relationship between the United States and Indian tribes, as well as its insistence that the
most emergent health care needs be prioritized, are both consistent with the international law principles explained above.
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legal sources in both common law and statute for the government’s trust
duty to provide health care services.378 Then, rather than citing the
aspirational policy language of the IHCIA’s findings and declarations379
as defining the scope of the government’s duty, a tribe with a shuttered
health care facility should cite the IHCIA’s language related to the
provision of specific health care services380 and IHS’s funding,
equipment, and facilities.381 Third, the tribe should cite the regulations
that suggest prioritization of need, following the White court’s
example.382 Together, the tribe could make a persuasive case that the
cumulative effect of the trust doctrine’s common law history, the
IHCIA’s statutory language, and the agency’s implementing regulations
378. The tribe could follow a similar path as the Rosebud Sioux Tribe did for this first step, at
least within the jurisdiction of the Eighth Circuit. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. United States, 450
F. Supp. 3d 986, 996 (D.S.D. 2020) (“The first step in this Court’s analysis then is to look to the
terms of the sources of law put forward and to determine whether a duty exists and the scope of
that duty under applicable Supreme Court precedents.”) The court then reviewed the treaty and
relevant statutes within the context of trust doctrine at common law. Id. at 996–99.
379. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1602.
380. For example, 25 U.S.C. § 1621(a) states:
The Secretary, acting through the Service, is authorized to expend funds . . . for the
purposes of—
....
(5) augmenting the ability of the Service to meet the following health service responsibilities with respect to those Indian tribes with the highest levels of health status deficiencies and resource deficiencies:
(A) Clinical care, including inpatient care, outpatient care . . ., primary care, secondary and tertiary care, and long-term care.
....
(D) Mental health . . . .
(E) Emergency medical services.
Section 1621(c)(1) further states:
Funds appropriated under the authority of this section shall be allocated to Service
units, Indian tribes, or tribal organizations. The funds allocated to each Indian tribe, tribal
organization, or Service unit under this paragraph shall be used . . . to improve the health
status and reduce the resource deficiency of each Indian tribe served by such Service
unit.
Section 1621(d) goes on to indicate:
For the purposes of this section, the following definitions apply:
(1) The term “health status and resource deficiency” means the extent to which—
(A) the health status objectives set forth in sections 1602(1) and 1602(2) of this title
are not being achieved; and
(B) the Indian tribe or tribal organization does not have available to it the health
resources it needs, taking into account the actual cost of providing health care services
given local geographic, climatic, rural, or other circumstances.
Taken together, this section of the IHCIA provides strong indications that the government must
prioritize the highest-level health care needs of the respective tribal communities served by IHS.
381. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1638e(c)(1) (“The Secretary, acting through the Service, shall establish, by regulation, standards for the planning, design, construction, and operation of health care or
sanitation facilities serving Indians under this chapter.”).
382. See sources cited supra note 376.
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support finding an affirmative government duty that includes keeping
IHS emergency medical services open and operating according to the
appropriate standard of care.
Provided the adjudicating court recognized the government’s general
trust duty under common law and the IHCIA to provide health care
services,383 the court could then address (1) the scope of that duty and
(2) whether the government had breached that duty by analyzing the
statute’s language and implementing regulations, as in the White district
court opinion. The tribe could then produce specific evidence to prove its
alleged facts showing a breach of that duty. If this approach prevailed at
the district court level, the court could craft appropriate equitable relief.
Such relief may include ordering the IHS to reopen its emergency
facilities and meet a medical standard of care defined according to federal
public health regulations.
Thus, by following an approach grounded in the trust doctrine’s
common law origins and consistent with the White district court’s
jurisprudence, Indian tribes may be able to establish judicially
enforceable trust obligations for the government to provide specific
health care services. This would also be consistent with the international
law principles described above. Should an appeal from such a case arrive
at the Supreme Court, the Court could then finally recognize judicially
enforceable trust obligations arising under the IHCIA. The Court would
thus act consistently with both the trust doctrine’s historic, common law
origins, as well as with the international law principles recognizing
indigenous peoples’ rights to health care.
To summarize this Comment’s proposal, the Supreme Court should
not consecrate the Jicarilla Apache Nation line of cases through the
reifying gaze of the colonizer. Nor should the Court perpetuate its narrow
understanding of the trust doctrine out of deference to formalist norms
and stare decisis. Precedent does not exist in a historical vacuum. Rather,
the Court should rehabilitate the federal government’s obligations under
the trust doctrine—as already expressed and affirmed in statute—
pursuant to its common law origins as well as through the lens of
reparations for the government’s historic and continuing crimes against
international law. The White district court offered model jurisprudence
for doing so. Tribes that face the suspension of critical IHS services
should pursue a litigation strategy that would encourage courts to follow

383. Currently, this is not the approach of the Ninth Circuit, nor the trend evolving in the Supreme Court’s trust doctrine jurisprudence. See discussion supra Sections IV.A, C. But as previously discussed, the Eighth Circuit and some district courts therein have recognized the general
trust obligation to provide health care services. See discussion supra Section III.A.
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the White district court’s approach, setting up the courts of appeals and
the Supreme Court to affirm.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the federal trust doctrine’s often misunderstood origins, its
imprecise scope under ever-evolving Supreme Court articulations, and its
uncertain enforceability under statutes that explicitly invoke its
obligations to provide services to American Indians, this judicial creation
of the early nineteenth century is worth the Court’s careful attention if it
is to fulfill its potential to redress historic injustices. The trust relationship
between the United States and indigenous Americans developed out of
and as a response to a history of conquest, colonialism, treaty-making and
breaking, military force, federal policymaking, and executive action over
more than four hundred years (and counting). But the Court has divorced
the contemporary meaning of the trust doctrine from its history and its
common law origins. In doing so, it has undermined the United States’
moral and legal obligation to redress the harms caused to American
Indians in innumerable contexts.
In the specific context of health care, the exigency of the Rosebud
Sioux Tribe’s lack of adequate IHS-provided emergency health care
services demands adherence to the district court’s declaratory judgment
to provide competent, physician-led health care to the tribe. The Eighth
Circuit has shown that Indian tribes can enforce this right under the trust
doctrine as expressed in the IHCIA, as well as other common law and
treaty sources. The federal government, however, will likely find a
Supreme Court receptive to the government’s vigorous arguments to the
contrary in its appeal. The most recent Supreme Court cases interpreting
the trust doctrine and its sources, scope, and enforceability—inapposite
as these cases may be to Rosebud—indicate a forceful trend away from
the original common law articulation and objectives that the trust
relationship served.
Justice and a true reading of the trust doctrine require the Court to
radically overhaul its comparatively recent departure in precedent and to
recognize judicially enforceable affirmative trust obligations. The Court
may defy expectations and take this righteous path. Indeed, as Justice
Neil Gorsuch wrote in the majority opinion of McGirt v. Oklahoma,
discussing another facet of the United States’ historically unjust dealings
with American Indians:
[M]any of the arguments before us today follow a sadly familiar pattern.
Yes, promises were made, but the price of keeping them has become
too great, so now we should just cast a blind eye. We reject that thinking. . . . To hold otherwise would be to elevate the most brazen and
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longstanding injustices over the law, both rewarding wrong and failing
those in the right.384

If the Court is willing, as Justice Gorsuch so implied, to correct its
historic injustices with respect to its treatment of American Indians, it can
start by overhauling the federal trust doctrine and realigning it with
foundational common law principles of tribal sovereignty and
international law principles of the rights of indigenous peoples.

384. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2482 (2020).

